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Notes from looking at the microfilm, at Bancroft Library.
In 1989 The National Archives - Pacific Sierra Region begun to archive the local Berkeley history of the Laurence Berkeley National Laboratory for the years 1947-1966. The manuscript collection resided in the University of California Bancroft Library system. These documents previously remained classified as for there sensitive materials relating to new discoveries on nuclear physics. The manuscript collection consisted of 41 reels of microfilm authenticated to their original size and natural color with the best efforts in reproduction for the 300 Million Electron Volt Synchrotron (1947-1966). These documents were first publicly released in 1991 from the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Included were engineering drawings, reports, logs, memorandums, correspondences, notes, photographs, publications and other records pertaining to the project. I limited the breath of my research to a ten year period. I studied 10 complete reels out of the 41 in the collection as for the limitations on time during the spring semester at the University of California. After spending 10 hours looking over these reels, I narrowed my focus to safety in the laboratory. I spent an additional 8 hours on this pursuit. Each reel contained between 400-1000 manuscripts. This indicated that the total mean, a possible 700 individual manuscripts per reel, and was about 28,700 manuscripts. This was a large depository of documentation. The manuscripts were unorganized by day, month or year and appeared only organized by general subject. Reels 1 and 3 gave a collection on the health manuscripts related to increasing safety. These were the only two reels, in which the titled ‘reports’ appeared in the heading. There were no other reels indicated as reports. One of the most difficult things I learned was that in these 10 reels I studied some individual or sets of manuscripts could be directly related to safety issues in general. It was impossible for me to look through the whole collection or to address all the issues. In addition, reels 1 and 3 consisted mostly of financial reports, indicating a lesser amount of these two reels dealt with the issue of safety for the laboratory. Furthermore, in reels 1 and 3 many years were missing. In fact the safety manuscripts were poorly kept. Sometimes I felt like I was searching for a needle in a haystack. The complexities of this issue generated multiple plausible questions. I wish not to invent a reason why most of the safety manuscripts were missing or poorly kept. I wish only to address the issues of what I found. Finally, all I could do was take a sampling of the most documented years in which I studied. These years and this paper concern the laboratory safety from 1949―1959, with the bulk of manuscripts only addressing safety up to year 1955.
Initial authorization for the construction of the 300 Million Electron Volt Synchrotron was issued on August 29, 1946 in a directive by the Manhattan Engineer District office. The Synchrotron was an outgrowth of the 1929 cyclotron, an atom-smashing device and was stationed inside a radiation laboratory on the campus of U.C. Berkeley. The laboratory relocated to a ridge on the mountain by the U.C. Regents determination in 1940 due to safety issues. The laboratory was first situated on the lower main campus and radiation became a safety issue. When the new facility was finished its name became the Laurence Radiation Laboratory LRL. The Synchrotron was built for a new phase stabilization method created by U.C. Berkeley physicists that attempted to “accelerate atoms to 99.994% the speed of light” and then smash them against a silver plated plate.1 Entire sections of the radiation laboratory site on the hill were dedicated to supplying the radiation laboratory with extremely dangerous voltage. This was major project, a safety hazard and many people from contractors to U.C. Students worked at LRL.
1. US Atomic Energy Commission, “300 Million Electron Volt Synchrotron Massive Voltage,” TMs (?) p.1, records related to the 300 Million Electron Volt Synchrotron, 1947-1966, Microfilm, reel 25, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
Atom-smashing machines, such as the new synchrotron, and other atomic nuclear research began to appear throughout the world and were managed by the American government. By 1947, The United States had many atomic and energy related research laboratories. Working in and around national atomic and energy laboratories became a national issue and the U.S. Congress addressed them. These laboratories created new mechanics and no-one knew what to expect in regards to safety. The U. S. Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 which facilitated sharing of safety concerns between these many national and few international laboratories and offices. These comprised of safety bulletins, daily, monthly, annual and periodic reports, as well as high priority safety issues. The governmental department known as U.S. Atomic Energy Commission AEC ran these laboratories. On the national list of 41 AEC research laboratories and facilities, LRL, or its more popular national name called Rad Lab, or just Laboratory, was on this list. The Laboratory became synonymous with the premier research laboratory in the country and was known throughout the world for its atomic discoveries. The LRL began an apparatus of specialized bulletins. One set for the physicists and workers around the radiation areas, another set for the departmental reports for accounting and assessing, a set for general reports for the non-radiation areas, and a set for statistical data of trends and oversight strictly for management. Then there was a directive type of bulletin indicating the new rule called the ACT of 1946.
