Crucifixion Eclipse The Large Gizāh  Pyramid : Nostradamus’ Birthdate at Central Axis of Giza Pyramid :

Edo Period Part I: History of Japan


  Welcome, Guest                        Michael Report  

[Contact, Search] World History - Yahoo! - Help

 : H O M E :  

 

 

 I N D E XBook of Life  Index  directory B I B L E Apocalypse Book of Revelationsdirectory W E B S> Internets  directory J O U R N A L  > Journal Directory directory G A L L E R Y >photo gallerydirectory W M D  > XLXXII  ARMAGEDON  directory G A M M A > gamma index 

Privacy  [Public]  

 


       

Japan’s Early Modern Period — Tokugawa

 
a    

(1603-1868)

By Michael Johnathan McDonald

Tokugawa Era (Edo Period)

 

Background

Rise

Definitions

Themes

Shogun Basics

Periods

Shogunate by numbers

Arguments

Villages

Official Name: Edo Period ― 1603 – 1867 when the Tokugawa Federal (loosely used)  military–literati government ruled Japan. The Idea was a limited control of the countryside, with national incentives (creating the federal aspect), an interchange of cooperation, and with the ideological notion that it was natural for the samurai to rule using the Neo Confucian ideologue script of jinsei. Conrad Totman's book argues a fantastic period of peace and growth, in general terms, from the 1600s to the 1700s, and then a blend of stasis and growth coming to a complete stasis about 1751 – 1790, then a gradual period of decline. However, I believe this was only from the perspective of the Bakufu, because the countryside continued to grow throughout the period, and even during the very later stages of the yonaoshi revolts. His book is great in that it covers a wide rage of themes that sometimes monographic investigations would natural overlook. He does a very good job of covering the potential outside contacts, and covering the philosophy and the reasons why the Tokugawa continued it policy of closed country. Another good aspect in the book is the coverage of the many scholastic debaters and literati of the period.

 

Thomas Smith’s outstanding investigations turned the idea that Japan was a backward nation around, using the Gerschenkron model of European industrialization before 1914,  by intensive recovery of village and domain data.  Usually Tokugawa scholars promoted the old notion that high-taxes brought down the Bakufu system, yet by close investigation, the faults of the Bakufu, or rather fear to implementing ( I believe they tried once) a comprehensive tax system, albeit fairly that is, makes the case that they didn’t tax enough which lead to Samurai rulers taking out loans from the chōnin and daimyō until finally they collapsed within from economic failure;  this set of a series of factionalism, or the few samurai that were wealthy enough still to garner power and they decided to re-arrange the entire Japanese government system.

 

In the Tokugawa period we have by-employment, free-market conceptions, increased agricultural-yield from a spat of farm books, entrepreneurship, women’s unsung roles, especially in the saki stem-house empires, secret village coastal trade, the lax of periodic cadastral surveys, the relationship and contradictions between the samurai and the Daimyō, the rise is literacy and public schools, the Kokugaku schools,  The contradictions between the Kokka and the Kuni, the temporal to permanent argument of jinsei, the neo-Confucianism models, the Mito revisionism, the daikan, nanushi, peasant, samurai and daimyō “swinging door” scenarios,  The quartermasters, tonya, ronin, and disaffected samurai and petitioning of vendettas, the contradiction of bun and bu, to the plethora of savant scholars, the literati, the dissidents, the pontificators, folktales of geronticide, life-cycles of rich and poor women, the ie, The shingaku women, the rationalization of the pursuit of prophet religion by Ishida Baigan (1729), female bunjin and the atmosphere of equal relations with men. Tatsu’uma Kiyo and the extension of the  Kokka, the four taxes, Koka land-tax, the main tax, the irregular exation by officials – usually bribes which didn’t hurt the rural regions, the Kamononari, non-agricultural tax that declined over time, and the corvée tax, for building castle-towns, and Sukegō work, which saw a development of free-market by charging commoners a market price on the roads for travel duties, The Jitsugaku model of Ogyū Sori (1666 –1728), the complainer on everything, who wanted to get rid of the merchants and the emperor-line, and was heterodox (not orthodox), and even complained about the peasants, and also who said “ I know what to do”  about the 46 ronin (sometimes cited as 47), and called the samurai incompetent but favored not to destroy the Bakufu, to Kamazawa Banzai (1619 – ‘ 91) that promoted that everyone must be respectful because ( samurai) received divine dispensantion, and called for them to learn letters and correspondence,  and Yamaga Sakō (1622 –), who called for practical Confucianism,  we have gi control of events, rei, etiquette and the right, and the standard of means alongside the judges who took these into account but ultimately sided with the law, Edokkoites, Tsū, sūi and Yoshiarwa to Edo memory, writers on the Edo period after the Tokugawa (notably after 1900) a utopian model of revision that in reality was really a distopia with peasants revolting toward lords as well as the standard uchikowashi (smashing-and-breaking riots), of the end of the Tokugawa period, and the other type of yonaoshi jōkyō ( the world renewal condition), a demand for relief of the poor, to the Nativist Irokawa Daikichi, some say revisionist, of the yonaoshi matsuri (a leveling festival) to punish the wealthy in the village, and the Daikichi model of a “romanticized village” that Japan should return too, and he believed that how the masses join together is at the village level, which others also describing this type of Edo memory therefore, gave the illusion that yonaoshi had become a contemporary political metaphor for anti-establishment and anti-establishment feelings, ideas, and movements of all sorts, and the movements are characteristically populist, communitarian, and voluntaristic, according to Irwin Sheiner in “The Japanese Village,” thereby showing Edo memory as invoking a classlessness, which surely if one asked the peasants who were suppressed by prescript and edit law would tell one otherwise, this really was not a fun situation, and this revision creates contemporary “likening local citizens” movements to past village movements to showcase individual creativity and social autonomy that in case. The “imagined community” would rise to be a vital political other, the locus of civil society. To the consensus of disagreement of what Tokugawa was, the political order undefined, a moment in a mirror of stillness to the reality that the populations after 1700s went static and the Castle–towns emptied out (18%, Smith) and the countryside’s population increased, a opposing model of the west, in which capitalism, loosely applied developed on its own in the later–half of the Tokugawa in which formed a work–force in the countryside so well adapted to quickly speed up the technological advancement that made Japan the Imperial power of the world by the time of Meiji Restoration kicked in its open country reforms.

History:

  • Capital history: Heian Period - 782 - 1184 when Japan's capital was located in Kyoto. Why is this important? The Tokugawa moved the capital to Edo, today’s modern Tokyo.

Main geography of the age:

Three islands, including many islets.

1    Honshú

2    Shikoku

3    Kyūshi

  • Traditions: Even before 794 ― Heian period they existed. Still – 1185 the Shogun starts appearing in history. Their motive is to subdue to barbarian wherever they may encroach on the Japanese.

  • Originally, the titles of Sei-i-Tai-Shogun were given to military commanders during the early Heian Period for the duration of military campaigns against the Emishi who resisted the governance of the Imperial court based in Kyoto.

Three primary shogunates.

