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The Rise of a Super Power

From 16th position of a worlds most powerful miltiary to number 1 describes the monumental effort the U.S.A. to sacrifice and to bravery in World Wars I and II.

2032008 thread one master [updated 07272009]

Strand One: U.S.A. From A Nobody To A Superpower

By Michael Johnathan McDonald

The Rise of the United States of America (Rise of a Global Power)

          A. Rise of United States as a Global Power

         UN Charter, San Francisco, June 1945

         Chalmers Johnson, Blowback (2000)

         Niall Ferguson, Colossus (2003)

         “Empire of Liberty”

·          Hitler

·          Munich 1938 ( Munich Agreement/Crisis)  ( Key word “appeasement”) Chamberlin negotiation.

·          Appeasement

·          German- Soviet Non-Aggression Pact

·          Riestage Fire Decree – Hitler took power

·          Operation Barbarossa

·          War of Machines

The American Oasis

·        Neutrality Acts

·        Isolationism

·        American First Committee

·        Internationalism

·        Four Freedoms

Meaning of the Holocaust

·        Steamship St. Louis 1939

·        “The Jew Deal”

·        Bataan death March

·        Siege of Leningrad

·        The Final Solution

American Way of War

·        Lend-lease

·        Arsenal of Democracy

·        Battle of Leningrad

·        Air War

·        Operation Radar

History of Bombing

          Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, 1921

          Hague Conference, 1922-23

          Guernica, 1937

          The London Blitz

          Area/Terror Bombing

          Precision Bombing

          Dresden, Feb 13, 1945

War in the Pacific

          Why did the United States use atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki?

War in the Pacific

          Pearl Harbor: Day of Infamy versus Military Necessity

          Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere

          “Yellow Peril”

          “Take No Prisoners!”

          Incendiary Bombs

          General Curtis LeMay

          Total War

Why Hiroshima & Nagasaki?

          1 – The atom bomb & military necessity

          2 – The atom bomb & racism

          3 – The atom bomb & the Soviet Union

          4 – The atom bomb & U.S. global strategy

          Admiral Ralph Ofstie, 1949

1 – The atom bomb and military necessity.

          The atomic bomb can’t be explained by military necessity. It is unclear what military effect it had in terms of the timing of the surrender. Some scholars stress that the Soviet entry into the war made an even bigger impression on the Japanese leadership.

2 – The atom bomb and racism.

          American war-making in the Pacific was influenced by the view that the Japanese people as a race were not fully human. But there is little evidence demonstrating that race was a specific factor in the decision to drop the bomb. There is also significant counter-evidence. For example, there is every reason to believe that the Americans would have dropped an atom bomb on Germany if the Germans had not surrendered before it was ready to go.

3 – The atom bomb and the Soviet Union.

          Was the real purpose of the bomb to frighten the Soviet Union? There is plenty of evidence that Truman hoped the bomb would “make Russia more manageable.” In that sense, it might be called the first shot of the cold war. But the record is pretty clear that Truman and his aides saw the defeat of Japan as the first order of business, and ordered the use of atom bombs for that purpose.

4 – The atom bomb and American strategy

          Truman and his aides never thought that they had a decision to make. If the atom bomb was ready to go, Truman was going to use it against America’s enemies. And in the summer of 1945, that was Japan. The decision was never in doubt. That is what is true about the official story.

          Over the course of World War Two, American strategic thinking had been guided by the principle of minimum cost to American lives, maximum destruction of enemy lives (including, if necessary, civilian “enemies”).  Hiroshima and Nagasaki took this principle to its conclusion.[1]

3 – Super Soldiers on Chemicals: USA & Germany's methamphetamine addiction.

          drugs were created in Japan in 1938, a type one banned Crystal Meth. FDR during the Pearl Harbor attacks, first went to his medicine Cabinet and grabbed his 8- ball of Cocaine , real archives uncovered in the last 10 years shows this as a fact and not a rumor. Hitler= Meth addict. 10% Germany pop addicted by 1941 to Pervitin ( crystal Meth created by Japanese in 1938 and brought to Germany, to public first on all street corners, 1941, NAZI general asks Mil to have pills for his soldiers. This becomes the Blitzkrieg (German, "lightning war") and the 3 day and night Lightening war on Moscow, that overwhelmed Stalin. 3 days before Hitler's death, he dismisses his meth doctor, so he crashed and burned.USA made counterpart, called bennies. These were argued that soldiers could stay up and fight for days and night  and kill more people.  Rommel ordered 600,000 tablets of Meth for North African campaign, historical records. Montgomery pleaded to Washington to make Bennies so he could compete.Industrial Germany wanted mini subs that take two days underwater, loud noises form engine.  So the 'drug cocktail' was powder coke, liquid coke, morphine and Crystal Meth.  No  one , not even the NAZIs , know of the outcome, not one of their test pilots of mini subs returned to tell a tale.After the war both Germany and Europe got black market Meth crystal forms, they had two factories one for mil and the other for general population.  This eventually became a U.S. problem with Sinaloa  95% Crystal meth being preferred immigration policies  of the  rich Arabs, Africans and Latinos that make up 99% of California’s population.Cocaine made up a part of the secret recipe in Coca Cola before 1973 and Nixon's ban on narcotics. I knew two  brothers who  mother dated Jimmy Hendrix, she was  addicted to two six-packs a day of Coca Cola.
 

Area/Terror Bombing

History of Bombing

           Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, 1921

           Hague Conference, 1922-23

           Guernica, 1937

           The London Blitz

           Area/Terror Bombing

           Precision Bombing

           Dresden, Feb 13, 1945

History of Bombing – Terror from the Sky – a unique peculiarity beginning in the twentieth century

Area Bombing: First rationalization for terroristic civilian bombing first appeared in Italian Giulio Douhet’s [2]work, “The Command of the Air” (1921). In 1911, the Italian war against Libyan military,[3] the first Arial bombs burst brought devastation and prophetic affects. The phosphorus compound of what is commonly called incendiary bombs clung to people and buildings, as tested.   As difficult to extinguish, and as prophetic in symbolism, these new military tactics of terrorizing from the sky preempted the next two world wars in what would become understood as devastating destruction upon masses of human lives. Area bombing was something that was done at night, and the strategy prompted to drop as much tonnage as possible on cities – that is also to say too –   to kill as many women, as many children, and as general convention as much of the human population as possible in these  civilian settings. It was a terrorist tactic, understood in those terms, and it demonstrated a new paradigm in modern warfare.  As paradigm, mass-murder by terror from the skies initiated a new scientific field for conquest and subjugation.  It was used for racism, for tactical purposes, and for general scientific understanding of human carnage and suffering. It acted as revengeful, spiteful and conciliatory reactionism. The common  regarded claim was visceral revenge. As well, a myth that area bombing put an end to the NAZI government remains in extent in common discourse today.  Consistent bombing in the eastern section of the German theater failed to meet its directives. As consequence, the Russian army sent in ground troops and waged a hard, face to face battle against resisting German troops in the Berlin subway.  German resistance in the east lasted until the end. The bitter battle on the ground decided the end of World War Two in the European theater, and not the mythical area-bombing of the civilians. This is called forbidden discourse. Although, claimed by Churchill, area-bombing’s objective was to cut-off oil and communication lines; yet after the British information act passed which allowed top-secret documents to be viewed by the public, the truth became known. The forbidden discourse foretells Churchill fostering civilian resistance and visceral revenge for the bombing of London Campaign by the NAZIs, by area-bombing of many civilian targets.  After World War Two, a panel of western strategists reevaluated and debated the war planner’s decision making process to question the mass-murder of civilians – a claim that the civilians, argued by the war planners,  would rise up and overthrow the NAZI government. This panel won each argument citing that there was no necessity to target any civilian towns and cities. One of the major arguments lay in that part of the German theater where the area-bombing campaign was heavy, which was the western part of Germany.  The Germans undersupplied, and badly spread-out over Europe,  and conquered -- were already on retreat, using children to fight-on because of a shortage of military –age manpower.  The entire conquested territories had been liberated and the enemy destroyed. This is to say that the area-bombings took place in the last months of World War Two, in the European theater, when it was not necessary. The bombing of Hamburg in July 1943 is when The Royal Air Force (RAF) and the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) Joined forces in supporting area-bombing. A fire-storm, typical of area- bombing exterminated much of the civilian population. Fire-storms created by area-bombing can reach a sustained one-thousand degrees. As fire storm, oxygen is sifted upward into the atmosphere, consumed by the flames, and the people suffocate to death below.  When Truman decided to area-bomb Tokyo, using these incendiary bombs, the project was promoted in such an understanding that knowing most Japanese households had constructed rice-paper and wood structures – therefore the decision to you phosphorous incendiary bombs ideally fit the terrorist tactics implicated as stratagem. This can be explained why most of the documents of the United States of America have never or probably will never be made available to the public and historians. As significance, area-bombings by both German and British military stiffened resistance for support of the war effort on both sides.

Douhet’s rationalized the new modes of warfare in his influential treaty on air superiority when he wrote that targeting civilians and the enemy state could be quickly broken, thus establishing a new principle of the aerial warfare. Douhet’s influence could be felt in the area bombing tactics commanded by Winston Churchill on many German cities and towns in the last months of the war, while the Germans were significantly weakened and in full retreat, and Truman’s commands of area bombing of Tokyo after the Japanese were in full retreat, weakened significantly and close to surrender. The United States of America remains uncommitted to release millions of World War Two documents pertaining to decisions such as bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki, area bombing of Tokyo, as well as German cities. While the British legislated an act to release some of the World War Two document, we have sense found terroristic tactics were pressed from the highest ranking officials in the British government. As forbidden discourse, that is to say, these subjects or topics remain off-limits in official political debates and venues, an historian’s role is to seek out the evidence to causalities and relate the underpinnings of previously unknown knowledge.

The first real demonstration of area bombing resulted in the 1937 bombing in northern Spain of the town of Guernica[4] (April 26, 1937,), where over a thousand civilians lost their lives to aerial bombardment.[5] Pablo Picasso  painted a testimony to  an anti-area bombing event in a mural called the “Guernica,” as to commissioned a centerpiece for the Spanish Pavilion of the 1937 World's Fair. Contorted figures are gazing upward toward intended death of aerial bombardment, a prophetic piece, in and of itself, thus predating these massive British and U.S. area-bombings in Europe and in Asia. As Operation Rügen, German and Italian air combat forces combined area bombing raid during the Spanish Civil War. Planes of the German Luftwaffe "Condor Legion" and subordinate Italian Fascists from the Corpo Truppe Volontarie gave historians a glimpse into this new “The Command of the Air” stratagem, by striking civilians as targets to place fear into their midst in hopes that they will retaliate against the ruling forces or as a message to submit to the forces that bombed them. New York Times reporters visited Guernica to get a first hand on the devastation, concluding that Basque architecture and civilian buildings were not necessary military targets.  In 1937 Roosevelt commented on the sickening bombing related to terrorist tactics from the sky, that is to say he was referencing this new area-bombing military tactic.[6] On the onset of World War II, in 1939, Roosevelt again condemned savage bombardment, which would not be heeded by later military leaders or his vice president.[7] In “FDR: A Biography” (Simon & Schuster, 1985) Ted Morgan argues that Roosevelt facilitated the production of the atomic bomb and ordered production of germ-chemicals for warfare purposes. Notwithstanding the implications on morality, the Germans who used chemical-germ gas to murder their opposition (mainly the Jews in the eastern death-camps), decisions made at the top-ranks of the NAZIs refused to use chemical-warfare against the allied forces – although, they were well equipped to do so if they willing chose too.

Japan became the next international outrage by indiscriminate bombing, the bombardment of Shanghai in 1932 and then onward to other towns and cities of China. As with Guernica, the U.S. newspapers reported to the general American population.  As result of communication by the print media, international outrage affected public discourse. This can explain todays and continuing non-release of World War Two documents that could help explain the secret missions to area-bomb cities in our world.

Hitler wanted nothing more than to make the British submit to Germany. In September 1940 he put his wishes into action with area-bombing in what was normally called the Battle of Britain, beginning in July of that year. [8] An estimated 63,000 deaths were attributed to area-bombing campaigns on London, Birmingham, Coventry, Sheffield, Liverpool, Hull, Manchester, Portsmouth, Plymouth and Southampton. Area bombing took on many identifications, such as carpet bombing, saturation bombing, mass-bombing, area-bombing, and most accurate of the identification were “ terror” bombing in which released documents of World War II by the British Archives reveals Winton Churchill favored the later identification when speaking of the relevancy of such tactics against German cities. Another name appeared to be used that is used today but with a different denotation: Precision bombing.  At this time, technology by dropping bombs had stipulations. First, air superiority had to be established. That meant, the enemies air-force needed to be destroyed first before clear-sky bombing could take place. If not the case, and as with most aerial bombing raids of World War Two, bombing at night and during cloud cover were desired circumstances for the safety of the crew. What does this mean? This meant  that precision was difficult to non-existent. As well, wind-currents, poor-maps, poor information were also key factors in bombs not reaching military targets, and subsequently falling off their intended mark.

Admiral Ralph Ofstie, 1949

Ralph Andrew Ofstie (16 November 1897 – 19 November 1956)

On October 11, 1949 Rear Admiral Ofstie testified before a committee stated:  "strategic air warfare, as practiced in the past and as proposed for the future, is militarily unsound and [s] of limited effect, [and] is morally wrong, and is decidedly harmful to the stability of a post-war world."  This discussion was related to Admiral Arthur Radford's infamous "Revolt of the Admirals".[9]

As result of the Revolt of the Admirals,[10]  “[I]n November 1943, General of the Army George C. Marshall called for post-war unification of the Department of War and the Department of the Navy. His action led to what became known as the "unification debates" and the eventual passage of the National Security Act of 1947. That Act reorganized the military, creating a unified National Military Establishment (renamed the Department of Defense shortly after), the National Security Council (NSC), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and an independent United States Air Force (which became its own military branch after being part of the Army). The generals of the newly-formed Air Force proposed the doctrine that strategic bombing, particularly with nuclear weapons, was all that would be needed to win any future war. To support such a doctrine, the Air Force would need to build a large fleet of long-range heavy bombers; the generals argued that their projects should receive large amounts of funding, beginning with the B-36 Peacemaker bomber.”[11]

Pacific War

The Battles for Prosperity

Pearl Harbor: The Day of Infamy  Verses Military Necessity

Dynamics: The Japanese Perspective:

Japanese felt dominated by an American Policy. After World War I ( a.k.a. The Great War), the United States of America failed on a promise of allowing Japanese immigration into the United States of America. As with British’s failed promise to Italy on trade access in the Mediterranean and some sections of North Africa – resulting in a national reactionism and the March on Rome ( later constituting Fascism), Japan reacted by planning a larger operation than just Pearl Harbor.  Japan planned a retribution war to end all wars and domination by the British, The United States of America, and other western identified civilizations.

Roosevelt did not know in advance of the attack on Pearl Harbor. However, the American Japanese diplomat returned to America with an understanding that an attack by the Japanese was being planned on America, eventually. The United States of America was in the process of funding, supporting and facilitating Chinese national resistance against Japan's military incursions and arial bombings in China -- to aquire raw materials and finanial means to build a state of the art Japanese Navy and Airforce. That is a general observation on planning – there appeared no specifics as Roosevelt was embroiled in keeping himself in power, and promising American jobs after the New Deal had illustrated itself as a massive failure ( it only paid down the debt a little but unemployement was not changed). Still, we must investigate why the United States of America as led by Roosevelt implemented an oil blockade and reversed military–parts trade act with the Japanese. Part of this can be explained in the Roosevlet plan to switch alligences to the Chinese National Forces, before Pearl Harbor.

As perspective, the Japanese sought to liberate the Asian Pacific of the colonialist westerners. French, Russian, U.S.A. and Britain owned islands in the Pacific with intent on economic opportunities in China (as well as others, some forced out of these opportunities by these countries).  Previously, on the return of a United States trading mission the previous year, Matthew Perry and company forced the Tokugawa to agree to the 1854 Kamagawa Treaty, a treaty that had been bargained by U.S.A. military threat of force. This began an era of western domination of the Pacific, as the United States of America drained silver and precious minerals from the Japanese homelands, eventually moving onward to China – the main economic zone.  Capitalists in America had been badgering U.S.A. officials to gain access to the “treasures” of China. It was in the sixteenth century that Philip II of Spain's plans were to open up China, due to polonesian myths of gold feilds.

Like Spanish colonial missions in the Pacific two centuries before, China was rumored to be “the” economic zone most cherished of earth’s possible economic zones. As Japan benefited form U.S.A. arms sales since the Meiji period, and had discovered by empirical observation of colonial benefits from the U.S.A. adventures, Japan invaded China with the same imperialist motives which sparked a U.S.A reaction to threaten to cut-off oil supplies by various stages in the 1930s. In desperation, Japan planned a larger reaction than just an attack upon Pearl Harbor. Malaya and the Dutch East Indies were controlled by the westerns, and the minerals to make rubber and oil reserves were a vital necessity for Japanese industrialization and for continuing production for war against China. Japan bitterly upset that westerners controlled their destiny, their agency, and their “supposed” traditional regions, set out to ascertain the islands and regions. Although, allowing oil to Japan continued until 1940, the regulation on Japanese agency from the Tokugawa period onward prompted the Japanese to finally react nationality.[12]

In 1939, F.D.R. promoted the propaganda of what is called the “Good Neighbor Policy.” He spoke of the area in the Western Hemisphere and everywhere in the world. However, economically dominating the Pacific and the Far-East remained a forbidden presidental discourse, and it was a U.S.A. policy for the capitalist president.