The Synchrotron began testing operations, called runs, in 1948. In the year 1952, the AEC sends out a bulletin to all of their labs in the world they managed to facilitate free information within their community for the betterment thereof working conductions and to form some safeguards. This began the LRL regulation for responsibility for reporting safety. The LRL received bulletin identification GM-INF-6 as a directive from the AEC on October 31, 1952. This bulletin had a purpose to inform the Laboratory of the new laws pertaining to facilitating the dissemination of “technology information originating with AEC Facilities…,”2 and a scope to provide coordinating reports along with its definition of “sharing technological information for the purposes of all aspects considering new nuclear scientific research”.3
This document was a major advance in safety for these dangerous laboratories. Part of the directive was for laboratories to keep and disseminate pertinent safety and warning information, while the AEC would distribute it to the other laboratories that had similar safety concerns. The scope pertained to encouraging safety awareness by sharing of information between the ‘authors.’ Authors were the lab directors, and/or overseers in charge of the various atomic programs. During the Synchrotron era Edwin McMillan, a long time Berkeley professor, and the co-discoverer of Plutonium on the Berkeley campus, was the head of the Physic’s department and co-author of the Synchrotron experiments. This directive told of his role to provide safety awareness for LRL and issue reports to the AEC. These included sharing information on engineering, nuclear ― radioactive observations on people, and the laboratory’s safety environment. In reel 1, I noticed such safety reports came as bulletins issued to all facility departments as well as the target facility for providing situational observations then recommendations for future solutions.
2 US Atomic Energy Commission, “University of California, Radiation Laboratory,” TMs, October 31, 1952, p.1, records related to the 300 Million Electron Volt Synchrotron, 1947-1966, Microfilm, reel 3, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. The AEC wanted to develop an organized effort to interpret technical developments and management techniques. These management techniques included safety bulletins which were crucial to the new environments and basic safety of constructing new types of buildings and machines. This bulletin was part of the U.S. Congress Section 10(a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. Its purpose serves as a basis authority for the organization and development of activities which facilitate the dissemination outside the atomic energy program of unclassified and declassified technology information originating with AEC Facilities. The Definition of “Technological information” as used in the bulletin is information and interest to American Industry, including (a) pertinent management information and (b) technical information likely to be applicable to process or product development in general history. The scope of the bulletin provides for a program of coordinated reporting of AEC – developed technology of use to American industry involving regular encouragement and assistance to authors and an organized effort to interpret technical developments and management techniques developed in the Atomic energy program, in terms of the potential contributions to the nation’s industrial productivity begun the original use in the Atomic energy program.
3 Ibid., reel 3.
The report, Lost Time Injury Report: January 1 to April 30, 1953, shows an itemize list of department related injuries and body part injuries. The report details calendar days lost, average per day of work hours lost and specific accounts of injuries. These specific instances are reported for the understanding how injuries occur and how to implement corrective management techniques. The departments are separated into four categories with the injured numbers as reported: Research, 1, Facilities, 4, Mechanics Equipment, 2, and Machine Shop, 3. Then the body part injuries are listed numerically: Back, 5, Hand, 1, Knee, 1, Head 2, and Head and Back, 2. Then there are ten reported injuries, with a statistical summery at the end. This report showed 88 reported calendar day’s lost, with an average of 8.8 man-hours per day lost for the period. Specific instances in this report are all non-radiation injuries. A sample recorded, such as “A physicist was working on the side of a cloud chamber, using an I beam for foot support and a ¾ inch water pipe for a hand hold. As he leaned forward from the unit, a cylinder to which to the pipe was connected broke loose, causing him to fall form a height of about 5 feet”.4 This physicist injury report concludes a “Contusion – head Abrasion and puncture mid Sacroiliac region.”5 This physicist misses three days of work. The other nine instances average a six day period of missed work. With each entry are comments for or a result of implementing corrective measures. For this injury, the entry read, “This area is badly congested, and the set of step-stairs were blocked off from use. The employees head struck the end of a generator nearby.