  • (A) c. 1200 AD Minamoto no Yoritomo; Kamakura Shogunate - Kamakura period 1185-1333 (see 1.a)
  • (B) 14th Century – 16th Century, Ashikaga Shogunate or Muromachi Bakufu - Muromachi period . Ashikaga last until Obu Nobunaga took power. Ashikaga Shogunate or Muromachi Bakufu - Muromachi period . Next, Ashikaga Takauji, like Yoritomo a descendant of the Minamoto princes, was awarded the title of sei-i taishōgun and established bakufu. The Ashikaga Shogunate lasted from 1338 to 1573.
  • Warring states period. Sengoku period 1467-1568
  • (C) c. 1600 AD Tokugawa (1603), Tokugawa Shogunate or Edo Bakufu - Edo period (1603)

 

Ancient Order

Shōen Manors

(Hanke)

 Ultimate proprietor: Emperor, court nobles, Buddhist Church

Provincial| Governor

 

(Ryōke)

Proprietor: Lower ranking nobles, Aristocracy, local elites, often lived in Kyoto

(Managerial Class)

Live in provinces, managed by peasants

(Cultivators)

Peasants attached to land & work

1.a) Kamakura Shogunate, The bakufu system was originally established under the Kamakura shogunate by Minamoto no Yoritomo. The system was feudal in nature, with lesser territorial lords pledging their allegiance to greater ones. Samurai were rewarded for their loyalty with land, which was in turn handed down and divided among their sons. The hierarchy that held this system of government together was reinforced by close ties of loyalty between samurai and their subordinates.

2.a) Ashikaga Shogunate , Muromachi period 1338 -1573, State Bureaucratic Organization.

1          Provincial governor

2          Representative (Daikan)

3          Local strongman

4              Peasants

·         1500s central authority and shogun lost control of lords and economic phases, while the Daimyō rose.

·         One Reason for the Ashikaga Shogun diminishment of power

Reason for the Shogun loss of power is credited to the Nakō Pirates that formed possibly in the 14th century made up of Koreans, Japanese, Chinese and others. They lived like normal Pirates within their own set of laws, not the states they plundered. In addition the Daimyō rose to power.

2.b) Warring states period. Sengoku period 1467-1568

2.c) Coming of the Tokugawa

Obu Nobunaga

In 1568,  Obu Nobunaga,  a powerful regional baron, marched his army from a castle near modern-day Nagoya into the ancient imperial capital city of Kyoto. There he compelled the powerless emperor Ogimachi to recognize the hapless thirty-year-old Ashikaga Yoshiaki as fifteenth —  and last shogun, or military dictator, of the Ashikaga lineage. 1

Enter, Obu Nobunaga, a daimyō who refused the title of shogun or an imperial title. He wanted the traditional authoritarian control of all of Japan.

1560 -1568 Obu Nobunaga (b. 1534- d. 1582) wins battles laying the ground work to change the ruling system of Japan. Although, he was strong before he was assassinated by the Mori, he wanted to rule with total authority, giving autonomous local authority to local lords.

1568, Obu goes to Kyoto and brings down the Ashigawa shogun and assumes power. Now he forms a series of campaigns to control all of central Japan. These were destructive campaigns against the Ikko Ikki , and Enryakuji Monastery in which he burnt to the ground, killing about 30,000 people, also he destroyed libraries.

Obu sold guns, and at the time Japanese hand guns were superior in the world; however, later they would not be involved in the musket development and eventually lost their technological edge, and in later periods buying them from Europeans and Americans. 

Close to the closing period of Obu’s life, he wanted to be worshiped as a deity.

After Obu’s assassination, Hideyoshi fights the Tokogawa, Hōjō, Chōsokabe and Shimazu. Hideyoshi consolidates power, and after victory he offers peace.. Now people recognize what he was promising as a Federation, instead of Obu’s plan of autonomous dictators. The period of his Toyotomi is often called the Momoyama period (1582-‘98 [also, 1600 Battle of Sekigahara]), after his castle.

 

Toyotomi Hideyoshi

How he gets power: Toyotomi Hideyoshi (Obu Nobunaga’s lead general; he assumes power after Obu’s ill timed death)

Hideyoshi affirms landholdings of others as their own rulers, to work together, instead as Mrs. Berry suggests Obu “offered local absolute dictators,” which was not popular as a general replacement of the traditional power structures.

Tokugawa Ieyasu takes the titles of Minister of Right, the Minister of State and many other offices but refuses the title of shogun at first – later he takes the title in 1603.

Hideyoshi set about masterminding invasions of Korea and setting up the pre-crystallized Tokugawa system by restricting to only the members of the Samurai class the ability to carry and use arms.

Korea Campaigns: 1570 Toyotomi Hideyoshi launched two devastating sanguinary invasions of Korea. (tot 30). Hideyoshi did not centralize authority. He reigned with eight years of struggles and eight years with peace, and did not accept the title of shogun, but asked that it would given to his offspring. Both Nobunaga and Hideyoshi distained the title of Shogun; only in 1603, when Hideyoshi’s successor, Ieyasu, finally accepted, with great pomp and circumstances the title.

Hideyoshi in 1592 sent a vast armada and transported his troops to landing points in Pusan area, from where they started driving northward. 2

Hideyoshi battles brought the horrific fighting away from the Japanese Islands to the Korean peninsula, meaning that peace could be a relative statement to the period of his reign. However, his armies lost and after much humiliation the fact he had to reopen negotiations to peace with Korea and China, an understanding of where Japan stood in lieu of geopolitics, many Japanese lives were cost. In 1598, all lords were subject to central authority, but this was not Hideyoshi’s decision, but the Daimyō’s. The sengoku daimyō proved itself central to the policy of political reconsolidation. Unusual competence as a lord had become in itself the basis for claiming a right to rule. Only the final stages of Pacification, when triumphant daimyō could no longer ignore the task of justifying their de facto rule, did they turn to the legacies of the emperor and shogun for help in converting domanial power and authority into a countryside right to rule. But they had already participated in the creation of a “ feudal” or “ federal” political structure that assigned enduring power and essentially autonomous administrative authority to daimyō. 3 (see mjm, federal def. A central authority contends with satellite semi-autonomous governments, of which both act in tandem, but also interact as part of a political whole – for the good of the people).

The Portuguse Jesuit Alessandro Valigano lamented that the Japanese of the 1570s and 1580s were “ much addicted to sensual vices and sins.”

He continued:

The Second defect of this nation is the meager loyalty which the people show towards their rulers. They rebel against them whenever they have a chance, either usurping them or joining them or joining up with their enemies. Then they about-turn and declare themselves friends again, only to rebel once more when the opportunity presents itself; yet this sort of conduct does not discredit them at all… Te Chief root of the evil is that fact that … there was a rebellion against [ the emperor] and Japan was divided up among so many usurping barons that they are always wars among them, each one trying to grab for himself as much territory as he can.

Valignano went on to characterize the government[s] of Japan as “ far less centralized than that of Europe. 4

However, in 1620, English merchant official Richard Cocks saw things differently.

He wrote:

The government  of Japan may well be accompted the greatest and powerfullest Terrany [ tyranny] , that ever was heard of in the world[! Sounds like an exaggeration, for he doesn’t understand history well] , for all the rest are as Slaves to the Emperour ( or great commander as they call him), who upon the least suspition (or Jelosie) or being angry with any man ( Be he never soe greate a man) will cause hym upon the Recepte of his Letter to cutt his bellie, which if he refuse to doem not only he, but all the rest of their race shall feele the smart thereof?