The Pearl Harbor Attack, 7 December 1941 was part of a larger operation which saw the Japanese invade various Indonesian islands,[13] and the Philippines[14] on which U.S.A. service men were stationed. The March of the Bataan[15] resulted in U.S.A.  outrage when concurrently with the attack upon Pearl Harbor raids on U.S.A. forces in South Asia were simultaneously conducted. As outrage, The March of the Bataan ,[16] conducted  during the winter and early spring of 1942, part of the Battle of the Philippines (1941–42), during World War II,  was the transference  of 90,000 to 100,000 American and Filipino prisoners of war and placing them in death-camps, discoursed as prisoner camps. As news surfaced and was reported back to the United States of America, racism played a major role as reflection – a reaction—to the starvation, decapitation, torture and brutality shown all the prisoners of war held by the Japanese forces.  At this time in America history, Japanese were viewed as giants by the United States of American citizenry, brutal giants depicted in posters—appearing mean and domineering over the United States of American citizenry. The Japanese viewed the United States of Americans, the British and the Russians as the white colonial races who dominated or sought to continue to dominate the world – more dangerously the Asian Pacific. The significance of the March of Bataan resulted in a “take no prisoner” policy played out in Marine training manuals. The racial connotation of the White race against the Asian race predominated military and civilian literature. Evidence shows there was no understanding of each-sides view from the others’ perspective. Each side wanted the resources for capitalism in the south pacific, a limited resource for both by quantity for one-side. Rubber, which made its developmental impact in the twentieth century, and of oil, which ran industrialization, facilitated civilization. Racism operated as myth, played a justifiable illusion to cover-up reality of a small-world. Racism made it easier to demonfy the enemy and conduct massive death battles. At first, Japan was depicted as the Goliath, and the United States played the underdog role of David, in biblical symbology. After the war, Japan was depicted in art, advertisement, memorial, and propaganda as little people, in whom the towering giant was now depicted as the White colonialists: United States of America, Britain and Russia. The entire theme of World War Two, the Pacific Theater, was based upon prosperity. If one wanted to conclude the underpinning, the main-point, the big-picture, the main-event, the real and/or imaginary- illusional cause of the Pacific War, one would conclude that the war was fought over Prosperity, played out in the sphere of East-Asia. To The Westerners, the Japanese were evil-barbarians, and to the Easterners, the westerners were evil barbarians. There was no commonality; it was just an illusionary difference.

As “Yellow Peril,” the United States rejected the scientific understanding of a master race, but nevertheless they said they “liked” their “whiteness.” United States colonialism was for one group but not for the Japanese. When the Japanese opened war upon China, the United States of America began to arm the Chinese with lend-lease military equipment. As competition with Japan, China would be the dumping ground for United States of American industrial system. Motives for the “Yellow Peril” had many variables. As propaganda, the Japanese became the Huns, racial monsters, and barbaric sub-humans. As comparison, after World War Two, the United States of America saw Germany as humans engaged in evil, whereas in the Pacific, the United States of America saw Japanese as sub-humans. This became “the Yellow peril of an American nightmares.” In U.S. film, army platoons were represented as ethnic tropes – everyone gets together for the greater cause of freedom.

Take no prisoners is a proud saying in the Pacific by United States of Americas’ soldiers during World War Two. Charles Postel says a poll of the army in 1943 reflected the take no prisoner sentiment. Fifty percent polled believed it was necessary to kill all Japanese to achieve peace.”[17] As Total War, the Japanese believed it was the United States of America set upon extermination of their entire race. Besides traditional warrior cults, the Kamikazes’ operated as reflections of this fear of protecting their homeland and families. They believed the U.S.A. to wipe their civilization off the face of the earth. Nothing proved this more than March 9th and March 10th in 1945 as fifteen square miles The United States conducted area bombing, dropping incendiary bombs on paper and wood family houses in purposeful effort to start a fire-storm and kill women, children and families as terror tactics to force the Japanese to surrender. The Japanese did not want to surrender for the purposes already empirically observed – the west dominated them from 1854 and now they fully believed the United States of America genocide program. The bombing campaign on Japanese soil resulted in an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 civilian deaths – many bursting into flames from the firestorm. As Postel recalls, General Curtis Le May stated that more people died in the Tokyo that night than both Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bomb attacks, together.[18]

The Japanese wanted to bomb San Francisco, or even better they planned to start forest fires by sending paper-balloons along the newly scientifically explained Pacific wind currents. In gymnasiums, they used children to produce these paper balloons and fill them with hydrogen. They sent numerous balloons over the Pacific, yet most lost to sea. As evidence, one balloon was found by a family in Oregon. Not knowing, the went to investigate the anomaly, and the device exploded resulting in the only casualties of World War Two on U.S.A. soil: six people. In context, on the verge of a U.S.A. victory against the Japanese we bombed them with intent on destroying innocent lives. 

Total War nominally meant that no rules of moral codes applied to modern warfare. To tie both the Asian Pacific and the European continent Total War reflected what Giulio Douhet had suggested that no clear lines between civilian and military in the new aerial warfare stratagem. Total War revisited, as Postel intends, becomes a cliché. As Total War, this means no rules applied in this modern warfare. But lets revisit this. The NAZI used poison-death gas on the Jews, but they never used them on the United States of America or the British or Russians. This then could explain that morals were upheld. 

De colonization of Asia

The Symbol  of World War Two, Postel claims was “The Foe was merciless.”[19]

On The Natural History of Destruction

Pacific War/ European War

1)       “[…]131 towns and cities [ of Germany and enemy territories of WWII] attacked, some only once and some repeatedly, many were almost entirely flattened, that about 600,000 German civilizan fell victim to the air raids, and that three and a half million homes were destroyed, while at the end of the war seven and a half million people were left homeless, and were 31.1 cubic meters of rubble for every person in Cologne and 42.8 cubic meters for every inhabitant of Dresden--- but we do not grasp what it actually meant.”[20]

2)       “Pforzheim, which lost almost one-third of its 60,000 inhabitants in a single raid on the night of February 22, 1945[…]”[21]

3)       German citizens ( not referring to the military) wanted to rebuild their country immediately.  “Writing on a conversation with the directors of I.G. Fraben in Frankfurt in April 1945, Robert Thomas Pell records the amazement with which he heard Germans stating their intentions of rebuilding their country to be “greater and stronger than ever before”—in a tone in which self-pity, groveling, self-justification, a sense of injured innocence, and defiance were curiously intermingled.”[22]

4)       Journalists, native to Germany, and foreigners writing on events of WWII, especially the last year, have mainly ignored the entire perspective of the citizens’ voices. In addition, the United States of America captured most of the German documents, which included previously publish material – including the citizenry, and refuse to release the material –citing national security (really?).

5)       Mjm Significance: What was released were the gloomy accounts of citizens, feeling of guilt as being a part of a larger collective group. This brings up the question. Are the citizens, in fact responsible for the totalitarian elite’s direction? Apparently the greater citizenry were never exposed to Nuremburg.  This could be explained that psychologically, the print-media would condemn “all” through psychological control of written ‘sentiment,’ but the larger issue of non-compliance and German citizenry agency was not allowed to surface ( as prior to WWI and II), by the plutocracies.

6)       “[…] Hans Brunswig’s Feuersturm über Hamburg ( “Firestrom over hamburg”), for instance, was issued in 1978 by Motorbuch-Verlag of Stuttgart—often seemed curiously untouched by the subject of their research, and served primarily to sanitize or eliminate a kind of knowledge incompatible with any sense of normality. They did not try to provide a clearer understanding of the extraordinary faculty for self-anesthesia shown by a community that seemed to have emerged from a war of annihilation without any signs of psychological impairment.” [23]

7)       Germany’s financial and miraculous success after World War Two was a direct result of the “Marshall Plan, [ and] the outbreak of the Cold War” ( nations ignored them which allowed them to modernize and invent expert automobiles, and ball bearings, and mechanical gadgets et cetera )…an unquestioned work ethic learned in a totalitarian society […].”[24]

8)       Erich Nossack’s account of the destruction of Hamburg: The ambivalence of Germans addressing the Royal Air Forces plans beginning in 1941 to indiscriminately bomb cities, which they knew would kill innocents, was ambivalently accepted as “just punishment.”[25] There were little protests against the allied bombings, even suggested by the NAZI press and Reich broadcasting service. [26] The British populous was split on this decision to use terror, that is to say the planned bombing of German citizens and their cities, but the British military continued their ambivalence even after the Germany’s unconditional surrender. After the war, and photos reached England, “there was a growing sense of revulsion against the damage that had been, so to speak, indiscriminately inflicted.[27] Max Hastings wrote, “the bombers’ part in the war was one that many politicians and civilians would prefer to forget.”[28] “Retrospective historical accounts did not clear up the ethical dilemma either. Feuds between various factions were continued in memoirs, and the verdict of historians trying to maintain an objective balance swings between admiration for the organization of such a mighty enterprise, and criticism of the faculty and atrocity of an operation mercilessly carried through to the end against the dictates of good sense.”[29]

The Rise of the United States of America (rise of global power)

After WWI, the USA demobilized the US Military. Sixteen countries possessed annual military budgets larger than the United States of America, prior to World War Two; but the United States of America was the largest and most advanced industrial society in the world. Its capacity ranked at number one in the world. This would explain the speed to which the United States of America quickly industrialized its military during World War Two.

Prior and after the Civil War, and prior and after World War One, the United States did not possess a standing Army (Hamilton’s desired a national military, but most viewed the Jeffersonians stance on anti-militarism) Why was this? Two main points: People believed that it cost each person considerable taxation, and second, it placed too much power into the hands of an elite who controlled the government.

After the World War Two, Eisenhower warned of the military industrial complex in his Farewell Address to the Nation speech, January 17, 1961, on the Military-Industrial Complex (1961): “In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. “[30] The (Birth of the) Atomic Age was full of promises of peace. U.S. citizens said, “This is the key that will unlock the road to peace.” It was a promise, and as promise, leaders assembled in San Francisco to Charter the United Nations, with an initial focus on social progress, larger freedoms and of Peace.

1)       Military grows (Cold war with Russia, or generally the under developed nations appearing as totalitarian governments, with a blind eye or a watchful eye to their progress –mjm note: The Russians refused the social apparatus and went toward military complex, while their other civil and peaceful projects mainly fluttered under a non-market system. All the money received from the 5% of investment or trade capital, much of it from the USA, went solely into the Russian (Soviet) military complex. ).

a.      (United Nations) The march of the Flags: 51 members sign on in 1945, each representative, then represents a flag, and currently there are 192 flags.

2)       Process that happened after World War II: decolonization. As decolonization, the United Nation was envisioned for this soul purpose.

3)       Various types of colonial tutelage still existed ( such as case with India/Britain), and the colonies ruled by white people exhibited their power to make the natives live under a second class social, economic and political status.

4)       Dismantling global colonization was a global process – associated with the rise of the United States of America (And the Fall of the British Empire). The last Empire as nominally understood colonial would attain the Soviet Block, the Soviet Union’s disablement beginning in 1989. Ensuing years after the collapse and subsequent dismantling of the U.S.S.R. revealed that the United States of America was now the sole superpower of Earth.

Chalmers Johnson:  Blowback (2000); A University of California, Berkeley professor; blowback is a CIA concept of “intermingling,” a concept applied to the USA’s involvement of backing the Mujahideen[31] of Afghanistan against the Soviet military. Johnson did not anticipate September eleventh, nineteen ninety-nine. Johnson warned, “America needs to be aware of [its] imperial power,” “we have consequences” [for this type of action]. During the last years of World War Two the United States of America sought to encircle the northern hemisphere with satellite bases for multipurpose. The primary purpose was American protectionism for prosperity. Promoted as National Security, and forming a prime enemy out of the Soviet Union, the United States of America prospered from these world control centers. As spoils of war, the U.S. Military encircled the globe with military installations, dominated the seas, and fostered a military technology race against phantom enemies. It was only after the collapse of the Soviet Union (1989) the United States of America learned that the U.S.S.R. was never really the global superpower threat it promoted itself as once feared.  Nothing proved this more than the Soviet War in Afghanistan, where a small army of U.S. back Mujahideen defeated the remnants of the Soviet Union Army.

Niall Ferguson[32]: “ Colossus: the Rise and Fall of the American Empire” (Allen Lane, 2004) believes in a benevolent Empire, an empire with better responsibility than the ones we know of in the past. He speaks about the Empire of Liberty, a Thomas Jeffersonian rooted concept. Chalmers differs from Ferguson in that Chalmers holds empires to be inherently unfair to human free choice and rights of individuals to make their own decisions. However, understand that a paradox at the foundry of “expanding an Empire of Liberty.” This explication tends contradictory evolvement.

1)       United Nations’ Charter:  to establish racial equality. The original purpose is quite different than today’s purpose. Its original purpose was to decolonize the world. The General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 1960 with no votes against but abstentions from all major colonial powers. As dupery, article seventy-five establishes the United Nations as a trustee of the once colonized territories: “The United Nations shall establish under its authority an international trusteeship system for the administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent individual agreements. These territories are hereinafter referred to as trust territories.”[33] In this sense, some individuals to groups contend this is another form of imperialism.

As example:

Article 77

The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following categories as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements:

a. territories now held under mandate;

b. territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War; and

c. territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration. [34]

It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the foregoing categories will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms. [35]

The United Nations was founded as a successor to the League of Nations, which was widely considered to have been ineffective in its role as an international governing body, in that it had been unable to prevent World War II. On 25 April 1945, the UN Conference on International Organization began in San Francisco. In addition to the governments, a number of non-governmental organizations were invited to assist in drafting the charter. The 50 nations represented at the conference signed the Charter of the United Nations two months later on 26 June. Poland had not been represented at the conference, but a place had been reserved for it among the original signatories, and it added its name later. The UN came into existence on 24 October 1945, after the Charter had been ratified by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council— the Republic of China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States—and by a majority of the other 46 signatories. That these countries are the permanent members of the Security Council, and have veto power on any Security Council resolution, reflects that they are the main victors of World War II or their successor states: the People's Republic of China replaced the Republic of China in 1971 and Russia replaced the Soviet Union in 1991. The fundamental criterion on which the scale of assessments is based is the capacity of countries to pay. This is determined by considering their relative shares of total gross national product, adjusted to take into account a number of factors, including their per capita incomes. In addition, countries are assessed -- in accordance with a modified version of the basic scale -- for the costs of peacekeeping operations, which stood at around $2 billion in 2000.[36]

What Time stamp do we use for World War Two?

Leftist Francisco Franco participated in a coup d'etat against the elected Popular Front government in  July 1936, and Mussolini rose to power in 1922, associated with fascist the March on Rome.

1937: Japan invaded China. Eventually by Lend-lease, the United States of America backs Chinese Republican militaries.

1939 Russian and Germany jointly invade Poland ( Postel in lecture, no mention of Russia’s joint invasion). Britain and France’s response declared war on Germany. This is the conventional start of World War Two in most history books.

Hitler

Munich 1939 Crisis

The Munich Agreement (Czech: Mnichovská dohoda; Slovak: Mníchovská dohoda; German: Münchner Abkommen) was an agreement regarding the Sudetenland Crisis among the major powers of Europe after a conference held in Munich, Germany in 1938 and signed in the early hours of September 30. The purpose of the conference was to discuss the future of Czechoslovakia in the face of territorial demands made by German dictator Adolf Hitler. The agreement, signed by Germany, France, Britain, and Italy permitted German annexation of Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland. The Sudetenland was of immense strategic importance to Czechoslovakia, as most of its border defenses were situated there.

Due to the fact that Czechoslovakia was not invited to the conference, the Munich Agreement is commonly called the Munich Dictate by Czechs and Slovaks. The phrase Munich betrayal is also frequently used because military alliances between Czechoslovakia and France was not honoured.

The agreement is considered by many as the quintessential example of appeasement. Because Hitler soon violated the terms of the agreement, it has often been cited in support of the principle that totalitarian states should never be appeased.[37]

The Sudetenland was an area of Czechoslovakia where ethnic Germans formed a majority of the population. The Sudeten Germans had attempted to prevent the German language border areas that had formerly been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire from becoming part of Czechoslovakia in 1918. They had proclaimed the German-Austrian province Sudetenland in October 1918, voting to join the newly declared Republic of German Austria in November 1918. This had been forbidden by the victorious allied powers of the First World War (the Treaty of Saint-Germain) and by the Czechoslovak government, partly with force of arms in 1919. Many Sudeten Germans rejected affiliation with Czechoslovakia because they had been refused the right to self-determination promised by US president Wilson in his Fourteen Points of January 1918. The Sudetenland became part of Czechoslovakia due to the fact it had always formed part of the Kingdom of Bohemia, which was the main portion of Czechoslovakia in the same sense England is the primary home-nation of the UK, and many German-speakers felt themselves to be German-speaking Czechoslovaks rather than Germans or Austrians living in Czechoslovakia. [38]

Appeasement

Neville Chamberlain, the British prime minister, met with Hitler in his retreat at Berchtesgaden on September 15-16; he reached a preeliminary agreement with Hitler who agreed to take no military action without further discussion, while Chamberlain promised to persuade his Cabinet and the French to accept the results of a plebiscite to be held in the Sudetenland. The French premier, Édouard Daladier, and his foreign minister, Georges Bonnet, met with the British diplomats in London, and issued a joint statement that all areas with a population that was more than 50 percent Sudeten German were to be given to Germany. The Czechoslovak government which was not consulted initially rejected the proposal but was forced to accept it reluctantly on September 21. This however proved not enough for Hitler; when on September 22 Chamberlain met Hitler at Godesberg he was told that now wanted the Sudetenland occupied by the German army and the Czechoslovaks evacuated from the area by September 28. Chamberlain agreed to submit the new proposal to the Czechoslovaks, who rejected it, as did the British Cabinet and the French. On September 24 the French ordered a partial mobilization: the Czechoslovaks had ordered a general mobilization one day earlier. It was the first French mobilization since World War I. In a last attempt to avoid war, Chamberlain proposed that a four-power conference be convened immediately to settle the dispute. Hitler agreed and on September 29, Hitler, Chamberlain, Daladier, and Mussolini met in Munich. [39]

A deal was reached on September 29, and at about 1:30am on September 30,[1] Adolf Hitler, Neville Chamberlain, Benito Mussolini and Édouard Daladier signed the Munich Agreement. The agreement was officially introduced by Mussolini although in fact the so-called Italian plan had been prepared in the German Foreign Office. It was nearly identical to the Godesberg proposal: the German army was to complete the occupation of the Sudetenland by October 10, and an international commission would decide the future of other disputed areas.

Czechoslovakia was informed by Britain and France that it could either resist Germany alone or submit to the prescribed annexations. The Czechoslovak government, realizing the hopelessness of fighting Germany alone, reluctantly capitulated (September 30) and agreed to abide by the agreement. The settlement gave Germany the Sudetenland starting October 10, and de facto control over the rest of Czechoslovakia as long as Hitler promised to go no further. On September 30th after some rest, Chamberlain went to Hitler and asked him to sign a peace treaty between the United Kingdom and Germany. After Hitler's interpreter translated it for him, he happily agreed.