4 US Atomic Energy Commission, “Lost Time Injury Report: January 1 to April 30, 1953,” TMs, May 5, 1953, p.1, records related to the 300 Million Electron Volt Synchrotron, 1947-1966, Microfilm, reel 1, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. However, for roughly a five month period these were not the only reports to be issued. A notation at the bottom of this report give us a clue that some new reports will be issued. “Retain this report. New front sheet and additional injury date sheets will be issued as necessary.” These reports show common maintenance and construction injuries around the laboratory, such as wrong posture when lifting, not obtaining a step stool or latter and then climbing on equipment and falling, or congestion in busy areas.
5 Ibid., reel 1.
A steel platform and a metal ladder have been installed on the cloud chamber.”6 This was a typewritten report sent from the AEC to LRL after the recommendations were concluded. These injuries were common problems. For the sample, here was a good demonstration of not climbing on the machinery where no human support existed. Other illustrations showed workers and physicists being too lazy to grab a step-stool or ladder and instead climbing on unbalanced chairs or non-human supports to reach high places then falling and becoming injured.
Such reports regarding serious injuries were labeled in their title with the words Debilitating or Serious. They appeared conducted with great concern for improving future safety. Serious injury reports contained lengthy analyses of the incidents with investigations conducted by inner and outside AEC personnel. Debilitating reports often showed statistical data itemized for documentation. Serious reports served to inform the atomic community of intricate and complex situational circumstances related to radiation exposure. One case I found in reel 3, and took place in 1959, in the Serious Accident’s bulletin Issue 145. The purpose of this report was to offer substantial fixes to otherwise fatal practices. This was the only radiation accident report I found. It was typed, three pages, and had a bold typeset heading with the prominent term Serious sticking out so the reader would take notice. This style appeared different from normative safety bulletins. This report also was the only report I found with an official Washington safety fire and protection branch address affixed to the end of the report. This made the report seem more official or indeed more critical then the others which had no official addresses on them.
6 Ibid., reel 1.
A new piece of equipment was being designed and certain equipment was turned off manually by the crew because of circuitry complexities. “There were five physicists, two operators and two maintenance men in the accelerator building at the time of the experiment.” 7 They manually had to go into the cell where the Synchrotron beam was located and adjust the beam. When the machine is turned on, radiation fills the cell. It takes roughly two minutes for the radiation to fall below harmful levels after the machine is turned off. At this time the physicists can enter the cell. This was a normal procedure and physics must have attempted this operation tens of thousands of time throughout the Synchrotron era. This described a possible habitual relaxation of safety procedures. When things become a habit, and when we deem that a habit as safe we often forget the dangerous that can pop up at anytime. While adjusting the beam sometimes takes more than one adjustment, the physicists will enter the cell multiple times. They turn the machine on and off and enter only when it is in the shut off position. During one of these times, two physicists named only as A and B had entered the cell and took a radiation measurement, as was the policy for all entries into the cell. The radiation read positive.