What happen here is that Japan had drastically changed between these two periods.5

The later decades of the sixteenth century were the most violent in Japanese history, with warfare cresting in a spat of horrific battles, which were followed by the 1950s by a domestic peace more complete than anyone could have imagined. 6

Guns and Technology & Christianity Arrive  and Foreign entailments matter

Shipwreck on Tanegashima, a small island south of Kyusha in the autumn by Portuguese aboard an ocean-going junk, saw the Portuguese carrying arquebuses, and Japanese military commanders quickly recognized the battlefield unity of those horrendous, metel-hurling, explosive iron tubes, which the Japanese dubbed Tanegashima. Blacksmiths shortly began reproducing them and by the 1560s, lords such as Nobunaga were using them to their tactical advantage. 7

 A few years after 1543, Portuguese merchantmen began arriving in Kyusha, their captains seeking trade, while accompanying Jesuit missionaries sought converts. Daimyō welcomed the trade, which included guns, and in the following decades trade missionary activity grew apace, primarily around Nagasaki and the other Kyushu ports where foreign vessels were usually anchored. By the mid 1580s, there may have been as many as two hundred thousand converts to the new creed, mostly in the poorer regions of the island. They included several daimyō, whose devotion produced numerous conversations among prudent trainers and subject peoples. 8  

In 1587, while in Kyushu overseeing subjugation of the Shimazu, Hideyoshi evidently became fearful that the missionaries were creating circumstances dangerous to his emerging supremacy. They ( Christian converts) controlled Nagasaki and its environs and were aggressively proselytizing among the daimyō and their retainers [ see Diego Pacheco, “ The founding of the Port of Nagasaki and its Cession to the Society of Jesus, 1970]. “ Japan is the country of the gods, acclaimed Hideyoshi, so he formed two edits to stop the control and spread of Christianity form the Daimyō who had considerably influence on the peasantry. Hideoyoshi tried to make it seem that the peasants had a choice in the matter, but he pressed the daimyō secretly to stop.  Some Daimyō who he claimed were compelling their retainers and subject people to follow in conversion, he made the claim that the Daimyō granted land to the missionaries, something he took a real offense too. So he ordered the padres to leave Japan, but added that their trade was a separate matter and he wished to continue ( remember the gun technology?). 9

However, Portuguese trade and missionary work did continue in the following months. During the 1590s, the Spanish arrived and began competing with the Portuguese for trade and influence. Franciscan missionaries, who arrived aboard a Spanish ship, challenged the Jesuit claim of a sole right to proselytize in Japan, and the rivals began maligning one another to Japan’s rulers. The conduct only compounded the distrust of Hideyoshi and other leaders, as well as proponents of Buddhist doctrine, already felt toward the foreign prelates. In 1596, when other affairs were going poorly for Hideyoshi, a Spanish officer boasted that missionaries were merely the vanguard of Iberian conquest. A report of that comment led Hideyoshi to order a harsh crackdown, and twenty-six priests and converts were executed. The larger goal of expelling the missionaries and halting the spread of Christian sectarianism was not effectively pursued, however, in great part because the rulers’ interest in trade undermined the effort. As a result, at the time of Hideyoshi’s death, the situation was still unresolved. 10 

Ross Hassig, in discussing the key-basic attributes of Aztec and Roman governance, had identified  Hideyoshi’s order  in what these attributes of each ordered shared.

(1)   expansion of political dominance without direct territorial control, (2) a focus on the internal security of the empire by exercising influence on a limited range of activities within the client states, and (3) the achievement of such influence by generally retaining rather than replacing local officials. Because their imperial concerns were limited, maintenance of the empire was achieved with great economy of force, local resources being relied on for local security and order.

The Tokugawa expanded on these rules and regulations to guide the Daimyō- client states’ but they adhered to the basic principle of qualified territorial autonomy.  So the distribution of real power that Hideyoshi had recognized survived the coming peace and remained largely intact until 1860s. 11

Japanese society before the Tokugawa?

Before 1600, the heartland was extended eastward along Honshu’s southern littoral to the Kantō plain, the largest area of flatland in the country. 12 The large coastal flatlands, the agreeable climate and agricultural foundations made this area ideal for a large administration that would employ millions of people. By 1568 Japan was one of the largest civilizations, with over 10,000,000 people living on three islands, Honshu, Kyushu, and Shikoku and countless islets that dot their costal waters. 13 The heritage made up by the rulers the aristocracy, the Samurai, the religious leaders and superordinate few, who constituted the social class.

The peasantry used iron farming tools plowed by draft animals, and knew how to operate such manufacturing devices as forges, menting vats, evaporating pans, and drying racks. They raised storage sheds to preserve the harvests from rot and infestation. The Village life embodied a mix of hierarchal and egalitarians relationships. 14 Villages utilized egalitarian arrangements, but some how villagers began to argued, get involved in legal disputes, and this caused an escalating tension for some to understand a need for outside, third-Party, arbitrating. This eventually formed the hierarchal system which then formed structures to medieval villages. The house ideology became a detailed matter becoming spiritual in itself in idealization. Preeminent families might retain their status form generation to generation, and often they functioned as local and political and even military leaders. 15 The leaders did help out the villages, but the villagers began to understand the asymmetrical mutual reciprocity. 16

Hideyohshi significance: He brought the samurai from off the land and into the cities ( Castle-towns, i.e. the eventual castle-towns of the Tokugawa with were to be built). This took the samurai away from managing the economics of the land. He made all the samurai hereditary positions.

·         1598 Toyotomi Hideyoshi dies. Power struggles.

After Hideyoshi dies, the Tokugawan receive the mantle to rule Japan.

Transfer of Power near Sekigahara

1600 AD The Decisive Battle of Sekigahara.

Tokugawa Ieyasu

After Hideyoshi’s death, rivalries among his lieutenants quickly got out of hand. As tensions escalated, Tokugawa Ieyasu, the greatest amount them, combined the resources of his sprawling domain in the Kanto plain with those of several allied lords to field an army of some eighty thousand, which defeated a rival coalition near Sekigahara in the autumn of 1600. He then acknowledged the baronial rights of all daimyō who accepted his leadership, letting them retain their castles, armies, and administrative autonomy. He rewarded allies in proportion to their service with lands taken from the losers in proportion to their mistakes. He also made elaborate displays of respect for the imperial court and ensured its fiscal well-being even while insisting that it conform to his wishes. By 1603 much of the political rearranging was complete, and Ieyasu agreed to let a docile Emperor Goyōzei award him a number of titles, one of which was seii taishōgun. 17  

Battle:

o       200,000 estimated combatants.

o       Tokugawa fielded 80,000 troops and Hideyoshi ( the sons’) forces came to an estimated 120,000. Hideyoshi’s troops  had the high ground, but disloyalty took the day as Samurai changed loyalty ( not common) to win the day.

o       After Hideyoshi dies, five generals now hold power. They are elders.  Each has an army and land for revenue. They compete against the emperor.

o       The emperor has retainers, land and revenue. These two groups clash. The tides showed that daimyō braced for an extreme makeover of Japan, so the had already begun to pacify their domains for the new ruler, whoever was to win at Sekigahara.