Announcing the deal at Heston Aerodrome, Chamberlain said:

"...the settlement of the Czechoslovakian problem, which has now been achieved is, in my view, only the prelude to a larger settlement in which all Europe may find peace. This morning I had another talk with the German Chancellor, Herr Hitler, and here is the paper which bears his name upon it as well as mine (waves paper to the crowd - receiving loud cheers and "Hear Hears"). Some of you, perhaps, have already heard what it contains but I would just like to read it to you ...".

The Führerbau, in which the Agreement was signed, is today a school, the Hochschule für Musik und Theater MünchenLater that day he stood outside Number 10 Downing Street and again read from the document and concluded:

'"My good friends, for the second time in our history, a British Prime Minister has returned from Germany bringing peace with honour. I believe it is peace for our time."

Chamberlain received an ecstatic reception upon his return to Britain. At Heston Aerodrome, west of London, he made the now famous "Peace for our time" speech and waved the England-Germany peace treaty to a delighted crowd.[40]

Reichstag Fire Decree

On the evening of February 27, 1933 — six days before the parliamentary election — fire broke out in the Reichstag chambers. Widespread chaos and looting in Berlin was quelled by the NAZI party who took control over the chaotic crowds and helped establish them as the predominant party ( even though they were already the dominant power at that time).

The Reichstag Fire Decree (German: Reichstagsbrandverordnung) is the common name of the Order of the Reich President for the Protection of People and State issued by German president Paul von Hindenburg in direct response to the Reichstag fire of February 27, 1933. The decree nullified many of the key civil liberties of German citizens. With Nazis in powerful positions of the German government, the decree was used as the legal basis of imprisonment of anyone considered to be opponents of the Nazis, and was used to suppress publications not considered "friendly" to the Nazi cause. The decree is considered by historians to be one of the key steps in the establishment of a one-party Nazi state in Germany.[41]

Soviet/German Non – Aggression Pact 1939

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, colloquially named after Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov and German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, refers to the officially-titled Treaty of Non-aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed in Moscow in the early hours of August 24, 1939, dated August 23. The Pact is known by a number of different titles. These include the Nazi-Soviet Pact, Hitler-Stalin Pact and German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact. It remained in effect until Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941 in Operation Barbarossa.[42]

The American Oasis

Neutrality Acts

The Neutrality Acts relate a notion that most socialist, democratic, and some prominent republicans refused the notion to take-part in European matters.

Congress, Neutrality, and Lend-Lease

“If we repeal it, we are helping England and France. If we fail to repeal it, we will be helping Hitler and his allies. Absolute neutrality is an impossibility.”  -- Senator George W. Norris on the repeal of the Neutrality Acts, 1939.

(mjm – note good synopsis, take out the fascist remarks)

“Between 1935 and 1937 Congress passed three "Neutrality Acts" that tried to keep the United States out of war, by making it illegal for Americans to sell or transport arms, or other war materials to belligerent nations. Supporters of neutrality, called "isolationists" by their critics, argued that America should avoid entangling itself in European wars. "Internationalists" rejected the idea that the United States could remain aloof from Europe and held that the nation should aid countries threatened with aggression.”

“In the spring of 1939, as Germany, Japan, and Italy pursued militaristic policies, President Roosevelt wanted more flexibility to meet the Fascist challenge. FDR suggested amending the act to allow warring nations to purchase munitions if they paid cash and transported the goods on non-American ships, a policy that favored Britain and France. Initially, this proposal failed, but after Germany invaded Poland in September, Congress passed the Neutrality Act of 1939 ending the munitions embargo on a "cash and carry" basis.”

“The passage of the 1939 Neutrality Act marked the beginning of a congressional shift away from isolationism. Over the next 2 years, Congress took further steps to oppose fascism. One of the most important was the 1941 approval of Lend-Lease, which allowed the United States to transfer arms to nations vital to the national defense.”[43]

Isolationism

Most Democrats, U.S.A. socialists, U.S.A. communists, U.S.A. radicals and a limited number of prominent Republicans opted to promote non-aggression stance against Germany, according to Postel. Isolationism was originally a Thomas Jefferson ideal of an isolated American agrarian community. Alexander Hamilton, as well as his close find George Washington, believed in a national standing Army, a Federal centralized government with provision of self protectionism – be it international conflict. On the practical side, the Isolationists believed that a policy of internationalism would bring high-taxes, place a strain on the economy and envelope the U.S.A. international problems.

Henry Ford (July 30, 1863 – April 7, 1947) was the American founder of the Ford Motor Company and father of modern assembly lines used in mass production was sympathetic to Hitler and socialism ( See my writings on Fascism, why would this be the case?).

Most pacifists were in the mid-west and Chicago areas, which were called the heart of isolationism – for a variety of reasons.  The eastern politicians received a label of internationalists, for a variety of reasons.

American First Committee

The America First Committee (AFC) was the foremost pressure group against American entry into the Second World War. AFC was established September 4, 1940 by Yale University law student R. Douglas Stuart, Jr., along with other students including future President Gerald Ford, Sargent Shriver and future Supreme Court justice Potter Stewart. At its peak, America First may have had 800,000 members in 650 chapters, located mostly in a 300 mile radius of Chicago.[citation needed] It claimed 135,000 members in 60 chapters in Illinois, its strongest state. [Schneider 198] Few Southern chapters existed. Fundraising drives produced about $370,000 from some 25,000 contributors. Nearly half came from a few millionaires such as William H. Regnery, H. Smith Richardson of the Vick Chemical Company, General Wood, publisher Joseph M. Patterson (New York Daily News) and his cousin publisher Robert R. McCormick (Chicago Tribune). It was never able to get funding for its own public opinion poll. The New York chapter received slightly more than $190,000, most of it from its 47,000 contributors. Since it never had a national membership form or national dues, and local chapters were quite autonomous, historians suggest the leaders had no idea how many "members" it had[44] [Cole 1953, 25-33; Schneider 201-2].

The America First Committee launched a petition aimed at enforcing the 1939 Neutrality Act and forcing President Franklin D. Roosevelt to keep his pledge to keep America out of the war. They strongly distrusted Roosevelt, arguing that he was lying to the American people.

On the day after Roosevelt's lend-lease bill was submitted to the United States Congress, Wood promised AFC opposition "with all the vigor it can exert." America First staunchly opposed the convoying of ships, the Atlantic Charter, and the placing of economic pressure on Japan. In order to achieve the defeat of lend-lease and the perpetuation of American neutrality, the AFC advocated four basic principles:

·         The United States must build an impregnable defense for America.

·         No foreign power, nor group of powers, can successfully attack a prepared America.

·         American democracy can be preserved only by keeping out of the European war.

·         "Aid short of war" weakens national defense at home and threatens to involve America in war abroad.

Despite the onset of war in Europe, an overwhelming majority of the American people wanted to stay out of the new war if they could.[CMH, Chapter 19]. The AFC tapped into this widespread anti-war feeling in the years leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor and the U.S. entry into the war.[45]

Arne Westad

In the book, “The Global Cold War,” Arne Westad intends the real contest took place in Asia, Africa and the […] and the anti-colonial process focused on intervention of the industrial society of under developed third world countries. The Global war, Westad intends, determined the final stage of European Global conquest.

Internationalism

FDR supported internationalism, but in a different context ( see the four freedoms). Many politicians believed, however not F.D.R.,  that World War Two was a prelude to the real war just over the horizon, The Third World War. The left in the United States of America, at least some groups, wanted a popular front, that is to say, an alliance with Russia.

A War of Machines

What was World War two key significance? A War of Machines

Tanks, artillery, warships and advanced aircraft – this was a new type of war.

How Did the Allies Win? What are the Perspectives?

The U.S.A. and Britain were victorious mainly of their air-campaign.

The key Allied leaders—Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill—were known as the "Big Three" because of the might of the nations they represented and their peaceful collaboration during World War II. These three leaders met together only twice during World War II, but when they did confer, their decisions changed the course of history.[46]

First War Time Conference

First War Time Conference: Opening up the Second War Front.

The Tehran Conference (codenamed EUREKA) was the meeting of Joseph Stalin, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill between November 28 and December 1, 1943 in Tehran, Iran. It was the first World War II conference among the Big Three (the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom) in which Stalin was present. It succeeded the Cairo Conference and was followed by the Yalta Conference and Potsdam Conference. The chief discussion was centered on the opening of a second front in Western Europe. At the same time a separate protocol pledged the three countries to recognize Iran's independence:[47] At Yalta, the U.S.A. acquiesces to the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, as the Soviet presented a list of grievances. Bad feelings erupted between the two of Poland and Czechoslovakia.

First agenda: Most importantly the conference was organized to plan the final strategy for the war against Nazi Germany and its allies.

Second agenda: Help Iran Economically.

U.S.A. &   Quasi-Fascist Russia

Why did the United States of America back J. Stalin and Russia, when we knew of some of J. Stalin’s slave-labor and death-camps ( by 1942) – as well as his part in the invasion of Poland, persecution of Jews (both Poland and Ukraine (Kulaks))? The western allies, mainly the United States of America, was afraid that the success of Germany’s war on Russia could result in forceful take over, in which forced conscription of Russian soldiers turned against the allies, and a Pan-German empire resulted. While very unfeasible, at the time, however the psychology and turmoil created an atmosphere of extreme panic which laid heavily on the United States of American decision to send military parts, trucks, jeeps, and trains to the quiz-fascist Russian state.  It also may be astute to surmise that Roosevelt wanted to ally with Russia to break the stranglehold of the British Empire in the Middle East and India. Certainly, whatever the case may be, at the end of World War II, the British Empire was no longer a viable world threat.

Second War Time Conference

Second War Time Conference: Winston Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin

The Yalta Conference, sometimes called the Crimea Conference and codenamed the Argonaut Conference, was the wartime meeting from February 4, 1945 to February 11, 1945 between the heads of government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union—President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Premier Joseph Stalin, respectively.

Bataan death March

“The Bataan Death March (also known as The Death March of Bataan) took place in the Philippines in 1942 and was later accounted as a Japanese war crime. The 60-mile (97 km) march occurred after the three-month Battle of Bataan, part of the Battle of the Philippines (194142), during World War II. In Japanese, it is known as Batān Shi no Kōshin (Batān Shi no Kōshin?), with the same meaning.”

 

“The march, involving the forcible transfer of 90,000 to 100,000 American and Filipino prisoners of war[1] captured by the Japanese in the Philippines from the Bataan peninsula to prison camps, was characterized by wide-ranging physical abuse, murder, savagery, and resulted in very high fatalities inflicted upon the prisoners and civilians along the route by the armed forces of the Empire of Japan. Beheadings, cut throats and being casually shot were the more common and merciful actions — compared to bayonet stabbings, rapes, guttings (disembowelments), numerous rifle butt beatings and a deliberate refusal to allow the prisoners food or water while keeping them continually marching for nearly a week (for the slowest survivors) in tropical heat. Falling down, unable to continue moving was tantamount to a death sentence, as was any degree of protest or expression of displeasure.”[48]

Siege of Leningrad

 

“This was undoubtedly the most tragic period in the history of the city, a period full of suffering and heroism. For everyone who lives in St. Petersburg the Blokada (the Siege) of Leningrad is an important part of the city's heritage and a painful memory for the population's older generations.  Less than two and a half months after the Soviet Union was attacked by Nazi Germany, German troops were already approaching Leningrad. The Red Army was outflanked and on September 8 1941 the Germans had fully encircled Leningrad and the siege began. The siege lasted for a total of 900 days, from September 8 1941 until January 27 1944. The city's almost 3 million civilians (including about 400,000 children) refused to surrender and endured rapidly increasing hardships in the encircled city. Food and fuel stocks were limited to a mere 1-2 month supply, public transport was not operational and by the winter of 1941-42 there was no heating, no water supply, almost no electricity and very little food. In January 1942 in the depths of an unusually cold winter, the city's food rations reached an all time low of only 125 grams (about 1/4 of a pound) of bread per person per day. In just two months, January and February of 1942, 200,000 people died in Leningrad of cold and starvation. Despite these tragic losses and the inhuman conditions the city's war industries still continued to work and the city did not surrender. “[49]

The Final Solution

 

“The Final Solution to the Jewish Question (German: Die Endlösung der Judenfrage) refers to the German Nazis' plan to engage in systematic genocide against the European Jewish population during World War II.”[50]

American Way of War

Lend-lease

·       Lend Lease Act, 11 March 1941

Lend-lease was a strategic, economic, and hegemonic contribution that the United States of America played as military supplier to the allies during World War II.[51] To the Soviet Union, we provided an estimated 400,000 vehicles, trucks and parts, as well as 2,000 trains, part of the “two war front” Tehran Conference agreement. The ‘Neutrality Act’ of January 10, 1941 was amended or excused as a result.

 

By late 1940 Great Britain was increasingly unable to pay for and transport the war materials it needed in its fight against Nazi Germany. Britain’s Prime Minister Winston Churchill appealed to President Roosevelt to find a way for the United States to continue to aid Britain. FDR proposed providing war materials to Britain without the immediate payment called for in the Neutrality Act. A bill, assigned the patriotic bill number "1776," was introduced in the House on January 10, 1941, by Representative John McCormack of Massachusetts. After extensive hearings and debate, Congress passed "Lend-Lease" and President Roosevelt signed the Act on March 11, 1941. After the United States entered the war, Lend-Lease became the most important means for supplying the Allies with military aid.[52]

 

·       Arsenal of Democracy

·       Battle of Leningrad

 

“Hitler's goal was to destroy Leningrad, the former capital of Russia, and the center of the Russian Navy, with its political and military importance, cultural wealth, and economic strength. Leningrad was the first priority in Hitler's plans [of] Operation Barbarossa and Generalplan Ost.”[53]

Air War

Air War

Air War: Simple explanation – ground troops create more casualties, so air-war simply exempts the dangers of mass-casualties on ones’ side of the war front. (this is the same logic Bill Clinton used for the Kosovo March 24, 1999 War. ).

 

The Air War is a concept that the United States of America excelled in aerodynamic production which significantly played the prime role in the United States victories of World War II. As part of “Arsenal of Democracy,” F.D.R’s “frame work of democracy,” [54]the goods of the war are what the United States of America contributed to the world in regards to military protectionism ( a view solely U.S.A  ‘o’ centric).

 

B29 Superfortresses were large aircraft produced mainly in California. At the height of production (c. 1945), one Superfortress was produced each hour. The world could not keep up with the American industrial complex.

 

Radar, invented and produced in the U.S.A. also played vital role in aeronautics.

Operation Radar

“In 1932, Allen B. DuMont proposed a "ship finder" device to the United States Army Signal Corps at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, that used radio wave distortions to locate objects on a cathode ray tube screen. The military asked him, however, not to take out a patent for developing what they wanted to maintain as a secret, and so he is not often mentioned among those responsible for radar. He did, however, go on to develop long-range precision radar to aid the Allies during WWII. As a consequence the French Government knighted him in 1952.”[55]

F.D.R. was a military hardware buff, a pioneer in thinking, and believed in the indiscriminate bombing of civilians, as a means to subdue the Axis enemies.

 

Air war, prior to expertise guidance missile systems, used in the Iraq Gulf War, One, (1989-1990), precision guided bombing had not been perfected. As result, the World War Two decisions to “terrorize” the NAZI Party by indiscriminate town and city bombing campaigns remained largely unknown, due to many factors.

What were the Consequences of Air War?

Pacific War/ European War

As part of the British, and the United States of America’s Air War, human casualties recorded show that extraordinary brutality, which included German holocaust figures, place fifth overall of the human-civilian casualties during World War Two.  Approximately of the total population of the then current German territory, only in Indonesia, Poland, Russia and China count human-war-related-casualties figures at a higher percentage of the gross population.  At total percentage of population death-casualties, Poland suffered a human-casualty count at 19.5%, and as estimate, eclipsed Russia’s count at 13.5%, while Germany placed third with a figure of 11%, which included approximately six million Jews ( according to this source?).

W. G. Sebald, in his work “On the Natural History of Destruction (trans. Anthea Bell , Modern Library, Random House, 2004), chapter, “Air War and Literature” write upon the horrors involved in the destruction on German cities and towns by the allied Air campaigns, which were deliberate terroristic polices, aimed at inciting populous sentiment of the German population to rise up and overthrow the NAZIs, in the final years of World War Two. His aims were to recount the new and existing evidence by firsthand accounts of the people that survived the devastation to the land, the townsfolk’s resolve, the absence of memory and the records which survive to tell the story. He says, “ It is true that the strategic bombing surveys published by the Allies, together with the records of the Federal German Statistic Office and other official sources, show that the Royal Air Force alone dropped a million tons of bombs on enemy territory; it is true that of the 131 towns and cities attacked, some only once and some repeatedly, many were almost entirely flattened, that about 600,000 German civilians fell victim to the air raids, and that there and a half million homes were destroyed, while at the end of the war seven and a half million people were left homeless, and there were 31.1 cubic meters of rubble for every person in Cologne and 42.8 cubic meters for every inhabitant of Dresden – but we do not grasp what it really meant. “[56]

 

Why do we not have writings by foreign journalists and native journalists, for this period?

 

Sebald utilizes “Hans Magnus Enzensberger’s collection Europa in Trümmern ( “Europe in Ruins”), published in 1990, consists pronominally of pieces by foreign journalists and writers making observations that until then had been almost completely ignored in Germany. ”[57] Sebald who utilizes Enzensberger’s work intends former exiles or other outsiders, “ such as Max Frisch,” and of them who stayed in Germany like “ Walter von Molo and Frank Theiss in the deplorable controversy over Thomas Mann,  were fond of saying that while others were comfortably ensconced in America they themselves had not left their homeland in its hour of need, refrained entirely from commenting on the process and outcome of destruction, probably not least for fear that accurate descriptions might get them into trouble with the occupying forces.” [58] As well, Sebald intends that selective or general amnesia was a result of traumatic or blocking-out from the memory, of those nights and days of allied bombing raids on cities and towns. Furthermore, the devastation to some cities created

9)       The bombing of Dresden by the British Royal Air Force (RAF) and United States Army Air Force (USAAF) between February 13 and February 15, 1945, 12 weeks before the surrender of the German Wehrmacht was a premeditated attempt to foster public uprising against the NAZI government. Controversial topic, because of a variety of points of view, Dresden became the more written example of this terroristic policy of the Allies. “The raids saw 1,300 heavy bombers drop over 3,900 tons of high-explosive bombs and incendiary devices in under 15 hours, destroying 13 square miles (34 km²) of the city, the baroque capital of the German state of Saxony, and causing a firestorm that consumed the city centre.” ( revise with other accounts).