7 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, “Serious Accidents The United States Atomic Energy Commission: Physicist Exposed to 1000 R per hour Radiation from an Electron accelerator,” TMs, March 23, 1959, p.1 – 3, records related to the 300 Million Electron Volt Synchrotron, 1947-1966, Microfilm, reel 3, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. Four tungsten beam defining plates were manually set in the electron beam path one at a time. When placed into position, the four plates, two horizontal and two vertical, define the aperture. Beam position is controlled by adjustments of steering magnets. Each plate was placed into position with the beam off. A Photomultiplier tube with Sodium Iodide Crystal was used to monitor the beam position. Tungsten plate #1 was rotated into position; the beam turned on, focused and positioned, and turned off. The beam “ON” time in this maneuver and in the four following adjustments was approximately one minuet. A Jordon betagamma survey meter ( range .01 mr/hr to 104 R/hr) and gas monitor (Sensitive ionization chamber used to measure gaseous N13 and O15) was then used by physicist A& B entering the cell to survey the area. A reading of 1mr/hr was noted at the site of tungsten plate #1 which was the maximum reading in the area. The gas monitor showed no activity. While in the cell , plate #1 was removed and plate #2 placed. They went out and the beam was turned on for one minuet, beam aligned and turned off. A & B entered the cell, monitored area, changed plates, then left the cell. Instruments showed same readings as previously. A third run duplicated the two previous runs. After the sixth run, which was five minuets’ duration, physicist A and B entered the cell with instruments. At the entrance to cell, the gas monitor registered a high reading and when introduced into the cell, it went off the scale. At this point, both men left the cell area immediately. Since the gas monitor was an ionization chamber, it also measured external gamma radiation and no conclusive evidence as to whether or not activity was gaseous could be evidence in view of the additional fact that the Jordon meter also showed a high reading. While discussing this turn of events with other physicists, physicist A left the group and entered the cell with a Jordan meter to determine the dose rate in the area where the beam locator plates were set. He brought the meter to the target area and, after obtaining a 1000 R/hr meter reading immediately left the area. This situation happened ten years after the synchrotron experiments begun. This demonstrates problems with the safety bulletins being an agent to inform on safety procedures and regulations. Physicist A should not have re-entered the cell after the initial high mr. reading. He should have known of this type of danger.
“At the entrance to cell, the gas monitor registered a high reading and when introduced into the cell, it went off the scale.”8 Both left the cell, but physicist A returned to make a further reading and was exposed for over a minute with dangers levels of high radiation. Unbeknownst to the crew, a circuitry malfunction created a situation in where the beam was still fluxing out radiation. This problem occurred ten years prior to this accident in graduate daily Synchrotron logs. However, this was fixed and apparently the physicists became too confident or comfortable thinking that no breakage of any parts could happen. This constituted the habitual relaxation. The continued pulse of the beam, because of malfunction, was not a thought in the minds of the crew that day. When the accident occurred the opening of the chamber lock of the cell radiation released radiation into the main control area of the laboratory and all who were present received variable doses of radiation.
All five members at the experiment that day were exposed to about 200 KEV energy gamma radiation. Physicist A received 41R and was indefinitely removed from LRL and the report ends with him under doctor observation. Physicist B received 400 mr. and all others received less than 50 mr. The report indicated the failed procedures of physicist A. The report further concluded he should not have gone back into the cell after the initial high mr. reading. The bulletin at the time of its release reported no conclusive cause for the accident and was still under investigation. This was a normal procedure without disassembling the Synchrotron for the diagnosis. An addendum note was affixed to the bottom of the bulletin and gave me clue to the cause when I was looking over the daily logs.
8 Ibid., reel 3.
“An AEC Headquarters Nuclear Physicist consulted the matter states that from information presented, it would appear that power was still on to some of the pulse cells in the machine, radiation levels recorded would hardly exist for a significant time. He further stated that faulty circuitry is known to have caused a similar occurrence in another machine of comparable type.” 9 These same problems existed ten years earlier when I looked at the daily Synchrotron logs. Frequent problems of various circuitry and parts often occurred. The AEC should have knowledge to malfunctioning of the synchrotron as these earlier logs were reported. There should have been increased awareness of possible random malfunction. This agreed with the final analysis’ cause by the AEC Nuclear Physicist, but no mention of the earlier malfunctions related to warning precautions were in the 1959 report. Periodic malfunctioning of the Synchrotron appeared in the graduate logs in the reels of 37-40.