 

Ieyasu had the titles transferred to his son, Hidetada, two years later. With these moves he had defined the basic relationship of emperor, shogun, and daimyō as it would remain for the next 250 years. All honors were shown to the court, but it was nearly powerless. All power now rested in the hands of a hereditary Tokugawa shogun, a man who might rule or might be under the control of his father or some other person of group [regent]. 18   

 

To control his power he made pretensions, the muscle that enforced regulations and kept daimyō in line, was the Tokugawa family head’s tightly organized army of fighting men and the domain that supported it. In short, the accoutrements of real power remained in the hands of the daimyōs, of whom the greatest, the head of the Tokugawa domain centered in Edo, was expected to control all others. 19  

 

Now the next move was to (try) subduing the realms, and forcing the Daimyō to give up their armies. He did this by making them build castle towns, but he never let it not be known he allowed them full autonomy in their realms. He, a politician as well, tried to encourage lords ― as well as priests and Kyoto aristocracy ― to handle affairs in an orderly and acceptable fashion. 20  

 

Stats: Tokugawa Ieyasu (Leyasu) (January 31, 1543 – June 1, 1616) ( Odu’s general) Hideyoshi befriends him.

 

·         Two major developments

 

Tokugawa Ieyasu Significance:  is that he begins the new Tokugawa system, including the beginning formations of the Sankin Kotai, a rethought on medieval system where hostages of lords were traded for responsibility. If the government gave a lord an order to build a castle-town, that lord received finance, men and equipment, and in turn he had to give the government a surety, which meant for the Tokugawa a significant relative, usually first the wife, or son, and next on down the line. This way the lord didn’t run-off with the money and equipment. The Sankin Kotai will eventually become a major institution and have many variables, including forcing the Samurai to spend time in castle-towns servicing the shogun or their retinue. The idea was to keep the lords moving from the countryside or from castle-town to castle-town so they wouldn’t form any unkindly alliances. This system was a major result of the wars that preceded the Tokugawa, and a way of rectifying the result of lords collaborating and bring war into fruition in the lands. This system based in part on Jinsei, benevolent government, and it main factor was to continue peace in the realm. When the peasants were displaced, and found continuous war unbearable, this was the solution offered by the intellectuals of this period. It surprisingly worked fairly well, and the first 100 years the peace the Japanese saw increased their populations from roughly 10,000,000 to 30,000,000 (including samurai), great or unbelievable prosperity: mining, construction of castle-towns, farm and village construction (production of arable lands)  and made everyone’s lives including the peasantry better which made them not complain or revolt was will see in later centuries.

 

 

 

Significant siege #2

 

Another great significance is the introduction of Neo-Confucianism, or more specifically the type of moral normality in the Tokugawa government. Confucianism was an amoral philosophy, but the Tokugawa created its government by reinterpreting it with a morality. Think of it as a denomination of Confucianism. China had dynasties, where different family emperors ruled. In Japan, only one family has ruled and only one dynasty of the Emperor has ruled. This is why the Tokugawa had to hold on to the Emperor and isolate the family instead of killing it off. This would have quickly doomed anyone vying for power in Japan thinking it could rule Japan by destroying its number-one institution that brought it agency and pride.  Several generations after Confucius died, Buddhists and Daoists reformulated or brought a structure (debated) to it original philosophy.  For Japan and Korea these formations ( Chu Hsi schools) brought a foundation to social and political functions to their countries. To Japanese, as sure as the sun rises high in the sky, the Shogun is that sun, the heaven appointed leader of Japan. Heaven above Earth and its leader, and these are above the ruled. Think of it as status level boxes, or the most simplest forms: Shi, Nō, Ko, Shō ( See below). During the tokugawa period, most notably after the 1700s, but even before beginning about 1660s, intellectuals will wrestle with this type of reformulation of a moral Confucian interpretation. In fact, to counter, the Bakufu set up schools for all segments of society to teach them that they are the moral rulers. The key weapon is junsei, but we must not always look on this as negative because it exists within a great moral contradiction – especially when discussing the Kokka and the Kuni.

The easiest way to understand intellectual thought on Confucianism is a dissenter who lived from 1666-1728. He wasn’t particularly against the Bakufu, he was a complainer on everything, including the peasantry. He was grumpy, but his arguments were relevant. Ogyū Sori, lived during the Genruku period ( urbanization), where all the major construction of castle-town had taken place and thereafter,  theater, arts, fiction and popular movements arose to make Japan a vibrant and colorful cultural dynamic. This was the heyday of the Tokugawa. Conrad Totman sees this period as a continuing era of growth from the beginning and the start of the era of general social stasis. Eventually we will see the Kyōhō famine (1716 – 1735) which will make people take a serious look around them and ask what are we doing? We will also see Yoshimune, who started out with some bad policies such as recoinage, but rectified them quickly and became much revered for his benevolent rule (jinsei).

Sori took on the philosophy of the Tokugawa. He thought hat the pragmatic founders of the Tokugawa did not presume that commoners were unworthy. 21 

Politically subordinate for practical reasons of state they certainly were, and subjected to onerous exploitation. But as samurai scholars elaborated Confucian ideology, they overlaid these utilitarian considerations with a legitimizing ideology of socioethical discrimination that was expressed most aggressively by Ogyu Sorai and his followers. Predictably, perhaps, the articulation of an ideology purporting to show the moral inferiority of commoners generated counterclaims of plebian worth, which were actively championed during the eighteenth century. Several scholars challenged the Sorai view that only samurai had a use for higher learning and that only they, as models for the "stupid commoners," deserved esteem. They promoted instead two other propositions: that the seeds of virtue lie in all humans and that all honest walks of life are meritorious. 22

Sori went back to the Sage kings of China and argued the amorality of Confucianism. Sori realized that Shi, Nō, Ko, Shō were not true and that the sage kings ( mythical founders of China) just made this up. Although, like most in Asian historiography, he believed they in fact were men that lived – therefore, his argument disturbed people. He stated that if men made up this concept, i.e. law, then men can change it. The Daigaku had also stated such and looked back to the original Confucian scholars to try to figure things out. Jitsugaka, practical learning, saw utilitarianism as a way to change things. This was to allow western technology or, in other words open up the trade to all and everyone including trade from the east ( albeit, China had licenses from time to time, depending on the shogun in office). Jitsugaka promoted men of talent. This was a contradiction, because the only meritocracy that existed existed in these boxes, which the Tokugawa created. In the Bakufu government, it existed, but within itself. The samurai could move into different jobs by their merit of specialty-field, but a great lord, or a commoner could not move into a government job. In the village a peasant could move into an area of specialty because of his or her merit, but could not become a great lord, or samurai. There were times that people moved up or down a rank, but usually only two ranks. There were many ranks in this complex system. Samurai becoming quartermasters to daimyō were one example of moving ranks. To understand the difficulty of the meritocracy argument pushed up against jinsei needs one to look at the relationship and contradiction of the Kakka and Kuni argument (see below).