Winston Churchill, who had called for a terrorist attack, of the likes of causing terror in the general sense of the people, believed like others in history, that this methodology brought immediate results. However, the Germans at this point in the War were on the retreat, they were losing, and this bombing of a city, one of the many that had taken place, was considered unnecessary.

“In February 1945, the last year of World War 2, Britain sent 300 Lancaster bombers to attack the crowded German city of Dresden. This attack was not the precision bombing of specific military targets. It was deliberate bombing of a whole area. The bombs destroyed city buildings and started tremendous fires.

Before long, eleven square miles of Dresden were consumed by a firestorm. The vacuum caused by the rapid rise of hot air created tornadoes that tossed furniture, trees and debris into the air. People were caught in fires as hot as 1000 °C. The city was devastated. No one knows how many thousands died.

The German armies were in retreat at this time and the war was nearly over. Some historians have argued that this attack was not justifiable on military grounds, that it was nothing more than a slaughter of civilians. But others say it helped to shorten the war in Europe.”[59]

 

In the Prime Minister’s personal telegram D. 83/5, March, 28, 1945 originally filed as Top-Secret, released under the Public Records Act 1958 (unknown release date), Winston Churchill called for questioning the halting of terrorist tactics: “It seems to me at the moment has come when the question of bombing of German cities simply for the sake of increasing terror, though under other pretexts, should be reviewed.” [60] However, at the end of the transcript, Churchill evades the consideration of questioning the current military objectives, intending, “The Foreign Secretary has spoken has spoken to me on this subject [61][of air terroristic bombings of cities and towns] and I feel a need for precise concentration on military objectives, such as oil and communication behind the immediate battle-zone, rather on mere acts of terror and wanton destruction, however impressive.”

A map of 1944 used by the Royal Air Force noted 75% of Dresden was residential. The other sections of the city contained, as follows:   Law courts, Factories, Barracks, State Museum of Applied Art, Exhibition  buildings, Railway marshalling yards, Hospital.  The Law courts – in the east, south of the river (between the river & Grosser Garten), Factories – in west of the city (NW, W & SW), Barracks – in the north, State Museum of Applied Art – in the east, south of the river (near the law courts), Exhibition buildings - Grosser Garten, Railway marshalling yards - immediately south of the railway intersection, Hospital – east of the law courts & art museum.

In Extract from the official account of Bomber Command by Arthur Harris, 1945 (Catalogue ref: AIR 16/487), archived transcript 166 mentions the immense fire-wall that engulf the city. This fire-wall explained later in history by various released documentation, blown boilers, and reduced the city to cinders.

 166. The attack on Dresden, the largest city (630,000 population) that had not previously been bombed, may be mentioned as one among many other highly effective operations. Apart from its industrial significance, Dresden had become of great importance as a communications centre and control point in the defence of Germany’s eastern front. On the night of 13/14 February, 1945, a double attack was made on the city by a total of 805 aircraft. There was cloud over the area for the first attack, but it had cleared for a distance of 10 miles from the target before the second attack developed. Next day reconnaissance showed a vast pall of smoke from innumerable fires still burning in the city. As a result of these attacks (and two smaller Eighth U.S.A.A.F. daylight attacks on the two succeeding days) more than 1,600 acres of the closely built-up sections of Dresden were destroyed. The effect, not only on the local population, but on the whole nation is now known to have been very great. Speer mentions this attack as having a moral effect comparable to that produced by the destruction of Hamburg in 1943. Other important industrial centres in Eastern Germany previously beyond effective operational range, such as Dessau, the heart of the Junkers concern, and Chemnitz, “the Manchester of Saxony,” were all attacked with outstanding results.

10)   “[…]131 towns and cities [ of Germany and enemy territories of WWII] attacked, some only once and some repeatedly, many were almost entirely flattened, that about 600,000 German civilian fell victim to the air raids, and that three and a half million homes were destroyed, while at the end of the war seven and a half million people were left homeless, and were 31.1 cubic meters of rubble for every person in Cologne and 42.8 cubic meters for every inhabitant of Dresden--- but we do not grasp what it actually meant.”[62]

11)   “Pforzheim, which lost almost one-third of its 60,000 inhabitants in a single raid on the night of February 22, 1945[…]”[63]

12)   German citizens (not referring to the military) wanted to rebuild their country immediately.  “Writing on a conversation with the directors of I.G. Fraben in Frankfurt in April 1945, Robert Thomas Pell records the amazement with which he heard Germans stating their intentions of rebuilding their country to be “greater and stronger than ever before”—in a tone in which self-pity, groveling, self-justification, a sense of injured innocence, and defiance were curiously intermingled.”[64]

13)   Journalists, native to Germany, and foreigners writing on events of WWII, especially the last year, have mainly ignored the entire perspective of the citizens’ voices. In addition, the United States of America captured most of the German documents, which included previously publish material – including the citizenry, and refuse to release the material –citing national security (really?).

14)   Mjm Significance: What was released were the gloomy accounts of citizens, feeling of guilt,  as if being a part of a larger collective group. This brings up the question. Are the citizens, in fact responsible for the totalitarian elite’s direction? Apparently the greater citizenry were never exposed to Nuremburg.  This could be explained that psychologically, the print-media would condemn “all” through psychological control of written ‘sentiment,’ but the larger issue of non-compliance and German citizenry agency was not allowed to surface ( as prior to WWI and II), by the plutocracies.

15)   “[…] Hans Brunswig’s Feuersturm über Hamburg ( “Firestrom over Hamburg”), for instance, was issued in 1978 by Motorbuch-Verlag of Stuttgart—often seemed curiously untouched by the subject of their research, and served primarily to sanitize or eliminate a kind of knowledge incompatible with any sense of normality. They did not try to provide a clearer understanding of the extraordinary faculty for self-anesthesia shown by a community that seemed to have emerged from a war of annihilation without any signs of psychological impairment.” [65]

16)   Germany’s financial and miraculous success after World War Two was a direct result of the “Marshall Plan, [ and] the outbreak of the Cold War” ( nations ignored them which allowed them to modernize and invent expert automobiles, and ball bearings, and mechanical gadgets et cetera )…an unquestioned work ethic learned in a totalitarian society […].”[66]

17)   Erich Nossack’s account of the destruction of Hamburg: The ambivalence of Germans addressing the Royal Air Forces plans beginning in 1941 to indiscriminately bomb cities, which they knew would kill innocents, was ambivalently accepted as “just punishment.”[67] There were little protests against the allied bombings, even suggested by the NAZI press and Reich broadcasting service. [68] The British populous was split on this decision to use terror, that is to say the planned bombing of German citizens and their cities, but the British military continued their ambivalence even after the Germany’s unconditional surrender. After the war, and photos reached England, “there was a growing sense of revulsion against the damage that had been, so to speak, indiscriminately inflicted.[69] Max Hastings wrote, “the bombers’ part in the war was one that many politicians and civilians would prefer to forget.”[70] “Retrospective historical accounts did not clear up the ethical dilemma either. Feuds between various factions were continued in memoirs, and the verdict of historians trying to maintain an objective balance swings between admiration for the organization of such a mighty enterprise, and criticism of the faculty and atrocity of an operation mercilessly carried through to the end against the dictates of good sense.”[71]

American Conception of National Security

Globalism and Military Bases Across the Globe

Melvyn P Leffler wrote:

IN AN INTERVIEW with Henry Kissinger in 1978 on “The Lessons of the Past,” Walter Laqueur observed that during World War II “few if any people thought... of the structure of peace that would follow the war except perhaps in the most general terms of friendship, mutual trust, and the other noble sentiments mentioned in wartime programmatic speeches about the United Nations and related topics.” Kissinger concurred, noting that no statesman, except perhaps Winston Churchill, “gave any attention to what would happen after the war.” Americans, Kissinger stressed, “were determined that we were going to base the postwar period on good faith and getting along with everybody.” [72]

That two such astute and knowledgeable observers of international politics were so uninformed about American planning at the end of the Second World War is testimony to the enduring mythology of American idealism and innocence in the world of Realpolitik. It also reflects the state of scholarship on the interrelated areas of strategy, economy, and diplomacy. Despite the publication of several excellent overviews of the origins of the Cold War,[73] despite the outpouring of incisive monographs on American foreign policy in many areas of the world,[74] and despite some first-rate studies on the evolution of strategic thinking and the defense establishment,[75]4 no comprehensive account yet exists of how American defense officials defined national security interests in the aftermath of World War II. Until recently, the absence of such a study was understandable, for scholars had limited access to records pertaining to national security, strategic thinking, and war planning. But in recent years documents relating to the early years of the Cold War have been declassified in massive numbers. ”[76] What we have learned becomes of importance for the study of the rise of states in our modern times. The United States military, political and government agencies of which many were created about this time tell us of seeking to dominate the globe by utilizing massive military-bases logistics and holding them across the global for United States of American economic-political interests.

“From THE CLOSING DAYS OF WORLD WAR II, American defense officials believed that they could not allow any prospective adversary to control the Eurasian land mass. This was the lesson taught by two world wars. Strategic thinkers and military analysts insisted that any power or powers attempting to dominate Eurasia must be regarded as potentially hostile to the United States.[77]  Their acute awareness of the importance of Eurasia made Marshall, Thomas Handy, George A. Lincoln, and other officers wary of the expansion of Soviet influence there. Cognizant of the growth in Soviet strength, General John Deane, head of the United States military mission in Moscow, urged a tougher stand against Soviet demands even before World War II had ended. While acknowledging that the increase in Soviet power stemmed primarily from the defeat of Germany and Japan, postwar assessments of. the Joint Chiefs of Staff emphasized the importance of deterring further Soviet aggrandizement in Eurasia.”[78]

Minerals and Prosperity

“Economic considerations also made defense officials determined to retain American access to Eurasia as well as to deny Soviet predominance over it. Stimson, Patterson, McCloy, and Assistant Secretary Howard C. Peterson agreed with Forrestal that long-term American prosperity required open markets, unhindered access to raw materials, and the rehabilitation of much—if not all—of Eurasia along liberal capitalist lines. In late 1944 and 1945, Stimson protested the prospective industrial emasculation of Germany, lest it undermine American economic well being, set back recovery throughout Europe, and unleash forces of anarchy and revolution. Stimson and his subordinates in the Operations Division of the army also worried that the spread of Soviet power in northeast Asia would constrain the functioning of the free enterprise system and jeopardize American economic interests. A report prepared by the staff of the Moscow embassy and revised in mid- 1946 by Ambassador (and former General) Walter Bedell Smith emphasized that “Soviet power is by nature so jealous that it has already operated to segregate from world economy almost all of the areas in which it has been established.” While Forrestal and the navy sought to contain Soviet influence in the Near East and to retain American access to Middle East oil, Patterson and the War Department focused on preventing famine in occupied areas, forestalling communist revolution, circumscribing Soviet influence, resuscitating trade, and preserving traditional American markets especially in Western Europe.”[79]     

CIA- Mid 1947

“American defense officials, military analysts, and intelligence officers were extremely sensitive to the political ferment, social turmoil, and economic upheaval throughout postwar Europe and Asia. In their initial postwar studies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff carefully noted the multiplicity of problems that could breed conflict and provide opportunities for Soviet expansion. In the spring of 1946 army planners, including General Lincoln, were keenly aware that conflict was most likely to arise from local disputes (for example, in Venezia-Giulia) or from indigenous unrest (for example, in France), perhaps even against the will of Moscow. A key War Department document submitted to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee in April 1946 skirted the issue of Soviet military capabilities and argued that the Soviet Union’s strength emanated from totalitarian control over its satellites, from local communist parties, and from worldwide chaotic political and economic conditions. In October 1946 the Joint Planning Staff stressed that for the next ten years the major factor influencing world political developments would be the East- West ideological conflict taking place in an impoverished and strife-torn Europe and a vacuum of indigenous power in Asia. “The greatest danger to the security of the United States,” the CIA concluded in mid-1947, “is the possibility of economic collapse in Western Europe and the consequent accession to power of Communist elements.”[80]

The U.S.A. will during and right after World War Two began to funnel appropriations to countries that will be protectorates, and in compliance allow U.S. military installations reside on their soil. The United States of America then will combat the Soviet Unions’ advances if the soviet appears to make moves. Negotiations and empirical observations let to only fearful “speculations” that the Communist countries, such as China and the U.S.S.R. were conditioned to spread. However, “Socialism in one Country,” Stalin’s plan for Russia did not include the Trotsky or Lenin plan of Marxist expansion. Instead, as the Soviets expanded into Europe, was solely an economic choice to help gain minerals, workforces and materials to better industrialize – from offices at the Kremlin. 

Leffler, Melvyn P., The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945—48 in AHR Forum, “The American Historical Archives,” Vol. 89, No. 2, April, 1984, presented in Postel, Charles, History 124 Reader No. 134 (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, 2008), pp. 21-22.

The Long Peace

Inquiries into the History of The Cold War

The Insecurities of Victory: The United States and the Perception of the Soviet Threat After World War II.

In  the Book[81] “The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War” John Lewis Gaddis condenses earlier history  journals and focuses on eight essays of events surrounding United States of American national security decisions during the beginning of the closing of World War Two. Isolationists lost to globalists that argued national defense remained the core of United States foreign policy. Gaddis uses sources from the 1940s, a time in which the United States was denied access to the revelations of Stalin’s genocidal programs, “Stalin’s unilateralism,”[82] the underpinnings of economic management and struggles of U.S.S.R. Industrialization.  F.D. R. at Yalta tried to facilitate cooperation with the Socialist Stalin. Yet, as historians, the British closed their records for three decades and the Soviet Archives had only been opened after 1989. What has been reveled is how much of the world feared the expansion of Stalin’s regime, and not only the United States of America. In this sense, Gaddis relates the Cold War was a global phenomenon – other countries feared the mighty Russian state as well as the U.S. government agencies.  The alarmist’s notions, it could be argued Gaddis admits, “had that desire for an American presence not existed, these “third party” assessments of Russian intentions might have been considerably less alarmist than they were. But that is missing the point,”[83] Gladdis intends. Records closed to the public now reveled British “insecurity.”  “The British Foreign Office concluded early in 1948:

[N]ot only is the Soviet government not prepared at the present state to co-operate in any real sense with any non-Communist…Government, but it is actively preparing to extend its hold over the remaining portion of continental Europe and, subsequently, over the Middle East and no doubt the bulk of the Far East as well….[P]hysical control over the Eurasian land mass and eventual control of the World Island is what the Politburo is aiming at—no less a thing than that. The immensity of the aim should not betray us into believing in its impracticality. Indeed, unless positive and vigorous steps are shortly taken by those other states who are in a position to take them… the Soviet Union will gain political and strategical advantages which will set the great Communist machine in action, leading either to the establishment to a  World Dictatorship or ( more probably) to the collapse of organized society over great stretches of the globe.”[84]

“It is significant that this top-secret Foreign Office document, circulated only within the highest levels of the British government and declassified only after the passage of more than three decades, should have revealed an assessment of the Soviet threat more sweeping in character and apocalyptic in tone than anything in the record of private or public statements by major American officials at the time.”[85]

“History, inescapably, involves viewing distant pasts through the prism of more recent ones. The incontestable fact that the United States over-reacted more than once during the subsequent history of the Cold War to the perceived threat of Soviet and/or “communist” expansion has, to an extent, blinded us to the equally demonstrable fact that in the immediate postwar years the behavior of the Russians alarmed not just Americans but a good portion of the rest of the world as well. How well founded that alarm was—how accurately it reflected the realities that shaped Soviet Policy—are issues upon which there are legitimate grounds for disagreement. But to deny that the alarm itself was sincere, or that Americans were not alone in perceiving it, is to distort the view through the prism more than it necessary. Fear, after all, can be genuine without being rational. And, as Sigmund Freud once pointed out, even paranoids can have real enemies.”[86]

Gaddis  sources do not reveal the inner workings of the Stalin period from sources outside of the Kremlin. The United States simply did not know the duplicitous policy planning of proud Stalin, the history of the Communist Revolution of 1917, and the sentiment that the United States of America was part of the problem of the world, as laid out in the Marxist-Leninist propositions – the plutocrats of the west.  Stalin still reserved the reactive nationalism that inspired his goals for“Socialism in One Country.”  Capitalism, a part of the United States of America, were manageable decisions for Stalin who controlled ninety-five percent of the economy, did not allow free-markets, and allowed limited and constrained capital- investment of some United States of American companies. The funds that Stalin condensed from consolidating Eastern-Europe went into military production for the defense of paranoid dictator. Gaddis uses sources that contend the United States of America under F.D.R., after the war, and continuing on into a few months of Truman’s Presidency, Stalin remained impervious to cooperation- gestures from the United States of America. This is to say that the often deemed policy of “insecurity,” a result of fear-mongering from both sides, did not decide the Cold War’s mutual-suspicion policy. Instead, after the War, the United States believed it in the best interest to all world states’ to re –industrialize Germany and Japan and to offer this same plan to the Stalin regime. Instead, it was Stalin who closed the doors on dialogue, cooperation, shutting the Russian state into a silent barrier understood as the Soviet Block became the reason for the Cold War.

Operation Barbarossa changed Stalin’s allegiance from the German Nazi party to an alliance with the United States of America. The Comintern switched its position to one of active support for the Allies. [87] The United States was fearful that the NAZIs would annex Russia, and therefore accumulate millions of soldiers for the German side. By supporting the Stalin regime, the United States believed that after the war, the continuance of corporation would last. However, by sending trains, jeeps, military vehicles, and spare parts to the Stalin Regime to support a military buildup of Soviet forces, the Stalin regime became self-sufficient, and upon conclusion of the war became a powerful state. The Marxist around Stalin still distrusted the western democracies, and this explains the Soviets retreating behind their socialist wall. The result of the Socialist wall created a communication barrio, in which “suspicion” resulted in the mutual phenomena of “insecurity” between the United States of America and the Stalin regime. Yet, as “insecurity,” Gaddis argues that mutual assurances of mutual destruction by use of nuclear warfare fostered four decades of peace between the two countries. As well, recognizing each sphere of influence, the other remained restrained from overt actionary impediment. Thus, the Cold War benefited both countries, if we regard peace as the sole factor of proclaiming relative world-peace.