Reels 37-40 dealt with synchrotron dailies which were logs kept by graduate students. These manuscripts were in handwriting and dealt with results from experiments from 1948 to 1952, problem solving and logging test runs. In these reels there appeared frequent shut downs for repairs due to malfunctions. Each student appraised the daily situation by writing in hand the assumed problems and then offering proposals for fixings or for warning the next shift-person not to run the machine until maintenance was performed. Generally students writing mostly appeared in normal hand written font, but warning messages were scribed in oversize script. In reel 40, on October, 31, 1952, one student wrote, “Looked for beam – nothing but florescence…. Very jittery…shut down…” there was “a leak at 10 N gage trap.”10
9 Ibid., reel 3.
10 US Atomic Energy Commission, “Synchrotron Dailies,” DS, vol., VII, October 31, 1952 – Dec 17, 1953, p.1, records related to the 300 Million Electron Volt Synchrotron, 1947-1966, Microfilm, reel 40, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. Leaks were often reported in the early period and this led me to understand that problems can pop up at anytime as I illustrated with the March 23, 1959 Serious Accident report.
In reel 39, On March 16, 1948, one student wrote he heard a “Bang,” and he scribed this message in an exaggerated script to warn next operator.11 On March 4, 1949 the a student shuts down the Synchrotron with the message to the next operator “Things are getting serious.”12 On run number 108, June 17, 1949 the student named Newman wrote “Scared myself! That the R.F. cavity was breaking down …I was observing light radiated by the electrons.”13 On April 30th a student recorded “spark flurries.”14 These types of commentaries in the logs appeared often and I could not account for all the shut downs of the machine, as it would take up this entire report. These logs indicated something very serious in regards to safety. At anytime things could go wrong. These logs indicated the beam pulses would continue due to leaks and circuitry malfunctions. By October 6, 1949 logs appear as an official stamps recording runs of the machine. I notice continual breakdowns had occurred. At this time separate AEC manuscripts showed security and safety notices to high officials ordering them to document safety. What did this tell me about the March 23, 1959, radiation accident?
Between 1949 and 1951 the synchrotron was periodically disassembled to make repairs. These logs indicated the machine was never in consistent operating condition but needed frequent and sometimes extensive maintenance. This was a safety concern. Leaks sometimes created visual radiation, and sometimes not.
11 US Atomic Energy Commission, “Synchrotron Dailies,” DS, March 16, 1948, p.1 , records related to the 300 Million Electron Volt Synchrotron, 1947-1966, Microfilm, reel 39, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
12 US Atomic Energy Commission, “Synchrotron Dailies,” DS, March 4, 1949, p.1, records related to the 300 Million Electron Volt Synchrotron, 1947-1966, Microfilm, reel 39, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
13 US Atomic Energy Commission, “Synchrotron Dailies,” DS (?) p.1, records related to the 300 Million Electron Volt Synchrotron, 1947-1966, Microfilm, reel 39, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
14 US Atomic Energy Commission, “Synchrotron Dailies,” DS, April 30, 1949, p.1, records related to the 300 Million Electron Volt Synchrotron, 1947-1966, Microfilm, reel 39, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
Physicist A should have been made aware by the AEC of the frequent malfunctions of earlier years as recorded by the graduate students. I found no documentation to support a case where physicists were shown these bulletins. This could have warned the physicists about possible dangers of random malfunctions. Another solution by the AEC stated that there needed to be a radiation expert present at all times and to oversee physicists so they do not randomly enter the cell without proper procedures. This accident didn’t need to happen. The graduate logs produced valuable information to the frequency of malfunctions of the machine. But they didn’t tell me about the overall safety of the labs and the impact of the safety bulletins. I decided to look for some statistical reports.
The next type of safety reports came as statistical records. These records helped keep the AEC apprised of trends in safety. I hoped these reports would show me some conclusive evidence as to how dangerous or not was the LRL. These bulletins were for the authors and the AEC. There were two reports categorizing 41 AEC laboratories and offices with safety data dealing with severity of injuries, man-hours lost and total disabling injuries. Both were typed and one page each, both summarized the year 1955, with some data included for the previous year. These titles were under the heading of Disabling Injury Experience of Contractors and AEC Offices, and had annual adjusted statistics for easy computations. The two years included were 1954 and 1955. For the year of 1955 the LRL rated fifth highest out of 41 international and national laboratories and offices in severity rate injuries.15 “One Berkeley injury resulted in 130 days of lost time.”16
15 US Atomic Energy Commission, “Disabling Injury Experience of Contractors and AEC Offices,” TMs, 1955, p.1-2, records related to the 300 Million Electron Volt Synchrotron, 1947-1966, Microfilm, reel 1, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
16 Ibid., reel 1.
This was compared to the second highest severity rate in 1555 in which another laboratory run by U.C. Berkeley had “Three Livermore injuries resulted in 57 days lost.”17 This told me that LRL had an extremely dangerous environment for the 1955 period. The same report also stated that LRL lead the severity rate category the previous year (1954).