[Ishida] Baigan was critical of Sorai, arguing that his doctrines were "mere intellectual reflection" that failed to grasp the true character of human nature and its oneness with heaven and earth. He quoted Mencius approvingly: "He who exhausts his mind, knows his nature. Knowing his nature he knows heaven." And since people of all stations can attempt that, samurai had no monopoly on access to truth. Indeed, all shared the Way; all had their proper roles. Whereas Sorai wished to eliminate merchants, Baigan argued, "If the merchants all became farmers and artisans, there would be no one to circulate wealth and all the people would suffer. . . . The trade of the merchants assists the empire. . . . The profit of the merchant too is a stipend permitted by the empire." And more broadly: "Although the samurai , farmers, artisans and merchants differ in occupation, since they all appreciate the same principle if we speak of the Way of the samurai , it goes for the farmers, artisans and merchants, and if we speak of the Way of the farmers, artisans and merchants, it goes for the samurai ."

Baigan's successors, who developed his teachings into the widely propounded doctrines of Shingaku, continued to promote these ideas. 23

Jinsie, the heavenly mandate was the Neo-Confucian stronghold that was both a positive force, as Thomas Smith argues and but negative force as I argue on the Bakufu who saw it develop into a  weapon of the rural against the bakufu, therefore the fear the Shogun had of not implementing a new-comprehensive- tax system when the corporations, enterprises, economic-empires erupted without being taxed because of jinsei formulations in the later-half of the Tokugawa period, formed critical basis for the eventual fall of the Tokugawa system. It turns out that in the beginning jinsei really was appositive aspect of the bakufu, but in the end it turned out to be the blessing in disguise for the commoner. Jinsei became the tool of peasant justification, albeit it was against the law, but by the 1840s, the samurai were so indebt and weak they could do nothing about providing law and order. They had no tax-money to work with. Although, historians cite the high-taxes that brought the Tokugawa down, this thesis has been destroyed. Think of it as having a country where Microsoft, Coca-Cola, Pepsi and other major industries didn’t have to pay any tax. They may had to pay a licensing fee which  surly the Bakufu ordered in the state sanctioned unions, but these state-functionaries quickly were not the success of these rural entrepreneurs whose wealth quickly rose to that of the entire Bakufu annual income and even became further a single-handedly richer treasury than the entire Tokugawa government. Saki industry was run by the rural-class ( Peasants/ Chōnin) and were not taxed. Saki became a national industry run by the peasants. Only the Tenryō were taxed by the Bakufu, and that averaged at a 50% tax ( Some as low as 17% and some as high as 70%; see Smith ch. 1-3). Sinse the samurai initially began as a military order (baku had developed into the word for tent, fu, is the word extension for government, which became the combined syntax for military government), it became a bureaucracy with samurai turning into ‘ savants’ and scholars, who then couldn’t perform their aggressive duties that were needed to keep suppressing the rural classes, which was really the plan in the beginning, albeit, the benevolence of creating peace was the jinsei that produced the concept in the beginning. The Japanese wanted their country to be benevolent. The Tokugawa was not necessarily an evil administration taking over, it was an ideology, and concept that was to bring peace, for its entire people, and at the foundation lay the agrarian calls, its 90% of the population to run the country by its production. We must rethink the western concepts of backwardness, because of the free-markets that arose within the lands without outside help. The Japanese progressed and jinsei was the tool ― both good and bad, but necessary for that time. Jinsei can as innocently be seen as a farm worker leaving a wooden rake out in the sun and its dries and cracks because of the elements; and the owner of that rake who came to retrieve it sees that it was not taken care of by the worker not initially putting it back in the shed, or leaving it in a dry, cool spot, and therefore this episode is seen as that worker not providing jinsei.

By the 1840s, many samurai leave the city and go to the countryside in search of work. IT was cheaper to live in the countryside as rent was higher in the cities, the cities were increasingly becoming old in foundational structure and samurai couldn’t refurbish because by this time there were severely in debt to Daimyō, peasants and anyone else that would lend them money. It didn’t help that prior judges forgave samurai debt and that increased sentiment not to loan them or to loan to them at increasingly high-rates.

Sori wished to eliminate merchants, and Baigan wished to elevate them to comparable to the samurai class in overall importance to society. In the end the samurai wished they were them. They were the rich. The way of the Samurai practiced to make peasant life better, a noble thing, but it was also the merchants that wanted this psychological territory  for themselves. They indeed made the ‘ some ‘ of the peasants’ lives extremely rich and wealth, and one could use this as an argument that the way of the merchant, was a viable as the way of the samurai. Both sought to make life for the peasantry more bearable in theory. For the samurai, this they said was their tradition. However this was the new Neo-Confucian age in Japan, and their legitimate rule placed them high in ‘ real’ social order and one, and many did, argue this was a contradiction that was too far gone – a strait-out dishonest lie.

The climax of Ieyasu's life was the siege of Osaka Castle (1614–1615). 1614 –‘15 Osaka campaigns, against the castle of Osaka ( he brings them up on trumped up charges).  Now Tokogawa have complete hegemony. 

Rice cake metaphor: This diddy came as an easier way for the people to understand history, but is a simplistic analogy to history.

Odu Nobunaga pounded the rice cake and gave shape to japan’s  ( the rice cake batter) organization of Daimyō lords, as Toyotomi Hideyoshi just ate the rice, meaning he reap the reward of the hard labor initiated by Nobunaga.

Summary. Hideoyshi offered Alliance, re–investiture, and Federation. 

Leyasu took the title of Shogun

3.            Major contrasts and contradictions in Tokugawa society. Compare and contrast, for example, the Confucian ideology of jinsei with the ideology of “house” or the prescribed limits of social movement with the reality of social change (change in the village or city) or the reality of the merchant role with the ideology of Tokugawa social and political prescriptions.

·         Most villagers were aware which administrators were incompetent. Where the contradiction lies, is in the fact that the Tokugawa tried to legitimatize Confucianism, by forming a Neo- Confusion legacy, and running a traditional Japanese horizontal administration along with a vertical Chinese administration. The contradiction lays in that Confucianism calls for meritocracy as a way of government, where testing and talent play vital roles in high-offices in the land;  therefore the Tokugawa needed to employ special religious scholars to form a legacy to fit their model – their system’ contradiction. The way of the warrior, was a long Japanese tradition linked to the kokka.

·         So how did they do this?

·         Neo-Confucianism exemplified no social-climbing and high-officials received higher stipends, according to rank. People did complain.

·         Bun verses bu: Another form of contradiction arose with this policy. Bun was looked down upon in the ancient times, so the Tokugawa tried to create a legacy (revising history of sorts – or special wordplay) to make it look as if bun was a legitimate pastime. Bun, civil of literary arts.

·         Confucianism: Confucius argues that under law, external authorities administer punishments after illegal actions, so people generally behave well without understanding reasons why they should; whereas with ritual, patterns of behavior are internalized and exert their influence before actions are taken, so people behave properly because they fear shame and want to avoid losing face.wiki) [ note the Foucaltian essence on lectures of sex]

·         bunjin: literatus:

o       Therefore, this society assumed everyone was (but needed) literate – which was not, or ever the case. There was enormous legal-code output by the governments, which needed vigilance of a literate village administration as well as a literate castle-town society which included workers that were not from the privileged class – the samurai.

o       However by teaching the peasantry they could become essayists/ scholars and advocate against the Tokugawa system. The peasants were ideologically supposed to live frugality and produce abundantly (& aggressively). This was a type of serfdom slavery.