To keep peace,   “[L]ondon’s attitude was the Americans were not doing enough [to keep peace in Western Europe]. It was this conviction that led foreign secretary Ernest Bevin late in 1947 to propose to the United States a formal and permanent peacetime military alliance with Western Europe.” [88]

The Atom Bomb and the Soviet Union

“Was the real purpose of the bomb to frighten the Soviet Union? There is plenty of evidence that Truman hoped the bomb would “make Russia more manageable.” In that sense, it might be called the first shot of the cold war. But the record is pretty clear that Truman and his aides saw the defeat of Japan as the first order of business, and ordered the use of atom bombs for that purpose.”[89]

The Atom Bomb and the American Strategy

“Truman and his aides never thought that they had a decision to make. If the atom bomb was ready to go, Truman was going to use it against America’s enemies. And in the summer of 1945, that was Japan. The decision was never in doubt. That is what is true about the official story. Over the course of World War Two, American strategic thinking had been guided by the principle of minimum cost to American lives, maximum destruction of enemy lives (including, if necessary, civilian “enemies”).  Hiroshima and Nagasaki took this principle to its conclusion.”[90]

Why Hiroshima and Nagasaki?

          1 – The atom bomb & military necessity

          2 – The atom bomb & racism

          3 – The atom bomb & the Soviet Union

          4 – The atom bomb & U.S. global strategy

The Atom Bomb and the Military Necessity

The atomic bomb can’t be explained by military necessity. It is unclear what military effect it had in terms of the timing of the surrender. Some scholars stress that the Soviet entry into the war made an even bigger impression on the Japanese leadership. [91]  

What were the Origins of the Cold War

          The Official Story

          Soviet (sis) Behavior) ( Gaddis)

          American Strategy Aims (Leffler)—Unofficial Version

          Stage of Euro- American control (Westad)

          The Forgotten war (Korea 1950-’53)

American Concept of Security

          Defense Department

          Strait Front [?]

          Truman Doctrine 1947

          West German Revival

          Strategic Frontier

          Defense in Depth

          Gaddis vs. Leffler

          Atomic Hegemonic

The Forgotten War ( a draw)

          Mao October 1st, 1949

          38th Parallel

          American Zone: Kim Il Sung  II

          Korea Invades Korea, June 25, 1950

          Ceasefire July 27, 1953 – Feb-7, 2008

 

Topics

What were the Origins of the Cold War

          Charles Postel: The Global Cold War ( Truman-Kennedy-Reagan)

          Hard-line to Soviets, leading to a collapse

          Reagan did more on Arms Control.

          Look how connected? [?]

          “A policy of Sternness and Containment, led to the collapse of the Soviet Union,”[92] Postel intends.

          The Global Cold War is a war of high-tech attrition—Fear (reject access to the Sea ( Dardanelles), and reject expansion) the attrition is cut off supplies to build equivalent military.  –mjm

          Yugoslavia, Tito chose to semi-ally with the United States, but remained independently communist/socialist.

          Marshal Plan: (1) Give massive amount of capital to prevent the United States of America, what happened in Europe ( the 20th century revolutions) (2) To prevent what happened in Europe – the poor uprising against the government (Postel).

 

Leffler: Col War/ Paranoia not about Russia, Americans are afraid of upheavals – threatening the strategic plan of America falling victim to deprivation. ( mjm – must get rich). For example, the fascists uprising to take over the Italian state, could be one such fear. The United States first Pacific post-colonial proper was the accusation of the Philippines – the U.S.A. pushed the Japanese off the islands. Today, there are approximately 700 military bases, and some of these can be considered colonial conquests.  The United States wanted Iceland, but Iceland made serious restrictions of use of bases to patrol the Arctic air routes.

 

Leffler’s thesis: Do not look only at the Soviet Union like Gladdis does, but also look at the United States of America. What were its goals, its motivation, its desires and plans?

 

          The United States of America forged a “strategic Frontier,” that is to say, to get close to the enemy as possible – in which to launch attacks if necessary.

 

Leffler: Both the United States of America and the Soviet Uion had their ideologies…

Altruistic principles:

·         Some said help,

·         Some said dominate,

·         Some said build civilization,

·         Some said “things that sound good.”

 

Westad: Global War/ West

Westad believed the Cold War was a side-show, and the decolonization of the Third World was a serious endeavor.

Westad’s Thesis: The Cold War’s final stage of European Global Control, the Cold War was the final stage of a European Globalization. Westad was not interested in who was the first or who was at fault, or who started it, but was interested in the substance and the content of the conflict, and the consequences of the intervention and control.

 

Westad: Iconic(s)

Iconic World War II, it was perceived by the United States of American citizen as the “Good War.” It brought prosperity. ( mjm – this is because the United States gained the most trade access to the world’s markets from colonialization of the ring-of-influence. )

 

Gaddis

          The Official Story

How did the American’s perceive the Cold War?

          U.S.A. Rational

          U.S.S.R. Irrational

 

          Soviet (mis) Behavior) (Gaddis)

          American Strategy Aims (Leffler)—Unofficial Version

          Stage of Euro- American control (Westad)

          The Forgotten war (Korea 1950-’53)

 

Yet, after the opening of the Russian Archives after 1989, we have learned as historians, Stalin feared liberalist (democratic) countries possibly more than the United States of American had feared the mighty Bear (Soviet Union). We now know that Stalin used the word “patriotism,” not nationalism, to rally his citizens to industrialize and fortify the Russian territories in advance of a European western liberal power as well as the liberal power across the Pacific Ocean. This explains that we no know Stalin was terrified of western imperialist conquest – which can explain, only ‘some’ of his actions. This also explains that communication between the U.S.A. and Soviet Union were problemsome on many levels (--mjm).

American Concept of Security

          Defense Department

          Strait Front [?]

          Truman Doctrine 1947

          West German Revival

          Strategic Frontier

          Defense in Depth

          Gaddis vs. Leffler

          Atomic Hegemonic

The Forgotten War (a draw)

          Máo October 1st, 1949.

In 1915, Japan issued the Twenty-One Demands to further its political and commercial interests in China. This was a result of the United States of America’s policy to force Japan into trading, and its own industrialization –a policy seen by Japan as economic conquest, and then as good for modernization. The result was Japan’s own version of “externalism.” That is to say Japan sent to conquest and hegemonically-dominate China, as the United States had represented the model to them.  As Japan began its conquests ( Sino-Japanese War(s) I & II, the United States switched support to China, eventually leaving vital military equipment until which Máo Zédōng (Wade-giles: Mao Tse-tung) utilize to rise up against the weakened Nationalist forces – to successfully implement a regime change in China. Máo’s rise to power became the difference in promotion of Marxism to that of Chinese Nationalism. (Chiang Kai-shek in the Chinese Civil War was a product of disfranchised soldiers, who were protesting  conscription – this led to mass-men ( Gregor, , etc) , easily influenced and  Zédōng capitalized on the untraditional mass-men to take power.  (( wiki Chiang Kai-shek, chairman of the Kuomintang government, who waged five waves of besieging campaigns against the "central soviet area." Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek announced the KMT's policy of resistance against Japan at Lushan on July 10, 1937, three days after the Battle of Lugou Bridge.))

 

Postel intends that Chiang Kai-shek’s regime was “corrupt, brutal,” and increasingly dependent upon the United States of America for financial assistance and military assistance. [93] The United States saw Chairman Máo as a dangerous nationalist, so the United States military and Chiang Kai-shek support operation retreated to Korea and set up a police state. [94]

          38th Parallel ( Armistice Line Drawn, June 27, 1953)

38th parallel north, the pre-Korean War boundary between North Korea and South Korea: It was discussed the United States of America had lost China, but the United States of America never had China to begin with. [95] Koreans retreated to the 38th  Parallel, the United states of America controlled. South of the armistice line, became the Republic of Korea. The North became communistic, and Kim Il Sung set up a peasant people committee, another type of police state against the rightists and Christians. [96] Both sides did not understand each other. As Civil War (1945-1953), sporadic periods erupted into guerrilla warfare, and a long Korean Civil raged on despite the 38th Parallel. In 1950, the North launched an attacked toward the South, and the U.S.A. said the North Started it, but the Civil War had already continued since 1945. But this excuse allowed the United States to conquer the group [?][97] The U.A.S. polished, as inspiration,  the rhetoric of another Pearl Harbor. Continuing racial epitaphs enveloped the U.S. Army’s training manuals.  The term Gooks, first used to identify Japanese in the Philippines, became a racial epitaph for Philippines, Japanese and Vietnamese, but in this case the Chinese (Who now took on the epitaph of Chi-coms) – who had sent over 200,000 to fight alongside the North Koreans. The North pushed the U.S. forces to the south/east while both proclaimed the 38th Parallel meaningless. The War ended in a draw.  It was a war of Communism verses Capitalism. A controversial plan drawn up by General Douglas Macarthur[98] and that the plan would have intended to use thirty atomic bombs. Other plans included an invasion of Manchuria. Truman had advisors plan on using nuclear devices along a line in the North as a devastated-boarder-line. Yet, none of this came to fruition. The U.S. Army manuals, composed like picture-cartoons-instructions, sought to teach U.S. soldiers how to tell a “good” Jap form a bad one. [99]  Face comparisons apparently told how a U.S. soldier could rightly identify an ally or an enemy. The Manual even told of how a “Jap expects to be shot.” [100]

          American Zone: Kim Il Sung  II

Korean War (1950–1953). Under Kim Il Sung (r. 1948–1994) North Korea became increasingly isolated, especially after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. Pyongyang is the capital and the largest city. Inhabited since ancient times, the region was occupied by Japan from 1910 until the end of World War II in 1945.

          Korea Invades Korea, June 25, 1950

          Ceasefire July 27, 1953 – Feb-7, 2008

 

Armistice Line Drawn, June 27, 1953. Economic Growth flourished for the first two decades in the north, in general. Economic Growth flourished to The South later. The Armistice line still is in place today.

          Marshall Plan:

The Japanese received the bulk of funding from the Marshall Plan ( after it was diverted from Europe to the Pacific following the  Korean War). After the Korean War, the North became a police state. There were estimated four million deaths attributed to the Korean Civil war, as was as the number of innocent of the four million, two million were estimated to be among the casualties. A three-year long bombing camping where peasants were targeted with Napalm ( petroleum mixed with Gelatin) in 1953, as announced as the “rice bomb,” a terroristic operation to bomb rice-farms ( 27sq. miles), observed as “ a battle of glow.” The American plan was to shock the peasants to bring down the government. (apparently similar tactics employed in terrorists against their own populations in the Middle East -mjm)

Odd Arne Westad The Global Cold War

“Westad is Director of the Cold War Studies Center at the London School of Economics and Political Science, where he teaches Cold War history and the history of East Asia. He has written or edited ten books on contemporary international history, the most recent of which are “Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950” (2003) and, with Jussi Hanhimäki, “The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts (2003).”[101] The byline on page “I” tells the reader this is the best book in the world on the Cold War ever written. Its thesis is that U.S. colonialism of North America, and its subsequent United States of America Third World policy was predicated only on racism, that is to say white domination. In contrast, progressivism, predicated on “breaking down routine” is associated with socialism (or communism) and is the only just system on earth.  It was the U.S.A’s fault, more than the Soviet Union, that spearheaded the unjustness of the modern world we live in today. The book received the Bancroft Prize, most possibly for identifying the root of evil on earth – the white European race-stock. There appears to be no conversation on Josef Stalin’s Slavophile activities, nor Mao Zendong’s national-racism in respect to other ethnic Chinese, as well as all outsiders. As well Karl Marx’s racism against the Jews, nor his classism argument against poor people as  laid out clearly in the Communist Manifesto, is never attempted; while Westad covers imperialism from the Muscovite era  (described as Russia, when it did not exist then) from the sixteenth century origins, albeit finding the period correctly, he never brings up Chinese dynastic influence upon their subjects  -- illustrating by their written sources that the outside of China’s classical boarders laid the hated barbarian. Apparently, Racism belongs only to the American past. There appears to be little to no understanding of Karl Marx, let along the general and broad usage of Marxism, where we know there are over 1000 different interpretations, the use of racism replaces Marx’s Capitalist pretheory. While Westad claims that the U.S. policy after WW II was a direct result of racism, he somehow forgets that Marx’s prethoery of capitalism predicates a proposition that new markets must be created constantly and this could explain the massive socialization of U.S. policy in the south as well as the north’s less industrial societies. As well, the use of Third World constantly throughout the text, in light of acknowledging the negative connotations of repetition, replete with negative repetitive- framing reaps of stark epistemological conquest. It is hard to contemplate that the persons living in the under developed nations of this world like to be labeled constantly throughout a text as not equal – regardless of epistemological neologisms. As well, after the New Deal, Freedom was overthrown and Semi-Socialism was implemented into the “American Way.” By understanding the radical change in the American Way, we can understand the rise of the global imperialists of the U.S.A., as we can also understand why the Soviet Union as well went imperialist under their socialism. Both socialist and the semi-socialist became the supreme dominators of earth – and had nothing to do with representative democracy that was overthrown beginning in 1933.  Both socialistic countries had their rhetoric, but their imperialism was empirically observed – as well as just the same. The decisions came not form the people, but the top. Since the U.S.A. government took considerable control beginning in 1933, its creations of CIA, NSA, FBI (National Security Act of 1947) and a myriad of other black-projects exemplified and mimics the Soviet socialist-militaristic agencies. It is hard to make the case that the socialists Americans were racists when they did not decide on the covert programs, or were tutelage of them on the evening news, print media or Sunday radio programs. Since liberalism took over in  1933 replacing Freedom, it would be hard to argue that white democracy was anything but the reality of what it was – socialism – controlled by the elite government—an not the people.

 The only difference between the unindustrialized societies and the industrial dominant societies were their technological acquisitions and aspirations. As with the American Civil War, the industrialized side won, not because they did not have the more talented General ( the South was more talented, a view held by most Civil War historians), but that the North had an endless supply of arms and ammunition. The Soviets role as Ally, as well as its Army’s valiant battle against the Germans in the subways of Berlin, led it to acquire advanced technology and build upon it to eventually dominate and influence its sphere after WW II. Since the Mongols dominated the Steppe system through technological advance weaponry, i.e. the pivot saddle, the stirrup, the bone-bow, the Blood Sweating Horses from the Tarim Basin, they dominated their enemies.  Sins they dominated their enemies, does that make them racist in history? Or was it only the White citizens of the Socialist period of the United States of America that dominated others, therefore as racists?  Apparently racism tells too little of the actual story or facts behind our history. There seems to be a human need to understand the domination of other humans that come into contact with other groups that have ascertained advanced weaponry – in all of history.  Westad’s main claim and tied to his thesis is that the United States through its racism of white-European dominance (most of the time, just Americans as in general)  was the sole shaper of our world’s modernity. Somehow, no other ethnic group or for that matter no other race had anything to do with modernity but be its clay – to the Americans (unspecified in most of the book as too who?) – who shaped all the peoples of the world into what they are today. Does he understand that Capitalism appeared in the countryside of the Tokugawa, regardless of western contact? Apparently, capitalism did not start in the English industrial revolution, or as Marx said, during the final period of the European Middle Ages, as to the merchants (Burghers). Somehow I cannot understand this irrationalism, but nevertheless, I will let you hear some of what he has to say (or you can pick up his book and become mesmerized to the white monsters of history). Finally we the word democracy was despised by the founders of the United States of America, and then it finally shows up after Karl Marx’s popularity in the later stages of the nineteenth century, and then begins its long assent into American discourse, and we know that true democracy to Karl Marx was socialism ( in his lexicography, communism)  because it “liberated” the individual to its higher self, then we understand that when the U.S.A. was/is rhetorically spreading “Democracy” it was/is spreading socialism – and socialism in this case was predatory-imperialism.

Abbreviations
AIOC                      Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
ANC                       African National Congress (South Africa)
ARAMCO              Arabian-American Oil Company
ASEAN                   Association of South East Asian Nations
BOSS                      Bureau of State Security (South Africa)
CC                          Central Committee
CCP                        Chinese Communist Party
CIA                         Central Intelligence Agency (US)
Comintern           Communist International
CPP (m- 1)            Communist Party of Philippines (Marxist-Leninist)
CPSU                      Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CWIHP                   Cold War International History Project
DCI                         Director of Central Intelligence (US)
DPK                        Democratic Party of Kurdistan
DPRK                      Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
ELF                          Eritrean Liberation Front
EPLF                        Eritrean People’s Liberation Front
EPRP                       Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party
FAPLA                    Forcas Armadas Popular para Libertacäo de Angola (People’s Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola)
FLN                         Front de Liberation Nationale (Algeria)
FMLN                     Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberación Nacional (Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation, El Salvador)
FNLA                      Frente Nacional de Libertacão de Angola (National Front for the Liberation of Angola)
FRELIMO                Frente de Libertacâo de Mocambique (Mozambiquan Liberation Front)
FRETILIN                                 Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente (Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor)
FSLN                       Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Sandinista National Liberation Front, Nicaragua)
GDR                       German Democratic Republic
GRU                        Glavnoie razvedivatelnoie upravleniie (Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff; USSR)
IBRD                       International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICP                          Iraqi Communist Party
IMP                         International Monetary Fund
ISI                            Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)
KGB                        Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security; USSR)
KhAD                     Khadimat-e atal’at-e dowlati (State Information Service [Security); Afghanistan)
MCP                       Malayan Communist Party
MFA                       Movimento das Forcas Armadas (Armed Forces Movement; Portugal)
MIT                          Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MNC                      Mouvement National Congolais (Congolese National Movement)
MO                         Mezhdunarodnyi otdel (International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU; USSR)
MPLA                     Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
NAM                      Non-Aligned Movement
NIEO                       New Intemational Economic Order
NLF                         National Liberation Front (Vietnam)
NPA                        New People’s Army (Philippines)
NSC                        National Security Council (US)
OAS                       Organization of American States
OAU                       Organization of African Unity
OPEC                     Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PAIGC                   Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde)
PDPA                     People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PDRE                      People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
PDRY                      People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen
PGT                         Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (Guatemalan Workers’ Party)
PM                          Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)[102]

Third World and Cold War Neologisms

“A friend of mine, who studies language, noted with more than a touch of friendly irony how chronologically well attuned my choice of conceptual terms for this book is to the topic covered: Both “Cold War” and “Third World” are late twentieth-century neologisms, employed for various purposes and in various cultural settings to create some of the most fundamental hegemonic discourses of the era. My linguist friend is of course right. Neither of these terms existed prior to World War II, and the ways in which they have been used are signals for which side you were on in the last great conflicts of the century. “Cold War” was first used by George Orwell in 1945 to deplore the worldview, beliefs, and social structure of both the Soviet Union and the United States, and also the undeclared state of war that would come to exist between them. “The atomic bomb,” Orwell found, may be “robbing the exploited classes and peoples of all power to revolt, and at the same time putting the possessors of the bomb on a basis of equality. Unable to conquer one another they are likely to continue ruling the world between them.”2 Although a critical term at first, the term “Cold War” in the 1950s came to signal an American concept of warfare against the Soviet Union: aggressive containment without a state of war. The Soviets, on their side, never used the term officially before the Gorbachev era, since they clung to the fiction that their country was “peaceful” and only “imperialism” was aggressive, in a way similar to how US (and Western European) leaders used the “Cold War” to imply a Soviet threat.”