There is a distinction in severity of an injury and the debilitating injuries. Severity is the measure of seriousness of an injury, whereas debilitating injuries can range from a swollen knee or a minor cut in which man hours were lost for recuperation. LRL was sufficiently in the lower range for total number of injuries in comparison to the other 41 facilities for the year 1955.
The other statistical report and the only general reporting that spans any significance in years I found was Disabling Accidents Per Million Man Hours reports of 1955. I decided to correlate these findings to another report I found that dealt only with population statistics to see if I could gather some valuable information from these comparisons. This report’s title was The growth of the Laboratory Man-hours Work, and was typewritten and had a tables delineating the data. The growth of the Laboratory report showed the steady inclination of employment from 2,000,000 man hours in 1947, and continuously rising each year to the end of the flow chart in 1958 where number of employee man hours reached 9,790,000.18 This document I compared to the Disabling Accidents report which showed a decrease of disabling injuries from the years 1951 to 1955.19
17 Ibid., reel 1.
18 US Atomic Energy Commission, “The growth of the Laboratory Man-hours Work,” TMs (?) p.1, records related to the 300 Million Electron Volt Synchrotron, 1947-1966, Microfilm, reel 3, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
19 US Atomic Energy Commission, “Radiation Laboratory Disabling Accident Summery Calendar Year 1955,” TMs, 1955, p.1, records related to the 300 Million Electron Volt Synchrotron, 1947-1966, Microfilm, reel 1, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
Disabling Accidents per million man-hours, man-hours hours lost per million man-hours.
Disabling Accident Per million man-hours
days lost per million man-hours
Radiation Laboratory Disabling Accident Summery Calendar Year
This could not be a definitive comparison of the effectiveness of the safety bulletins for the years 1951―1955 as correlated to the same continual increase in population of the Growth of the Laboratory report, for the same abridged period. There was definitely a gradually increase in man-hours for the periods between 1951―1955. The number of employees significantly rose and the disabling statistics showed an average decrease in the number of injured employees and lost hours. However, more people could have been employed as this data I could not find. Years 1956, 1957, and 1958 were missing as I could not find them too. The data was not complete and I wanted to reach my goal of 1959. Another disappointment I found was the total disabling injuries for 1955 as cited in the Disabling Injury Experience of Contractors and AEC Offices report, I could not find a single bulletin concerning any incident of the number of person injuries that were listed as I did with the Lost Time Injury Report: January 1 to April 30, 1953 . In the same manner, I found one bulletin for 1953 with individual cases, but I could not find the Disabling Injury Experience of Contractors and AEC Offices report for that year. It seemed my search was a failure ―many long hours with no important discoveries.
Also I found the Synchrotron was up and running two years before the AEC began accumulating data. This documentation was found in the manuscripts of the graduate logs. I looked at and that accounting for this period. It was not kept well at the AEC or at LRL. The general archive date told me that Synchrotron era continued until 1966. This indicated most of the safety data for the Synchrotron was either lost, or I couldn’t find it and/or could it be buried and mislabeled in other reels, or some were burnt or missing. Burnt edges appeared on all documents in reel 25. Reel 7 did have some safety records dealing with years 1952 and 1953 but I ran out of time for my search to apprise them. It is here that further research could be conducted.
There was not enough evidence to make a decisive overall judgment on the Synchrotron era safety data in the manuscripts. However, a precise conclusion for the period of 1949-1959 can be concluded. I found radiation and malfunctions of high-voltage circuitry contributed to some serious radiation injuries at LRL. If the 1955 Disabling Accident reports were correct noting no other substantiated evidence existed in these archives, then I can claim that a decrease of injuries occurred directly proportional to the increase of the employee population for those years 1951 to 1955. This made the Laboratory safer. I could claim this because this was a full summery I found and I compared it with similar data of man-hour growth. This means I could show change with the conclusion that the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission bulletins and procedures following the Congressional Act of 1946 helped LRL employees to a better road to safety.