·         bunjin: literatus

·         Harmony:

o       Tokugawa Bakufu ideology which was represented in prescripts and edicts which attempt to place society into boxes, a simplistic way of organization, often designation as the term rank. This was part of Basic Neo-Confucianism vertical illusional structure ( Hereditarily rules the real Tokugawa, and an ideal is only a term that recommends acknowledging striving for –not an assumed reality.  That’s why we call things ideals, because ideals often played out in reality as contradictions).

o       However entrepreneurialism developed, and bi-employment, special peasant artisans and then peasant and ronin businesses that were not agricultural, all developed in villages and domains. The Tokugawa allowed this to happen known or unbeknownst. Even by the sanctioning of monopolies run by entrepreneurial peoples, they knew then,  they contradicted their own policies of keeping people in their own boxes. 

THE ERA OF PACIFICATION, 1570–1630

Ideology founding’s:

1560s, Obu Nobunaga stated that he had a right to rule because he had displayed more competence than other daimyō and was, therefore, more qualified then the emperor of shogun to govern the realm. His statement counts as a personal reflection of his meritocracy. He was a military genius who capitalized on a violent period. He built the first strong castle symbolizing merit of being a strong leader. He built the Azuch, a seven story castle. In 1582, he was assassinated by an ungrateful vassal.

Toyotomi Hideyoshi skillfully took over the domains of Nabunaga and let the lords rule. He dreamed of conquering the Chinese, but never formed a centralized state. Both saw management of the Daimyō as the way to legitimacy, but didn’t accept the title of shogun. This showed that commoners could rule. Toyotomi Hideyoshi, the son of a poor peasant family, created a law that the samurai caste became codified as permanent and heritable.

Clearly, it was the legacy of the daimyō, specifically that of sengoku daimyō, that proved central to political reconsolidation. Unusual competence as a lord had become in itself the basis for claiming a right to rule. Only in the final stages of pacification, when triumphant daimyō could no longer ignore the task of justifying their de facto power, did they turn to the legacies of emperor and shogun for help in converting domanial power and authority into a countrywide right to rule. But by then they had already participated in the creation of a "feudal" or "federal" political structure that assigned enduring power and essentially autonomous administrative authority to daimyō.[12]

The particulars of Hideyoshi's political arrangements were unique, of course, but the basic pattern of qualified territorial autonomy was not. Ross Hassig, in describing basic characteristics of Aztec and Roman governance, has identified the key attributes of Hideyoshi's order. Hassig writes that Aztec and Roman rule shared these characteristics:

(1)       expansion of political dominance without direct territorial control, (2) a focus on the internal security of the empire by exercising influence on a limited range of activities within the client states, and (3) the achievement of such influence by generally retaining rather than replacing local officials. Because their imperial concerns were limited, maintenance of the empire was achieved with great economy of force, local resources being relied on for local security and order. (Ross Hassig, Trade, Tribute, and Transportation: The Sixteenth-Century Political Economy of the Valley of Mexico (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985), 24

In later years, Tokugawa rulers elaborated rules and regulations to guide daimyō—their "client states"—but they adhered to the basic principle of qualified territorial autonomy. So the distribution of real power that Hideyoshi had recognized survived the coming of peace and remained largely intact until the 1860s. 25

These elaborated rules changed the Tokugawa basic principles in which I do not ascribe to all of Conrad Totman’s argument of political stasis 1751 – 1790. Totman argues three basic criteria used as variables in a totality of a Tokugawa ear argument for judging society — stasis (inactivity caused by opposing equal forces.): social, financial and political. However, to make a general statement one cannot separate the three variables into distinctive departments. Why the ideology of the Tokugawa is as Professor Shiener argues individuals representing separate spaces which often were in reality more fluid in interconnectedness than a static representation.

The “Swinging Door” analogies represent a fluid space as well as the individuals that played the controller of these spaces of whom had to operate with carefulness to allow the door to swing open to one-side and closed to the other and vise-versa to allow these variables to permeate into another space. This would eventually allow change and not a stasis. What we saw was an early ideology, which then changed or morphed into something quite different, and then later people became miss-informed about the original Tokugawa system through revisionism, The Mirror of Modernity, Edo Memory and mythmaking.

The fundamental realities of what happened: Class separation, samurai off the land and into cities to take away economic power, took swords away from the peasants, taxed the people for campaigns against the Koreans, and controlled the imperial family 

First, the peasants: the principle idea of the Tokugawa system was the peasants lived frugality, and produced vigorously, therefore, remaining a slaves as they were not allowed to venture from the village. Secondly, the domain rulers: daimyō, Fudai and Tozama were the managers of their peasant populations in which they were provided autonomous control. Thirdly, the right of Gekokojō belonged to the Samurai, the privileged common winners at the battle of Sekigahara in 1600.

Gekokojō Those below commanding those above,” created the base ideological-structure in China and which the Samurai ruled but didn’t last throughout the Tokugawa era in reality, as the countryside rose in influence to  political importance, many privileged samurai changed to a ronin class, some went poor and peasant revolts grew to great social and political legitimacy weakening the once powerful Gekokojō formula. This is a contradiction of the ideology of the Bakufu that in reality rulers from above ruled those below. That is why the Tokugawa used the Neo-Confucian ideology. It was their interpretation.

It is the understanding how this change came about that signifies not a statis in the later half of the Tokugawa era but a countryside/rural fight back that triumphed over the central authorities that makes up the story of the Tokugawa era. 

The Tokugawa era saw both positive things in the beginning and negative things. First, it brought relative peace from a long period of warring domains, and second it established an ideology that kept this peace relativity in tact in order to develop some good policy. The relatedness then saw people think of good things and how to better conditions of all lives.

Hideyoshi began the archetype the Castle towns. The daimyō had job security until 1615, and the boxing in were the Tozama, by flanking loyal daimyō.

1603-1630 were the formulations of the base ideology of the Tokugawa.

Iemitsu (1623/7/27 -1651/4/20) crystallized the Tokugawa system with new policies of Sankin Kotai:

More important, in retrospect, than Iemitsu's measures of urban control were his moves to regularize the daimyō hostage practice that had operated haphazardly since Ieyasu's day. During the 1630s he developed it into the intricate sankin kotai , or "alternate attendance" system, in which lords and large numbers of retainers moved between castle towns and Edo every year, and wives, heirs, and suitable numbers of attendants lived in Edo permanently. Sankin kotai became the single most important mechanism of daimyō control, remaining intact and little changed until 1862. 26

Policy of Sankin-Kotai called for all Daimyō to spend 2-3 years in Edo  so they could not form permanent bonds in their realms. Sometimes they had to leave their wives, or family members in Edo as hostages when they returned to their domains. This was largely a medieval practice. The central government would provide capital to lords to build castle-towns, meaning a great responsibility of clout was given to these lords, and for insurance purposes the shogun Ieyasu demanded a surety. Then under Iemitsu it was decided that an elaborate form was devised. The purposes were to restrict any great Lord a retainer (domain holder) from fostering unity in the realm either with other lords, or in a particular domain and create an army to challenge Edo. Each lord had to keep busy to show the Bakufu that they were not ideally conspiring. Each lord had to build a mansion for the shogun, must spend one’s own money on the shogun, and attend Tokugawa functions. Also, be of service and act as a servant to the Tokugawa whenever they ask or want.