“The concept “Third World” came into being in the early 1950s, first in French and then in English, and gained prominence after the Bandung conference of 1955, when leaders from Asia and Africa met for the first large postcolonial summit. With its French connotations of tiers hat — the “third estate,” the most populous but least represented of the French prerevolutionary social groups — the term “Third World” implied “the people” on a world scale, the global majority who had been downtrodden and enslaved through colonialism, but who were now on their way to the top of the ladder of influence. The concept also implied a distinct position in Cold War terms, the refusal to be ruled by the superpowers and their ideologies, the search for alternatives both to capitalism and Communism, a “third way” (if that expression can be decoupled from present-day Blairite hypocrisy) for the newly liberated states.”

“My use of these terms may therefore be seen to point in two opposing directions: the term “Cold War” signals Western elite projects on the grandest of possible scales, while the term “Third World” indicates colonial and postcolonial processes of marginalization (and the struggle against these processes). Some critics have claimed that by positioning one “in” the other I do violence to their separateness - I implicitly subsume one discourse under the other. Having reread the literature that was written on the Cold War in the Third World towards the end of the Cold War era, I can sympathize somewhat with this position: the greater amount of these mostly American writings attempted to delegitimize domestic Third World revolutions or radical movements on the grounds that they were Soviet-inspired or Soviet-sponsored.”


“Still, the argument that the Cold War conceptually and analytically does not belong in the south is wrong, mainly for two reasons. First, US and Soviet interventionisms to a very large extent shaped both the international and the domestic framework within which political, social, and cultural changes in Third World countries took place. Without the Cold War, Africa, Asia, and possibly also Latin America would have been very different regions today. Second, Third World elites often framed their own political agendas in conscious response to the models of development presented by the two main contenders of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union. In many cases the Third World leaders’ choices of ideological allegiance brought them into close collaboration with one or the other of the superpowers, and led them to subscribe to models of development that proved disastrous for their own peoples. The latter aspect of the Cold War in the Third World is the least explored, perhaps because it is the most difficult for both former Cold Warriors and their opponents to accept.”[103]


“For the purpose of this volume my definitions of the key terms are rather straightforward. “Cold War” means the period in which the global conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union dominated international affairs, roughly between 1945 and 1991. “Third World” means the former colonial or semicolonial countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America that were subject to European (or rather pan-European, including American and Russian) economic or political domination.[104] “Global” means processes that took place on or toward different continents at roughly the same time. “Intervention” means any concerted and state-led effort by one country to determine the political direction of mother country. These are brief, operational definitions that make sense n the particular context in which they are used here (but that are obviously open to challenge in any broader context).”
[105]

Creating the Third World: the United States confronts revolution

“In the aftermath of World War II the United States intervened repeatedly to influence the processes of change that were taking place throughout the Third World. In some quarters in Europe (and often in the Third World itself) it became usual to speak of America replacing the European colonial powers in their struggles against anticolonial radicalism. But, as we shall see, these interventions were generally grounded in US perceptions and beliefs, and were not primarily attempts at helping out bankrupt and war-weary European powers. At the core of American Third World involvement stood the Cold War anti-Communist agenda and the exceptional interventionist capabilities that the United States possessed after the Second World War ended, a war which had made it, for the first time in its history, the dominant capitalist power, economically and militarily, as well as ideologically.”


“In economic terms, the US dominance was absolute, both as a reflection of American growth and because of wartime destruction elsewhere. In 1950 the US gross domestic product (GDP) was higher than all of Europe’s put together, and possibly equal to that of Europe plus the Soviet Union. Its annual average growth rate since the outbreak of World War I had been almost three times that of Britain or of France, its GDP per capita was twice that of Western Europe, and productivity was almost three times the European average. And even though most of its economic growth was still concentrated at home, by 1950 the United States was by far the world’s leading exporter and foreign investor.’”


“The modern Third World was created in the shadow of American predominance, and many of the leaders of the newly independent countries looked to the United States for support and direction. At the same time, the US gaze was firmly turned toward Europe --  there was no Marshall Plan for the countries that emerged from colonialism, and American support for independence was increasingly tempered by its fear of Communism. US postwar policies therefore helped to give birth to the extreme inequality that has existed between the developed capitalist states and the Third World over the past two generations, both in terms of power and economic resources.”[106]

 

“This relegation did not take place because American policy makers lacked the will to globalize its model of development — as we have seen, that drive existed as a significant element of their ideology, both in Europe and in the Third World. It was, rather, the combination of ideological predilections, racial stereotyping, and Cold War political and strategic aims that made America become part of the Third World’s problem.”


“Why did the United States intervene in the Third World as often as it did during the Cold War? One obvious reason was its capabilities, another its  taking on of the responsibility for a global capitalist system. Very often, as we shall see, US involvements were perceived in America as defensive interventions, mainly against left-wing or Communist movements. Still, Washington always remained preoccupied with structural solutions to the Communist challenge, meaning — in the language of the 19 50s — development, or becoming more like America. The political scientist Douglas Macdonald is therefore right when he calls US Cold War interventions “interventions for reform.” But the American perceptual dilemma was that in a Cold War setting, Third World domestic political conditions often needed to be changed first, before US-inspired reform could begin to take hold. Such change generally meant the defeat of radical attempts at controlling the political order, and it was in order to produce such a result that most US interventions took place, even when military strategy, economic gain, or favors to friends also played a role in the decision making.  In overall terms, the US Cold War mindset was implemented only slowly with regard to the Third World. The late 1940s was a period of  transition. Even NSC 68 — the most consciously ideological of all foreign  policy documents from the Truman administration — saw the American  objective as “with our allies and the former subject peoples to seek to  create a world society based on the principle of consent. Its framework  cannot be inflexible. It will consist of many national communities of great and varying abilities and resources.” But the same document also gave the United States a special responsibility for imposing order:

 

In a shrinking world, which now faces the threat of atomic warfare, it is not an adequate objective merely to seek to check the Kremlin design, for the absence of aider among nations is becoming less and less tolerable. This fact imposes on us, in our own interests, the responsibility of world leadership. It demands that we make the attempt, and accept the risks inherent in it, to bring about order and lance by means consistent with the principles of freedom and democracy.[107]

 

U.S. Continual Continental expansion up until 1914.

1783 Original Territory of the Thirteen States.

1800s (nineteenth century, interventions took place against the Native Americans, Westad’s figures.

Louisiana Purchase: 1804 (purchased from Napoleon of France, so he could pay his army).

Jeffersonian(s) “cherished the self-sufficient farmer as the ideal citizen”[108] [not Alexander Hamilton]

1812: War of; for international trade.

1819 Florida and South/East ceded by Spain.

1845 Texas Annexed from Mexico ( Spain).

1846: Oregon Territory Title Established ( North West to Pacific).

1848 South West to Pacific, ceded by Mexico.

Late 19th Century, U.S. became a transoceanic imperial power.

Late 19th Century, U.S. became an industrialized nation. “the capitalist market became a reality for all.”[109]

1890s-1910s: U.S.A. reached its peak at industrialization – especially leading up to World War One ( causing questions on ethnic immigration, Slavs, Latin, Asian immigrants)

1870-1920 American Values:  “Northern Whites grew increasingly concerned over the threat to “American values,” that could come out of the entry of “unassimilable strangers. From 1870 to 1920, as the United States received 26 million new immigrants, racial and ethnic stereotyping came to determine their initial “placing” in American society.” [110]

1898: The United States took Cuba away from Spain. It was seen as place to supplant the U.S.A. version of democracy. It was also part of the definition of Westad’s  version of “ interventionalism.”

World War I and the opportunity to influence the world: American pattern representation: Woodrow Wilson and many of his contemporary, Westad intends.[111]  “Interventionalism, Wilson had concluded by 1917, was the only way of achieving “a reasonable peace settlement and the reconstruction of the world order. “[112] What Wilson felt to be good for the world – as in his Fourteen Points—would also, necessarily, be good for America.” [113]

1920s-1930s: Westad’s Isolationism period: “ America’s postwar unwillingness to take the lead in the international organizations Wilson had constructed is often written down to  a US sense of policies betrayal after Europe spurned US positions at the peace conferences.“[114] During the post-World War One era, when most Cold War leaders were growing up, the “ idea that Europe and the world had shown themselves not ready for American order, organization, and concepts of rights merged with concern over the effects of immigration.“[115]

Racism and Communism: Westad intends that U.S.A rejection of communism in the early twentieth century (c. 1920s) was a result of its universalism, as regards to multiculturalism.[116] However, this was never the case. Only with Lenin, then Trotsky, were multiculturalism parts of the communist process. Lenin’s vanguard communist parties were temporary, as he saw it and not permanent. Many historians use the period when Lenin was engaged in the process of structuring to view it as he ultimate position. Lenin was content with Marx’s world proletarian movement, but understood that it could not be accomplished in the world’s present state. Lenin did not live long enough to establish a firm control of his vision of ‘universalism.’  Why Stalin understood conditions did not persist, he went about organizing vanguard parties based upon each country that wanted to join in the universal communism experiment. This did not mean he was a mono-centralism or a multi-factionist as some prominent historians view his intentions.  Stalin’s rejection of multiculturalism in the top administrations of the Soviet Politburo and Mao’s ethnic Chinese superiority, communism was as un – multiculturalism reality as western liberal democracy. Richard Nixon would understand this in his détente and Realpolitik agendas. Nixon did not see states as communist or democracies but as each state forming, managing, and promoting their own nationalisms.

As Westad intends, America was not ready for “collectivism” on an ethnic scale. Only for a brief moment in history, the Depression era, did the American Communist Party have an influence on American society’s structure. Still the party was small in comparisons to the European socialist parties. Westad does appear to understand that Americans began to see Stalinism, National Socialism, and Communism with fear, and as the same composure of an “authoritarian collectivist ideology.”[117] F.D.R’s rhetoric after World War One partially led to the sentiments of isolationism. However, Westad contends that U.S. foreign relations can barely deserve the label  “isolationist,”[118] during the interwar periods. These two decades,  1920s-‘30s, Westad stresses were breakthroughs on American foreign policy in regards to the Third World (underdeveloped states which were rising out of former colonies). As evidence, American exports to Asia almost tripled between 1920 and 1940. The total percentage was small, but still the east was seen as a continuation of western expansionism. Post-war 1945, The Soviets counter with their eastern expansion policy – which led to the first dilemmas of the Cold War as a larger symbolic civil war between two similar nationalistic ideologies complicated by rhetoric of social foundational ideologies. “In a world where the Great Depression forced many minds to begin to consider new models for their nations, American ideas followed American products to an extent that few Americans—in their fear of outside challenges—realized.”[119]  Westad therefore understands that economic imperialism, masked as free-market capitalism, intended to spread Americanism along with material products [this of course is what Karl Marx’s theory on capitalism predicts][120].  “Roosevelt’s New Deal  and the state-led reforms that followed were greeted by some as a necessary concession to collectivism, while others feared the administration’s initiatives and saw them as confirming the political, cultural and moral decline that had been forced on America by “foreign” influence.”[121] Yet, F.D.R. did formulize free-market-trade-zones at least in Meetings with Stalin and as concepts for post-war capitalism. While F.D.R.’s social programs at home were given to sacrificial collectivism, the aim in the U.S. foreign policy sense was purely capitalist and intensely pro-American. F.D.R. while economically promoting collectivist economic responsibility would not go as far as Stalin as collectivism the social and political rural regions of the state. Communism during and before the war period answered many justice questions of equality, and ethical-economic issues. 

Dichotomy: Westad intends it was the liberals of the 1930s that wanted to spread Americanism, birth physically and economically.[122] Today, the role appears the opposite, at least illusionary. Both liberals and conservatives accused each other of being “soft on Communism” and the liberals claiming that the conservatives were unwilling to pay the price of “making the world safe for democracy.[123] This appears perfectly viable during the war and post-war Democratic foreign agenda making. However, after the Civil Rights and Rights Revolution of the 1960s, the shift went toward Republicans ‘ paying the price to make the world safe and fostering economic agendas as far as the New Left would allow. But as my studies have noted, the New Left’s human and global human rights agenda profoundly affected Washington’s overt acquisition of market share across the globe the price for economic prosperity is now regulated to moral and ethical standards that decreased the middle-class and affected the U.S. high-wages (seen in the 1970s) and the overall standard of living.

What changed the conservative’s viewpoint in 1940s? Westad intends it was the Attack upon Pearl Harbor (1941).[124] […] F.D. R. believed in “positive nationalisms” as the best guard against authoritarianism. “[125]

China Policy: “The American wartime involvement in China is the best example of how Washington attempted to guide allied regimes deemed deficient in talent [Roosevelt’s racism], education ,and moral strength toward reform. While the Chinese leader Jiang Jieshi  [a.k.a. Chiang Kai-shek] saw his alliance with the United States as a marriage of convenience directed, first,  against Japan and then, after Tokyo’s defeat, against the Chinese Communists, many in Washington viewed Sino-American cooperation as a blank check to reform Chinese society and the state.”[126]

American modernity: After WW II, a large portion of the world then desired the American culture and way (Westad intends).

Conservatives against the New deal: “Conservatives did criticize the Roosevelt administration for being naïve in its relations with the Soviet Union – in part a way to attack reform at home – but with limited success,” Westad intends.[127]

Intervening in the Third World in domestic policy –African Slavery: It is incorrect to see US foreign affairs, as some historians have done,  with the polices of Africa after WW II, but view the first hundred years of America’s existence with Native Americans and African intervention into the Third World with the American-slave trade.[128]  Ultimately the controversy over liberty, freedom, and equality were qualified assessments. Nation building, apparently, was seen through classes of groups identified ethnically as demarcated through technology.

Reconstruction in South and conflicts over slavery: New Third World Policies – emancipation and guidance.[129] These were rhetoric, implied and valued – all at the same time—solutions to the global inequality.

Pilipinos to the American colonial project: mid-1930s, enough American confidence that the Philippines could progress to a colony and gain independence. The Philippines was seen as a triumph in American colonialism. [130]

Caribbean: American failed to progress American colonial model.

Philippines: The only country in the early twentieth century that The U.S.A could impose its” model of development through colonization […].”[131]

Post WWII:

Marshall Plan:  “ Within Europe, American aims centered on economic rebuilding through the Marshall Plan and the Security through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Both of these aimed at combating Communism,  and -- in different forms—later came from key elements of American policy toward the Third World.”[132] The restructuring formed the main model of the Marshall Plan. “It was the veterans of the F.D.R’s New Deal programs who set the aims, and in doing so they reflected a much more positive view of what the state would be able to do than had been usual in American policy abroad.”[133]

“Paul Hoffman – a Key Marshall Plan administrator—put it in 1951: “We have learned in Europe what to do in Asia, for under the Marshall Plan we have developed the essential instruments of a successful policy in the arena of world politics.”[134] Those instruments,” Westad argues, “were the political and cultural seduction of local elites, access to local markets, and military aid and training. Together, these measures were aimed at creating states that could both be successful in their own development and be part of American containment policies against the Soviet Union and its allies.”