Before embarking on this project, I had no knowledge of the U.C. Berkeley Radiation Laboratory or its history. I was only interested in who were the founders of plutonium, and these curiosities lead me to the LRL and Synchrotron. The only truth claim that I can come up with about the era of the Synchrotron and these many women and men who were injured sacrificed themselves for the betterment of mankind; the focus of creating atomic physics for creating better atomic weaponry had moved away to Livermore and Los Alamos laboratories before the era of the Synchrotron took place. Many people know about the atomic lore of the 1940s and how Berkeley physicists discovered plutonium and were instrumental in the manufacturing the first Atomic weapons. This paper did not address that issue. This was a different era. During the Synchrotron era Edwin McMillan was a staunch advocate for creating peaceful purposes for Atomic Physics and the ground breaking phase stability machine made possible high energy physics which helped create many new advances in nuclear medicine and health related issues which are in use today all over the world. This concludes my research paper.
1. Radiation Laboratory Disabling Accident Summery Calendar Year 1955………..13
US Atomic Energy Commission. “300 Million Electron Volt Synchrotron Massive Voltage.” TMs (?) p.1. Records related to the 300 Million Electron Volt Synchrotron, 1947-1966, Microfilm, reel 25, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
US Atomic Energy Commission. “University of California, Radiation Laboratory.” TMs, October 31, 1952, p.1. Records related to the 300 Million Electron Volt Synchrotron, 1947-1966, Microfilm, reel 3, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
US Atomic Energy Commission. “Lost Time Injury Report: January 1 to April 30, 1953.” TMs, May 5, 1953, p.1. Records related to the 300 Million Electron Volt Synchrotron, 1947-1966, Microfilm, reel 1, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. “Serious Accidents The United States Atomic Energy Commission: Physicist Exposed to 1000 R per hour Radiation from an Electron accelerator.” TMs, March 23, 1959, p.1 – 5. Records related to the 300 Million Electron Volt Synchrotron, 1947-1966, Microfilm, reel 3, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
US Atomic Energy Commission. “Synchrotron Dailies.” DS, vol., VII, October 31, 1952 – Dec 17, 1953, p.1. Records related to the 300 Million Electron Volt Synchrotron, 1947-1966, Microfilm, reel 40, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
US Atomic Energy Commission. “Synchrotron Dailies.” DS, March 16, 1948, p.1. Records related to the 300 Million Electron Volt Synchrotron, 1947-1966, Microfilm, reel 39, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
US Atomic Energy Commission. “Synchrotron Dailies.” DS, March 4, 1949, p.1. Records related to the 300 Million Electron Volt Synchrotron, 1947-1966, Microfilm, reel 39, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
US Atomic Energy Commission. “Synchrotron Dailies.” DS, (?) p.1. Records related to the 300 Million Electron Volt Synchrotron, 1947-1966, Microfilm, reel 39, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
US Atomic Energy Commission. “Synchrotron Dailies.” DS, April 30, 1949, p.1. Records related to the 300 Million Electron Volt Synchrotron, 1947-1966, Microfilm, reel 39, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
US Atomic Energy Commission. “Disabling Injury Experience of Contractors and AEC Offices.” TMs, 1955, p.1-2. records related to the 300 Million Electron Volt Synchrotron, 1947-1966, Microfilm, reel 1, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
US Atomic Energy Commission. “The growth of the Laboratory Man-hours Work.” TMs (?) p.1. Records related to the 300 Million Electron Volt Synchrotron, 1947-1966, Microfilm, reel 3, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
US Atomic Energy Commission. “Radiation Laboratory Disabling Accident Summery Calendar Year 1955.” TMs, 1955, p.1. Records related to the 300 Million Electron Volt Synchrotron, 1947-1966, Microfilm, reel 1, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
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