1635 Iemitsu ordered:

It is now settled that the [lords] are to serve in turns (kotai [] ) at Edo. They shall proceed hither (sankin ) every year in summer during the course of the fourth month. Lately the numbers of retainers and servants accompanying them have become excessive. This is not only wasteful to the domains and districts, but also imposes considerable hardship on the people. Hereafter suitable reductions in this respect must be made. [If daimyō] are ordered to go to Kyoto, [they must] follow the instructions given. On official business, however, the number of persons accompanying [them] can be proportionate to the rank of each [lord].  (David John Lu, Sources of Japanese History (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974), 1: 204.) 27

What did this policy do? If took the daimyō away from managing, fermenting, pursuing and developing the economics of his land. Instead some could argue they were ideally stationed in Edo for two-three years in order to amend Bakufu fears because the Bakufu were the overlords of the realm in hereditary and no meritocracy could establish other commoners with brought ideas to rise the ranks of supreme decision maker for Japanese policy.

Road compulsory work:

Porters, packhorses, cheap labor, long hours, shortage of manpower, reluctant workers, messenger service, free enterprise, entrepreneurial supplications, 

Initially tax-free land grants, government stipends for managers,  and a scale of fees charged to travelers.  Commoners had to agree with porters on a rates, making it a free-market enterprise, but officials had set rates.

With the regularizing of sankin kotai[*] and overall growth in the volume of travel, post stations outgrew their sources of income, and the rulers resorted to poorly paid corvée labor and animal levies to supply the stations with porters and packhorses. For the rest of the century, corvée levies imposed on nearby villages—sukego [*] , or "assisting villages,"—enabled highway stations to keep pace with commercial expansion, thereby helping cities grow. 28

The Tōkaidō was a highly traveled road connecting Edo (now Tokyo) and Kyoto. Horses were for hire, Pine-tree shady areas for rest, made mostly of gravel and sand. Many people traveled on it. Daimyō traveled with their retinues, most possibly to take their rice to Osaka, the required exchange/commerce castle-town. Corveé work, often paying a pittance, was compulsory and part of the Sukegō duty.  Villagers swept the roads to remove debris and graded the surface so the water would run off in rain storms. In later Tokugawa there were some 250 stations to provide travelers with necessities, along 5-10 kilometer intervals. Each station consisted of a post town, with varying populations between 500 to 3000 residents. Sukegō duty, was a decree to villages settled alongside major highways where the government ordered the people to provide horses, corveé labor and porters to help officials cross the land. Each decade an increase in demand for people and horses incurred resentment, as these were poorly paid positions, and positions of noble abuse. River crossings were one of these duties and the peasants had to hoist by planks the officials across rivers to keep them dry. It was hard and poorly paid ‘forced’ labor. Often workers would not show up on time and this slowed the transformational system of the entire government.

500-kilometer run between Edo and Osaka had required six days, but by century's end, by skipping layovers and running nights as well as days, messengers were covering the distance in less than four. 29

during the 1660s and 1670s The Bakufu took various sea and estuary routs to deliver food to by pass expensive and time-consuming land transport.

[the] goods came down the Pacific coast to below Mito, where they were off-loaded to Tone River boats, hauled upstream to the south branch of the Tone, sent down that branch to Edo Bay, and finally shunted across the bay to the city. 30

These road constructions were also elsewhere, but on a smaller scale and on purpose.  The Bakadu didn’t want to make roads to large so military up rises could use them, or large trade could be transported. During cropping season, the duty of a corveé service was the hardest. corveé labor were paid at the bottom of the barrel, and usually one-half of a normal pay and the had to carry people of goods for miles then, turn around and do the same back and forth. They would sometimes work for three day stretches. Sometimes that had to journey to a station to work, and sit idle if they didn’t get work and then hike back to their homes.

Jinsei: Benevolent government

The Neo-Confucian helped to bureaucratize the samurai thought which pervaded the ideology of the Tokugawa system and can be summed up in one term as jinsei. It turned samurai from a once military class of rulers into public servants and looked to harness the activity of the common people into a Tokugawa consensus. Rather than looking at it as a law, we look at it as a ritual of the natural hierarchy of the universe. Benevolent government was consciously fomented into Confucianism.  It was natural that the shogun rule, the great-lords administered their domains correctly, and the peasants ran frugality and produced vigorously.

Of course there were ways in which this had to be produced and maintained and that was the Tokugawa way. The relationship of the balancing of correct measure of kuni and kokka, make up the prime objective of the relationship between the samurai and the daimyō.

Kuni the code of  jinsei; benevolent government, and Kokka , the ideology of house,  sought to blend two different concepts together and function as a contradiction which is possible, if not practical.

To understand the contradiction we simply changed the hereditary Kokka ( in which a samurai could have been associated with, a protector of ( from a military order that had influence with the imperial court),  and move him out of the domains and into the city and give the Kokka to the great-lord in which he uses peasants to run it)  to a temporal possession of a temporal ‘great-lord’, and we instead turn the samurai from a temporary position of the meritocracy military-system of domainal factionalism, of which Obu Nobunaga claimed legitimacy of military fortuitous, to a hereditary position as non-warrior, i.e servant of the people,  given by Tokugawa Ieyasu to the bakufu shogunate which then ruled by implementing kuni. For example,

·         Jinsei one: daimyō maintain the house to pass on, but need to pass it on in a condition the same or better than they inherited it. It is like a subway rider who rides the train and gets off at the end, but some how must leave it in a better condition, theoretically, then when he boarded it. Daimyō don’t own the house of the domain, it is owned by the ancestors. He is just a rider that will eventually get off the ride and leave the position to the next rider.

·         The peasant owns the house, but in essence have no power but within their own village. The shoganate give no power in political legitimacy of state to the house.

·         Filial is second only to jinsei. First the house must be ruled with benevolence, and second he must have filially to the Shogun.

·         Once a daimyō is removed his domain is demolished, and his castle must be cleaned and vacated. If one barricades themselves in their castle, they better have other daimyō support them to agree that the offending shogun acted without jinsei. Sometimes, the shogun overseeing a domain where this happened could not gather up enough people to forcefully remove a daimyō, thereby needed to leave the issue unresolved. However, this type of move meant everyone with the daimyō that revolts is under the same penalties now as the daimyō in question.

·         The way the Tokugawa were able to achieve this contradiction was to place every social class strictly into tight-definitional-fixed boxes. The Shoganate line contradicted by definitional – separation the daimyō line, and they were both tied to kuni and kokka respectively in order to make the system function as a single line. Both in theory had power over the other, but it was generally understood and practiced that the Shogun had supreme control, as abstractly as that could comprehended. 

·         Daimyō don’t own the house of the domain, it is owned by the ancestors. He is just a rider that will eventually get off the ride and leave the position to the next rider.

·         Daimyō do not have rights of a private owner, but they have rights to give that domain to their heirs. Even still,  they need to make sure that their heirs are going to administer that domain with their own domainal- version of jinsei.

·         Ritual suicide: If a Daimyō loses his land he can be asked to commit ritual suicide, and he does, his personal belonging will be untouched and passed down to the next in line of his heritage, his daughters and wife will not be sold into prostitution, and his family gets to keep their home and will not lose power.