 

NSC MEETINGS – TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION (1947-1953)

Meeting Date Agenda Topics

Sep 26, 1947 National Security Council System, National

Security Council Staff, Directives to the CIA

Nov 14, 1947 Exports to USSR, Maritime Commission, Italy,

Military Bases, Psychological Operations

Dec 12, 1947 Intelligence, CIA Directives

Dec 17, 1947 Exports to USSR, Spain, Greece, Japan Economics

Jan 13, 1948 Greece, Intelligence, Military Bases, Greenland

Feb 12, 1948 Greece, Italy, Intelligence, Palestine, China

Mar 11, 1948 Italy

Mar 23, 1948 Defense Policy

Apr 02, 1948 Korea, China, Foreign Information

Apr 22, 1948 Western Union, Intelligence

May 20, 1948 Western Union, Intelligence, Great Britain,

Eastern Mediterranean, Middle East, Nuclear

Matters

Jun 03, 1948 Special Studies/State Army Navy Air Force

Coordinating Committee, Defense Policy, Greece,

USSR, Nuclear Matters, International Trade,

Eastern Europe

Jun 17, 1948 International Trade, Turkey, Military Assistance,

Korea

Jul 01, 1948 USSR, Aviation, Western Union, Intelligence

Jul 15, 1948 Great Britain, Defense Policy, Military

Assistance, War Powers, China

Jul 22, 1948 Germany

Aug 05, 1948 Italy, Africa, Colonies, Defense Policy, China,

Berlin

2

Aug 19, 1948 Berlin, Palestine, Russia, United Nations, Defense

Policy

Sep 02, 1948 Scandinavia, State Army Navy Air Force

Coordinating Committee, United Nations, Palestine,

Yugoslavia

Sep 14, 1948 Berlin

Jul 16, 1948 Atomic Warfare, France, Military Assistance,

Intelligence, Budget

Sep 30, 1948 Japan, Berlin, USSR, China, Yugoslavia

Oct 07, 1948 Japan, Berlin Airlift, Economic Warfare, Venezuela

Oct 14, 1948 Berlin Airlift, USSR

Oct 21, 1948 Berlin Airlift, USSR, Budget

Nov 03, 1948 China, Military Assistance

Nov 23, 1948 USSR, Jerusalem, Denmark, Norway, Military Bases,

Berlin

Dec 02, 1948 Military Bases, Denmark, Norway, Berlin, China

Dec 10, 1948 Japan Economics, China

Dec 16, 1948 Turkey, Middle East, Greece, China, Military

Assistance, Japan Economics, Berlin, Austrian

Treaty

Jan 06, 1949 China, Formosa, Intelligence, Venezuela, Oil,

Middle East

Jan 27, 1949 Europe, Germany

Feb 03, 1949 China, Formosa

Mar 03, 1949 China Trade, Formosa, USSR, Germany

Mar 22, 1949 Korea, Turkey, USSR, Intelligence

Apr 07, 1949 Intelligence

3

Apr 21, 1949 Turkey, Japan, Intelligence

May 05, 1949 Export Controls, Western Union, Germany

May 17, 1949 Germany, Austrian Peace Treaty

Jun 02, 1949 USSR, Berlin, State Army Navy Air Force

Coordinating Committee

Jun 26, 1949 South Asia, USSR, Berlin

Jul 07, 1949 Intelligence, Austria, USSR, Berlin

Aug 04, 1949 Intelligence, Italy, Colonies, Iceland, Iran

Sep 15, 1949 Israel, Arab States, Austria, Great Britain,

Canada, Antarctica

Sep 29, 1949 Budget

Oct 20, 1949 Formosa, Austrian Treaty, Hong Kong

Nov 17, 1949 Austria, USSR, Yugoslavia

Dec 08, 1949 Eastern Europe, Intelligence, Budget, USSR

Dec 29, 1949 Asia

Jan 05, 1950 USSR, Defense Policy

Feb 01, 1950 Defense Policy

Feb 16, 1950 Chemical Warfare, Austria

Apr 06, 1950 Arms Sales, Near East

Apr 20, 1950 Italy

May 04, 1950 Austria, National Security Council Directive 68,

Berlin, Middle East, Oil

May 18, 1950 Latin America, Defense Policy, National Security

Council Directive 68, Middle East, Oil

Jun 29, 1950 Far East

Jul 05, 1950 Far East

4

Jul 06, 1950 Far East, Spain, West Germany, Point IV Program,

Korea

Jul 13, 1950 Far East, Great Britain, Defense Policy

Jul 27, 1950 Intelligence, USSR, Korea, Formosa, NSC Staff

Aug 03, 1950 Formosa, China Peoples Republic, Intelligence,

Korea, National Security Council Staff, Manpower

Aug 10, 1950 Port Security, Korea, United Nations, Mutual

Defense Assistance Committee

Aug 17, 1950 Far East, Middle East, Oil

Aug 24, 1950 Export Controls, USSR, Korea, Port Security

Sep 07, 1950 Korea, Austria

Sep 29, 1950 France, Military Assistance, Economics

Oct 12, 1950 Defectors, Israel, Arab States, Greece, Turkey,

USSR, Middle East, Oil, Far East

Nov 02, 1950 East - West Trade, Export Controls, USSR,

Yugoslavia, Ireland, NATO, Germany, Psychological

Operations

Nov 09, 1950 Korea, Philippines, Great Britain, Suez Canal,

Iceland, Latin America, Military Assistance

Nov 22, 1950 East – West Trade, China Peoples Republic, United

Nations

Nov 28, 1950 Korea

Nov 28, 1950 Korea, Prime Minister Attlee

Dec 14, 1950 China Peoples Republic, United Nations, Germany,

Denmark, Norway, Military Bases, Jerusalem

Dec 21, 1950 Brussels Meetings, Cannon Amendment, Korea,

Indochina

Jan 04, 1951 Korea, Intelligence, Manpower, Psychological

Operations

5

Jan 10, 1951 Classification, Intelligence, Italy, Austria

Jan 12, 1951 Korea

Jan 17, 1951 Korea, China Peoples Republic, South Asia

Jan 24, 1951 Far East, South Asia

Feb 01, 1951 Far East, Puerto Rico, Port Security, Spain, Great

Britain, Arms Sales, Intercontinental Ballistic

Missiles, Iran, Turkey, Hong Kong, Cargo Air Lift

Feb 01, 1951 Far East, Port Security, Spain, Puerto Rico, Great

Britain, Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles,

Defense Policy

Feb 14, 1951 Far East, Greece, Japan, Israel, Arab States

Feb 21, 1951 Far East, Defense Policy, USSR, Economics, Cannon

Amendment

Mar 07, 1951 Far East, Yugoslavia

Mar 14, 1951 Far East, Arab States, Israel

Mar 21, 1951 Far East, Iran

Apr 11, 1951 Far East, Economics, USSR, Indochina, Germany,

Europe, Defense Policy

Apr 18, 1951 Far East, USSR, NATO, Defectors

May 02, 1951 Far East, Asia, Middle East, Oil

May 03, 1951 Far East, Asia, Manpower, Latin America, Military

Assistance

May 23, 1951 Far East, Cannon Amendment, Turkey, Italy,

Colonies, South Asia, Arms Sales, Middle East

Jun 06, 1951 Far East, USSR, Eastern Europe, Iran

Jun 13, 1951 Far East, Budget, Intelligence, USSR, Economics,

Aviation

6

Jun 27, 1951 Far East, Iran, Spain, Latin America, Military

Assistance

Jul 11, 1951 Far East, Classification, Intelligence

Jul 18, 1951 Far East, Austria, Greece, Defense Policy

Aug 01, 1951 Far East

Aug 08, 1951 Far East

Aug 22, 1951 Far East, USSR, Japan, India, Pakistan, Iran,

Middle East, Oil

Aug 29, 1951 Far East, International Trade, Denmark, Poland

Sep 12, 1951 Far East, Congressional, Berlin, NATO, Budget

Sep 26, 1951 Far East, Asia, Korea, Spain, Latin America,

Military Assistance

Oct 10, 1951 Korea, Far East, Iran

Oct 17, 1951 Far East

Oct 23, 1951 Far East, United Nations General Assembly

Nov 28, 1951 Far East, Austria, International Trade, Economics,

Aviation, USSR, South Asia

Dec 05, 1951 Far East, Switzerland, USSR

Dec 12, 1951 Far East, Oil

Dec 19, 1951 Far East, Korea, Armistice, Indochina

Jan 16, 1952 Far East, Canada, International Trade,

Scandinavia, Finland, USSR

Feb 06, 1952 Far East, Port Security, Hong Kong, Macao

Mar 05, 1952 Korean Negotiations, Southeast Asia, International

Trade, Venezuela, Italy, Defense Policy,

Philippines, Switzerland

Apr 02, 1952 Formosa, Port Security, Latin America, Military

Assistance

7

Apr 23, 1952 Far East, Arab States, Israel, Middle East, Oil

Apr 30, 1952 Far East, Manpower, Defense Policy, Japan

May 28, 1952 Far East, Manpower, Economics, USSR, Arab States,

Israel, South Asia, Greece, Berlin, Arms Sales

Jun 11, 1952 Far East, Berlin, USSR

Jun 18, 1952 Far East, Civil Defense, Covert Action, Economics

Jun 25, 1952 Far East, Southeast Asia

Aug 06, 1952 Far East, Iran, Japan, Defectors, USSR, Turkey

Sep 03, 1952 Far East, National Security Council System

Sep 24, 1952 Far East, National Security Council System, Early

Warning System, South Asia, Scandinavia, Finland,

Middle East, Oil

Oct 14, 1952 Early Warning System

Nov 19, 1952 Far East, Iran, Germany, Economics, USSR, Latin

America, Military Assistance

Nov 26, 1952 Far East, National Security Council System,

Psychological Operations

Dec 17, 1952 Far East, Oil, Diplomatic Security

Jan 09, 1953 Oil


[1] Postel, Charles, unpublished class material, History 124B, Spring ’08 ( Berkeley, University of Calfiornia, Berkeley, 2008).

[2] General Giulio Douhet (30 May 1869 - 15 February 1930).

[3] In 1911 Italy went to war against Turkey for control of Libya -- a war that saw aircraft used for the first time in reconnaissance, transport, artillery spotting and bombing roles.

[4] Telegram for the CO of Legion Condor, sent by HQ at Salamanca, in: Maier: Guernica 26.4.1937. Die deutsche Intervention in Spanien und der "Fall Guernica", Freiburg 1977, Appendix 6. Nationalist order of forces: Condor Legion in 1937, Oberstleutnant Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen from Spanish Command.

[5] Five waves of aerial-area-bombing attacks, the attacks destroyed the majority of Guernica. Three quarters of the city's buildings were reported completely destroyed, and most others sustained damage. The population at the time was approximately 5000. The city was mainly a market town, which meant that people came in from the outside to shop. There was evidence that the market was announced closed for unknown reason that day, a Monday.

[6] April 26, 1937

September 1, 1939, appeal at the outbreak of World War II in Europe, President Roosevelt beseeched the belligerents to refrain from the “inhuman barbarism” of attacking civilian centers.

“FDR” by Ted Morgan, he authorized production of anthrax and botulism toxins that could be disbursed by bombing. “Roosevelt consistently supported the manufacture and use of the atomic bomb,” Morgan wrote. “At a meeting with Stimson on December 30, 1944, FDR approved the production and testing of the bombs, and the training of the crews of the 509th Composite (bomber) Group.” [ online]

[7] General George C. Marshall, head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Roosevelt present, had called for off-the-record press briefing in November of 1941. Marshall decided that the enemy would be treated mercilessly. At that time Roosevelt was handedly in command of producing the U.S. Air Arsenal for war.

[8] The Blitz was the sustained area-bombing bombing of England by Nazi Germany between 7 September 1940 and 10 May 1941, in World War II.

[9] Cox, Robert Jon, Real Admiral Ralph A. Ofstie United States NavyTask Unit 77.4.3 (Taffy III) Commander Carrier Division 26, in "The Battle Off Samar - Taffy III at Leyte Gulf " [ available online] January 2008. Ralph Andrew Ofstie was born in Eau Claire, Wisconsin on November 16, 1897.  His hometown was Everett, Washington. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in June 1918.

[10] The Revolt of the Admirals is a name given to an episode that took place in the late 1940s in which several United States Navy admirals and high-ranking civilian officials publicly disagreed with the United States government's plans for the military forces.

[11] Air Force insistence on a monopoly for the strategic role also helped kill the P6M SeaMaster. Piet, Stan, and Raithel, Al. Martin P6M SeaMaster. Bel Air, Maryland: Martineer Press, 2001, p. 148. in “Revolt of the Admirals,” Wikipedia, unsourced editing, [ available online] January 2008.

[12] In 1940, under the Export Control Act, the U.S.A. halted shipments of airplanes, parts, machine tools, and aviation gasoline, which Japan saw as an unfriendly act.

[13] Currently, The Republic of Indonesia (Indonesian: Republik Indonesia), is a nation in Southeast Asia. Comprising 17,508 islands, it is the world's largest archipelagic state.

[14] The Philippines (Filipino: Pilipinas), officially the Republic of the Philippines (Republika ng Pilipinas; RP), is an archipelagic nation located in Southeast Asia, with Manila as its capital city.

[15] Bataan is a province of the Philippines occupying the whole of Bataan Peninsula on Luzon. The province is part of the Central Luzon region.

[16] The Bataan Death March (also known as The Death March of Bataan) took place in the Philippines in 1942 and was later accounted as a Japanese war crime.

[17] Postel, Charles to Class in “personal class lecture notes,” unpublished material, 31 January 2008 (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, History 124B, 2008).

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Sebald, W. G., On The Natural History of Destruction, trans. Anthea Bell (Modern Library, Random House, 2004), pp. 3-4.

[21] Sebald, W. G., On The Natural History of Destruction, trans. Anthea Bell (Modern Library, Random House, 2004), p. 3.

[22]  See Hans Magnus Enzensberger’s collection Europa in Trümmern ( “Europe in Ruins”(1990)) in Sebald, W. G., On The Natural History of Destruction, trans. Anthea Bell (Modern Library, Random House, 2004), p. 7.

[23] Sebald, W. G., On The Natural History of Destruction, trans. Anthea Bell (Modern Library, Random House, 2004), p. 11.

[24] Sebald, W. G., On The Natural History of Destruction, trans. Anthea Bell (Modern Library, Random House, 2004), p. 12.

[25] Sebald, W. G., On The Natural History of Destruction, trans. Anthea Bell (Modern Library, Random House, 2004), p. 14.

[26] Ibid.,15.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

[30] “Military-Industrial Complex Speech, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1961” in Public Papers of the Presidents, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960, p. 1035- 1040 [ available online] 2008. See “Anatol Lieven Interview: Conversations with History; Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley,” interviewer Harry Kreisler 6 May 2004.  Clearly, one factor (though only one) in maintaining this hostility to Russia as a state is obviously the legacy of Cold War hatred of Russia and the Soviet Union, but it was also very much the interest of what's called the American military-industrial [complex], or as it was originally called by Eisenhower, military-industrial-academic complex: the need to keep major states as enemies in order to justify the present configuration, or the Cold War configuration, of American military spending [ available online] 2008.

[31] Mujahideen is also transliterated from Arabic as mujahedeen, mujahedīn, mujahidīn, and mujaheddīn. Mujahid, and its plural, mujahideen, come from the same Arabic root as jihad ("struggle"). Arabic words usually have triliterals, which are triconsonantal (three-consonant) roots. The root of mujahidin is J-H-D (ج-ه-د), meaning "effort or sacrifice" ("Jihad" can mean to struggle and "Mujahideen" can mean struggler.) However, the particular verb stem of J-H-D from which both jihad and mujahid are derived means "to exert effort against" or "to struggle". Mujahid is originally, therefore, "someone who struggles". The term has, even in Arabic, taken on meanings that are specifically religious, or specifically military or paramilitary, or both.  ( wiki “mujahedeen”, 01232008, an editor, no source). The Soviet war in Afghanistan, also known as the Soviet-Afghan War, was a nine-year conflict involving Soviet forces supporting the Marxist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) government against the largely Islamic fundamentalist Mujahideen insurgents. The latter group found support from a variety of sources including the United States, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and other Muslim nations in the context of the Cold War. This conflict was concurrent to the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War.

The initial Soviet deployment of the 40th Army in Afghanistan began on December 25, 1979. The final troop withdrawal began on May 15, 1988, and ended on February 15, 1989. ( wiki “Soviet War in Afghanistan”, 01232008, an editor, no source).

[32] Niall Ferguson (b. April 18, 1964 in Glasgow, Scotland) is an award winning Scottish historian specializing in financial and economic history. He is best known for his views on imperialism and colonialism. Ferguson’s views represent what Karl Marx had observed about British colonialism in the east. It brought about great benefits. However, he does not appear to entertain the same distain for the family disruption on capitalistic measures as Karl Marx contended. See Niall Ferguson, "Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World" (2004). Niall Ferguson, MA, D.Phil., is the Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University and William Ziegler Professor at Harvard Business School. He is a resident faculty member of the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies. He is also a Senior Research Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford University, and a Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. See his  personal website [ available online]

[33] Chapter XII, International Trusteeship Systm, in “Charter of the United Nations,” The United Nations Organization [available online] 23 January 2008.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid.

[36] The United Nations: Organization in Basic Facts About the United Nations, "United Nations Organization" [available online], 23 January 2008. 

[37] Munich Agreement, Wikipedia, unsourced editing, [ available online] 29 January 2008.

[38] Munich Agreement, Wikipedia, unsourced editing, [ available online] 29 January 2008.

[39] Munich Agreement, Wikipedia, unsourced editing, [ available online] 29 January 2008.

[40] Munich Agreement, Wikipedia, unsourced editing, [ available online] 29 January 2008.

[41] Reichstag Fire Decree, Wikipedia, unsourced editing, [ available online] 29 January 2008.

[42] Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Wikipedia, unsourced editing, [ available online] 29 January 2008.

[43] George W. Norris , Lend-Lease Acts: Congress, Neutrality, and Lend-Lease, Senator George W. Norris on the repeal of the Neutrality Act, 1939. in Wikipedia, unsourced editing, [ available online] 29 January 2008.

[44] The American First Committee, Wikipedia, unsourced editing, [ available online] 29 January 2008.

[45] Ibid.

[46] The Tehran Conference, Wikipedia, unsourced editing, [ available online] 29 January 2008.

[47] Ibid.

[48] The Bataan Death March, Wikipedia, unsourced editing, [ available online] 29 January 2008.

[49] 900 Day siege, Saint Petersburg.com online, 2001 [available online] 2008.

[50]  Final Solution, Wikipedia, unsourced editing, [ available online] 30 January 2008.

[51] See Public Laws. Part 1 of United States Statutes at Large Containing the Laws and Concurrent Resolutions Enacted During the First Session of the Seventy-Seventh Congress of the United States of America, 1941-1942, and Treaties, International Agreements Other than Treaties, and Proclamations. Vol. 55 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1942): 31-33.

[52] Notes to Lend Lease Act, 11 March 1941, Wikipedia, unsourced editing, [ available online] 29 January 2008.

[53]  Siege of Leningrad, Wikipedia, unsourced editing, [ available online] 29 January 2008.

[54] Postel, Charles to class in personal Class lecture notes unpublished material, History 124 B,  29 January 2008 ( Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, 2008).

[55] History of Radar, Wikipedia, unsourced editing, [ available online] 29 January 2008.

[56] Sebald, W. G., On The Natural History of Destruction, trans. Anthea Bell (Modern Library, Random House, 2004), pp. 3-4.

[57] Sebald, W. G., On The Natural History of Destruction, trans. Anthea Bell (Modern Library, Random House, 2004), pp. 8-9.

[58] Sebald, W. G., On The Natural History of Destruction, trans. Anthea Bell (Modern Library, Random House, 2004), pp. 9.

[59] Winston Churchill, and the Bombing of Dresden, in “The National Archives Learning Curve, Villains and Heroes” (Kew, Richmond, Surrey: The National Archives)  [ available online] 2008; United Kingdom Records and Information Act,  Public Records Act 1958. This section of the United Kingdom’s educational foundation facilitates expanded learning as stated: Heroes and Villains is an expanding collection of galleries looking at significant historical figures and controversies. The aim of these galleries is to introduce students to the interpretation of original sources and to help students use such sources to draw their own conclusions about historical arguments and about the people who made a difference in history.

[60] Winston Churchill, Top Secret, General Ismay for C.O.S. Committee. COS, 28.3.45, , in “The National Archives Learning Curve, Villains and Heroes” (Kew, Richmond, Surrey: The National Archives)  [ available online] 2008;  This was the Prime Minister’s personal telegram D. 83/5, March , 28, 1945 originally filed as Top-Secret, released under the Public Records Act 1958 by 10. Downing Street.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Sebald, W. G., On The Natural History of Destruction, trans. Anthea Bell (Modern Library, Random House, 2004), pp. 3-4.

[63] Sebald, W. G., On The Natural History of Destruction, trans. Anthea Bell (Modern Library, Random House, 2004), p. 3.

[64]  See Hans Magnus Enzensberger’s collection Europa in Trümmern ( “Europe in Ruins”(1990)) in Sebald, W. G., On The Natural History of Destruction, trans. Anthea Bell (Modern Library, Random House, 2004), p. 7.

[65] Sebald, W. G., On The Natural History of Destruction, trans. Anthea Bell (Modern Library, Random House, 2004), p. 11.

[66] Sebald, W. G., On The Natural History of Destruction, trans. Anthea Bell (Modern Library, Random House, 2004), p. 12.

[67] Sebald, W. G., On The Natural History of Destruction, trans. Anthea Bell (Modern Library, Random House, 2004), p. 14.

[68] Ibid.,15.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Research on this article was made possible by generous support from the Woodrow Wilson International

Center, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Harry S. Truman Institute, and the Vanderbilt University Research Council. The author wishes to express his gratitude for the incisive comments and constructive  criticism of Samuel Walker, Michael Hogan. Walter LaFeber, Thomas G. Paterson, Charles Eagles. Cecilia  Stiles. Eduard Mark. Robert Pollard. Rajon Menon. Ernest May, and Andrew xdpaster. Special thanks go to  David Rosenberg for his unceasing efforts to declassify documents pertaining to atomic strategy. Kissinger. Far the Record: Selected Sto.tnnents, 1977—1980 (Boston, 1980), 123—24. in Leffler, Melvyn P., The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945—48 in AHR Forum, “The American Historical Archives,” Vol. 89, No. 2, April, 1984, p. 346. Presented in Postel, Charles, History 124B, Reader No. 134 (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, 2008), p. 22.

[73] For recent overviews of the origins of the Cold War, which seek to go beyond the heated traditionalist-revisionist controversies of the I960s and early I 970s, see, for example. John L. Gaddis. The United States and the Origins of the Cold War (New York, 1972); Daniel Yergin. Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston, 1978); Thomas G. Paterson, On Even Front: The Making of the Cold War (New York. 1979); and Roy Douglas. From War to Cold War, 1942—48 (New York. 1981),  in Leffler, Melvyn P., The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945—48 in AHR Forum, “The American Historical Archives,” Vol. 89, No. 2, April, 1984, p. 346. Presented in Postel, Charles, History 124B, Reader No. 134 (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, 2008), p. 22.

[74] For some of the most important and most recent regional and bilateral studies, see, for example, Bruce  Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran. Turkey, and  Greece (Princeton, 1980); Lawrence S. Wittner, American Intervention in Greece (New York. 1982); Aaron Miller,  Search for Security: Saudi Arabian Oil and American Foreign Policy, 1939—1949 (Chapel Hill, NC.. 1980); Michael B.  Stoff, Oil, War, and American Security: The Search for a National Policy on Foreign Oil. 1941—47 (New Haven. 1980);  Timothy Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Westport, The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, 9 vols. ( Baltimore, 1970-78), 9; 2262-70. Of greatest utility in studying the views of civilian and military planners in the Army and War Department are Record Group 165, Records of the Operations Division (OPD). and Records of American-British Conversations (ABC); Record Group 319, Records of the Plans and Operations Division (P&O); Record Group 107, Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, Robert P. Patterson Papers (RPPP), safe file and general decimal file, and Records of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. Howard C. Peterson Papers (HCPP), classified decimal file; and Record Group 335, Records of the Under-Secretary of the Army, Draper/Voorhees files, 1947—50. The records of the navy’s Strategic Plans Division (SPD) and the Politico-Military Division (PMD) are divided into many subseries; helpful indexes are available at the Naval Historical Center (NHC). The center also contains, among many other collections, the records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO, double zero files) as well as the manuscript collections of many influential naval officers. including Chester Nimitz, Forrest Sherman. Louis Denfeld, and Arthur Radford. For air force records, I tried—with only moderate success—to use the following materials at the National Archives: Record Group 107, Records of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, Plans, Policies, and Agreements, 1943—47; Records of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, Establishment of Air Fields and Air Bases, 1940—45: and Incoming and Outgoing Cablegranis. 1942—47: and Record Group 18, Records of the Office of the Chief of Air Stall, Headquarters Army Air Forces: Office of the Air Adjutant General, confidential and secret decimal correspondence file, 1945—48. For the records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and its successor, the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee, see Record Group 353. National Archives, Washington, and, for the important records of the Committee of Three (meetings of the secretaries of state, war, and navy), see Record Group 107, RPPP. safe file.  in Leffler, Melvyn P., The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945—48 in AHR Forum, “The American Historical Archives,” Vol. 89, No. 2, April, 1984, p. 346. Presented in Postel, Charles, History 124B, Reader No. 134 (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, 2008), p. 22.

[75] For recent works on strategy, the national military establishment, and the emergence of the national  security bureaucracy, see, for example. Richard Haynes, The Awesome Power: Harry S. Truman as Commander in

Chief (Baton Rouge. La., 1973); Alfred D. Sander. “Truman and the National Security Council, 1945—1947,”  JAH, 59 (1972—73): 369—88; Michael S. Sherry, Preparing for the Nert War: American Plans for Postwar Defense,

1941—45 (New Haven, 1977); Brian L. Villa, “The U.S. Army. Unconditional Surrender, and the Potsdam  Declaration,”JAH, 63(1976—77): 66—92; James F. Schnaebel, The Histort of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs  of Staff and National Policy, volume 1: 1945—1947 (Wilmington, Del., 1979); Kenneth W. Condit, The History of the  Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, volume 2: 1947—49 (Wilmington, Del,, 1979); Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb and the Cold War, 1945—1 950 (New York. 1980); David  Alan Rosenberg, “American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision,”JAH, 66 (1979—80): 62—87; Harry R. Borowski, A Hollow Threat: Strategic Air Power and Containment before Korea (Westport. Conn.. 1982);  Mark Stoler. “From Continentalism to Globalism: General Stanley D. Embick, the Joint Strategic Survey  Committee, and the Military View of American National Policy during the Second World War,” Diplomatic  History, 6 (1982): 303—21; Walter S. Poole, “From Conciliation to Containment: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and

the Coming of the Cold War,” Military Affairs, 42(1978): 12—16; Thomas H. Etzold, “The Far East in American  Strategy, 1948—195 1,” in Etzold, ed., Aspects of Sino-American Relations since 1784 (New York. 1978), 102—26;  Paolo E. Coletta, The United States Nasry and Defense Unflcation, 1947—i 953 (East Brunswick, N.J., 1981); Douglas  Kinnard, The Secretary of Defense (Lexington, Ky., 1980); Anna K. Nelson, “National Security 1: Inventing a

Process, 1945—1960,” in Hugh Heclo and Lester M. Salamon, ads.. The Illusion of Presidential Government  (Boulder, Col., 1981), 229—45; Larry D. O’Brien. “National Security and the New Warfare: Defense Policy,

War Planning, and Nuclear Weapons. 1945—50” (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University. 1981); .John T.  Greenwood, “The Emergence of the Post-War Strategic Air Force, 1945—1955,” paper delivered at the Eighth

Military History Symposium, held at the United States Air Force Academy in October 1978; and Robert F.  Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907—1 964 (Maxwell Air

Force Base, Ala., 1971).

[76] Leffler, Melvyn P., The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945—48 in AHR Forum, “The American Historical Archives,” Vol. 89, No. 2, April, 1984, pp. 346-347. Presented in Postel, Charles, History 124B, Reader No. 134 (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, 2008), p. 22 ( missing in published reader, as handout given in class – misnumbered).

[77] For views of influential generals and army planners, see OPD. Memorandum, June 4, 1945, RG 165, OPD 336 (top secret). Also see the plethora of documents from May and June 1945, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York [hereafter, USMA]. George A. Lincoln Papers [hereafter. GLP], War Department files. For Deane’s advice, especially see Deane, “Revision of Policy with Relation to Russia,” April 16, 1945, RG 218, 5cr. CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),JCS 1313, and The Strange Alliance: The Stcrry of Our Efforts at Wartime Co-operation with Russia (New York, 1946), 84—86. For theJCS studies, see, for example. JPS. “Strategic Concept and Plan for the Employment of United States Armed Forces,” September 14, 1945, RG 218, ser. CCS 381 (5-13-45), JPS 744/3; and JCS, “United States Military Policy,” September 17, 1945, ibid., JCS 1496/2. in  f. 31, Leffler, Melvyn P., The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945—48, p. 356 in AHR Forum, “The American Historical Archives,” Vol. 89, No. 2, April, 1984, presented in Postel, Charles, History 124 Reader No. 134 (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, 2008), pp. 31-32.

[78] Leffler, Melvyn P., The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945—48, p. 356 in AHR Forum, “The American Historical Archives,” Vol. 89, No. 2, April, 1984, presented in Postel, Charles, History 124 Reader No. 134 (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, 2008), p. 31.

[79] “Moscow embassy staff, “Russia’s International Position at the Close of the War with Germany,” enclosed in Smith to Eisenhower, July 12, 1946, DDEL. Dwight David Eisenhower Papers, file 1652, box 101. Also see, for example. Stimson to Roosevelt, September 15, 1944, ML, JFP, box 100; Stimson to Truman, May 16, 1945, HTL, HSTP, PSF. box 157; McCloy, Memorandum for Connelly, April 26. 1945, ibid box 178; MID, “Intelligence Estimate of the World Situation,” June 25. 1946; numerous memoranda, June 1945, USMA, GLP. War Dept. files: numerous documents. 1946 and 1947. RG 107, HCPP, (>91 Germany (Classified); and Rearmament Subcommittee. Report to the Special Ad Hoc Committee, July 10, 1947, RG 165. 5cr. ABC 400.336 (3-20-47). For Forrestal’s concern with Middle Eastern oil, see for example, “Notes in Connection with Navy’s ‘Line” on Foreign Oil” [late 1944 or early 1945], ML. JFP. Box 22; Minuets of the meeting of the Secretaries of the State, War,  and the Navy, April 17, 1946, R.G. 107, RPPP, safe file, box 3; and Walter Millis, ed. The Forrestal Dairies ( New York, 1951), 272, 356-58. in f.37  p. 358  Leffler, Melvyn P., The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945—48 in AHR Forum, “The American Historical Archives,” Vol. 89, No. 2, April, 1984, presented in Postel, Charles, History 124 Reader No. 134 (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, 2008), pp. 33-34.

[80] ‘ CIA, “Review of the World Situation as It Relates to the Security of the United States,” September 26, 1947. Also see, for example, JCS, “Strategic Concept and Plan for the Employment of United States Armed Forces,” Appendix A, September 19, 1945: JPS, Minutes of the 249th and 250th meetings; Lincoln to Wood. May 22, 1946, RG 165, ser. ABC 381 (9-1-45); [Giffin (?)] “U.S. Policy with Respect to Russia” [early April 1946]. s/nd ser. ABC 336 (8.22-43); JPS, “Estimate of Probable Developments in the World Political Situation up to 1956,” October 31, 1946, RG 218, ser. CCS 092 (10-9-46), JPS 814/1; MID, “World Political Developments Affecting the Security of the United States during the Next Ten Years,” April 14, 1947, RG 319, P&O, 350.05 (top secret). in  f.51  p. 364  Leffler, Melvyn P., The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945—48 in AHR Forum, “The American Historical Archives,” Vol. 89, No. 2, April, 1984, presented in Postel, Charles, History 124 Reader No. 134 (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, 2008), p. 39.

[81] A distinguished historian of post-1945 international relations presents eight substantial, thoroughly researched essays on the overall theme of the war the United States and the Soviet Union have managed to avoid with each other. Topics include why the United States did not use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union in the years of its superiority, how the U.S. tried to exploit divisions within the communist world, and the emergence of a mutually beneficial regime of satellite reconnaissance. Although much of the material has appeared in journals and conference proceedings, its accessible concentration in one volume is welcome. See Foreign Affairs, Reviewed by Gaddis Smith, Foreign Affairs, Winter 1987/88 in "Council on Foreign Relations" [ available online] January 2008.In this collection of essays, Gaddis raises some interesting and timely questions. How is it that we have known four decades without a world war, when relations between the superpowers have been so tense? Gaddis believes that historians of the next century may look back upon our era as one of general peace and stability, despite the numerous conflicts . His explanations include nuclear deterrence and the fact that the United States and Russia studiously avoid direct confrontation, by constructing walls, using the troops of client states, or recognizing spheres of influence. This provocative and well-argued work is recommended. See Jeff Northrup, Birmingham P.L. Ala. in “Library Journal” ( Reed Business Information, Inc, 1987 ) represented in “Editorial Reviews,”Amazon book reviews [ available online] January 2008.

[82] Gaddis, John Lewis, The Long Peace:  Inquiries Into the History of The Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 30. In  Postel, Charles, History 124 Reader No. 134 (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, 2008), p. 62.

[83] Gaddis, John Lewis, The Long Peace:  Inquiries Into the History of The Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 46. In  Postel, Charles, History 124 Reader No. 134 (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, 2008), p. 70.

[84] Gaddis, John Lewis, The Long Peace:  Inquiries Into the History of The Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 46. In  Postel, Charles, History 124 Reader No. 134 (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, 2008), p. 70.

[85] Ibid.

[86] Ibid.

[87] At the start of World War II, the Comintern supported a policy of non-intervention, arguing that this was an imperialist war between various national ruling classes, much as World War I had been. However, when the Soviet Union itself was invaded on June 22, 1941, during Operation Barbarossa, the Comintern switched its position to one of active support for the Allies. The Comintern was subsequently officially dissolved in 1943. in Michael Johnathan McDonald, "How to Understand Fascism, Communism and Our World," December 2007, f. 199. [available online] 2008.

[88] Gaddis, John Lewis, The Long Peace:  Inquiries Into the History of The Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 16. In  Postel, Charles, History 124 Reader No. 134 (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, 2008), p. 70.

[89] Postel, Charles to Class in “personal class lecture notes,” unpublished material, 31 January 2008 (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, History 124B, 2008).

[90] Postel, Charles to Class in “personal class lecture notes,” unpublished material, 31 January 2008 (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, History 124B, 2008).

[91] Postel, Charles to Class in “personal class lecture notes,” unpublished material, 31 January 2008 (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, History 124B, 2008).

[92] Postel, Charles to Class in “personal class lecture notes,” unpublished material, 7 February 2008 (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, History 124B, 2008).

[93] Postel, Charles to Class in “personal class lecture notes,” unpublished material, 7 February 2008 (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, History 124B, 2008).

[94] Postel, Charles to Class in “personal class lecture notes,” unpublished material, 7 February 2008 (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, History 124B, 2008).

[95] Postel, Charles to Class in “personal class lecture notes,” unpublished material, 7 February 2008 (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, History 124B, 2008).

[96] Postel, Charles to Class in “personal class lecture notes,” unpublished material, 7 February 2008 (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, History 124B, 2008).

[97] Postel, Charles to Class in “personal class lecture notes,” unpublished material, 7 February 2008 (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, History 124B, 2008).

[98] Postel, Charles to Class in “personal class lecture notes,” unpublished material, 7 February 2008 (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, History 124B, 2008).

[99] Postel, Charles to Class in “personal class lecture notes,” unpublished material, 7 February 2008 (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, History 124B, 2008).

[100] Postel, Charles to Class in “personal class lecture notes,” unpublished material, 7 February 2008 (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, History 124B, 2008).

[101] Westad, Odd Arne, The Global Cold War (Edinburgh Blvd., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. i.

[102] Westad, Odd Arne, The Global Cold War (Edinburgh Blvd., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. xii-xiii.

[103] Ibid., ft. 3, See for instance the furious debate over Tiermondisme ( Third-Worldism) in France in the late 1980s and early 1990s reflected in Claude Laiuzu, L’enjeu tiermondiste: débats et combats ( The Tiermondiste Stakes: Debates and Battles) (Paris: Harmattan, 1987). For the historical background, see Denis Pelletier, Economie et humanisme: de l’utopie communautaire au combat pour le tiers-monde: 1941-1966 ( Economy and Humanism: From Commutarian Utopia to Struggle for the Third World) ( Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1996).

[104] Ibid., ft. 4, I am barrowing Immanuel Wallerstein’s use of the term; see his “Cultures in Conflict? Who are We? Who are the Others?”, Y.K. Pao Distingushed Chair Lecture, Center for Cultural Studies, Hong Kong University of Sciences and Technology, 20 September 2000.

[105] Ibid., pp. 2-3.

[106] Ibid., p. 110.

[107] Ibid., ft 2. “NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” 14 April 1950, in Foreign Relations of the United States ( Hereafter FRUS), 1950, vol. I, pp. 237-286.

[108] Westad, Odd Arne, The Global Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p.12.

[109] Westad, Odd Arne, The Global Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p.12.

[110] Westad, Odd Arne, The Global Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p.14.

[111] Westad, Odd Arne, The Global Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p.15.

[112] Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson: revolution, War, and Peace ( Arlington Heightds, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1979),p. 177. in Westad, Odd Arne, The Global Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p.16.

[113] Westad, Odd Arne, The Global Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p.16.

[114] Westad, Odd Arne, The Global Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p.17.

[115] Ibid.

[116] Ibid., p. 18.

[117] Ibid., pp. 18-19.

[118] Ibid., p. 19.

[119] Ibid.

[120] Ibid.

[121] Ibid.

[122] Ibid.

[123] Ibid.

[124] Ibid., p. 20.

[125] Ibid.

[126] Ibid.

[127] Ibid., p. [127].

[128] Ibid., p. 21.

[129] Ibid., p. 22.

[130] Ibid., p. 23.

[131] Ibid., p. 23.

[132] Ibid., p. 24.

[133] Ibid.

[134] Paul G. Hoffman, Peace Can Be Won (New York: Doubleday, 1951), p. 130. In Westad, Odd Arne, “The Global Cold War” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p.25.


 
 

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