·         Daimyō need to see each other as equals, and this cultural function acted upon the desires of acceptance, unity, understanding, and competition.

 

Out of Conflict comes community as in family and class structures or class systems.

The house rose in natural time of the warrior, and this was real, but the ideology of the Tokugawa cannot rationalize the importance of the natural of the house. Informal thinking was deeply rooted in the warrior society.

How the retainers saw the relationship, Samurai and the Daimyō’s relationships were a tangled between serving the kuni or the kokka, according to the chide retainers of a daimyō.  Samuria were loyal to the tradition of the kokka, but they should be loyal to the kuni, bakufu.

Daimyō’s relationship to the Samurai

Samurai’s life used to be hereditary, but  under Tokugawa’s  Neo-Confucian system, their position became granted by meritocracy practices. Samurai previously meant personal control over land and people, directly exercising their inherited right. Now their duty became impersonal and bureaucratic. They operated under a meritocracy system where they could be replaced, and usually incumbents had no security. They became appointed officials by the Tokugawa Shoganate. They no longer could form emotional attachments to lords as the Tokugawa government’s agenda was to move them around so they could form no deep personal relationships, within any given domain. This meant they often had many lords. What did this do? The function of this type of mobile bureaucracy assured the Tokugawa system that their relationships remained distant and formal. Vassals now looked upon the samurai as symbols of administrations and less as leaders of warrior classes.  Loyalty became to known as disinterest advice and personal conduct that was a credit to the lords administration: qualities  of an ideal bureaucrat had come to be viewed as the essence of the warrior.31

Daimyō

Who were the daimyō?

Ideology: The Daimyō system under the Tokugawa saw to manage it by fragmenting its authority, therefore by not allowing it to rise against the shogunate. For example, Tokugawa purposely forbid large ship-building. This way no Tozama or Daimyō could transport large fleets of men for an insurrection. The contradiction was that the daimyō system could not prevent a foreign invasion, consolidate national unity and it was entirely the sankin kotai system that restrained this necessity of state. A state must organize itself for all periods in its existence to defend itself. Therefore the Daimyō were powerless while caught in a ‘swinging door’ which saw the peasants rise to power and samurai demand more of them. What did this result in? Well at least, 260 daimyō during the later period saw some type of poverty-stricken time. With the contradiction of cash-crops verses the koku stipend-tax, it divided the wealthy landlords and poor tenants. 32 How could the Bakufu raise new types of taxes without causing mass-riots?

Samurai lived in luxury in cities [castle-towns, majority in Edo], used to effete lifestyles. Criticism of samurai, of political situation, came from people of all walks of life. Who is to blame? How should one interpret events? How should we deal with situation? Many blamed the government for its corruption, low morals, arrogance and ignorance, its isolation, and poor defenses. The government reacted with hostility, arrested dissidents, purged western learning.

Lower samurai untrained and ill equipped, Samurai lived in luxury in cities, used to effete lifestyles. Criticism of samurai, of political situation, came from people of all walks of life. Who is to blame? How should one interpret events? How should we deal with situation? Many blamed the government for its corruption, low morals, arrogance and ignorance, its isolation, and poor defenses. The government reacted with hostility, arrested dissidents, purged western learning.

The Daimyō should be able to fortify their domains, stock weapons and build ships. Sato Nobuhiro argued for a centralized state. Economy, frugality, promotion of men of talent—traditional Confucian response to disorder, saw crisis as moral not political/economic. Domain Reform: Traditional response to crises was “reform,” kaishin or chuko, kaikaku (gaige), vague response to unprecedented crisis. Domains reacted differently according to geographic location and other factors, some blame corruption of samurai city ways, urged frugality. Some cut samurai stipends, leading to more problems. Some argued for restriction of commerce. 33

Bakufu:

1790s onward: political scholarship entered into the social arena. It stimulated intellectuals and society, giving it some good ideas and some bad ideas. The old system of stasis and longevity with ideology was crumbling with the introduction of the outside world. What did the outside world do; what did it think; and more importantly what was out there?

Peasant and Village:

Lord, Daikan, Headsman, household heads, village elders, multi- family organization,  village groups, shrine, wet, dry and common lands, families, school for basic training, and tax.

Village things: the Lord (usually a daimyō, fudai, tozama ); Nanushi (mamushi) /shōyathe most important village peasant, the headman - the ruler of the Village; Household: Village multi- family organization, five-house system in small groups, and then multi-five-house systems. Ideal of daimyō/Tokugawa arrangements were less peasants on land and at the same time more production ( i.e. less mouths to feed). Village made up of five-house segments in which many segments could exist in a village. Each designated with forth basic elements: Household, Wetlands, Dry lands, Common lands. Wetlands: paddy-culture, the paddy field’s soil actually gets better over time, as the soil takes on richer nutrients, contrasted with dryland soil depletion. Each family had a paddy to grow rice. Paddy-rice production required much cooperation, Dry lands: hatake, each had a dry patch of land to grow vegetables, Common land: each village needed a forest for fuel and fertilizer. Uakanomo – guni, village orders: toshiyori, hyakushō dai, yoriai; yoriai, heads of village families and attend a privet council of only heads of family if one mortgages (or sells)  their lands one loses representation and services of this order; Kenchi daikan, the cadastral survey, usually administer once in a long period; Nengu the two tiered taxes, one of the large (rice koku), and all others, grain tax, Diakan, the Shogunal attendant goes directly into Village to administer shogun laws; homogenous , all peasants rule and are accountable as a whole, with the headman as representative to the daimyō who could then let the samurai deal with the village at his dispense, but lose in the ideology of jinsei and could lose his job as leader of a domain; Samurai can kill any peasant legally; Vendettas can be legally issued at Edo, but need to register before a certain time period, and be known to the opposing party beforehand of any action taking place; Unofficial religion, the Shrine of the village, illegal but operational, no samurai came into village as a general statement. They could, but they didn’t like too. They were not liked. Village religion is based in animistic beliefs, and elite used the founders of the village as a heritage of sorts for village ceremonial and often power of hierarchy ― saying “ we go back to the founding so we are the de facto rulers. Still headman jobs were rotated as a general policy ordered by peasant understanding. Yet, prominent families were big issues at ceremonies, in regards to seating arrangements, and proper respect; physical relations, chastity were no issue at the community level, as it was in Castle-towns, or towns, uncommitted relationships often happened, many children born out of wedlock; Infanticide, childbearing was investigated and a consistency arose in the years between a mother’s birth and her children of a strangely four-five year interval; much speculation and argument as to why this has happen.  Waka-guni groups consisted of all, male, female and children. Usually identified as a group-set, entering at the age of fourteen to fifteen, but some people as old as seventy remain committed to group functioning. This is because these youth groups ran all the vital services, from the fire department, to the sweeper, and clean-up crew.

Kokugaku rural headman school set up by daimyō to teach jinsei, turns into power-network for headman’s problems against daimyō and samurai. Kokugake came from Kara (Another form to say China, but translation means empty) and gaku, studies. Initially a deity religious type of functionary. It helped change the rural agrarian society:” We’re the real base of the Tokugawa system.” The ideal was offered to have the wealthy peasant replace the samurai. Then associations of many headmen was the functionary. In the late Edo period, Daimyō could not control or help all of the problems.  Later many manushi’s said, lets take over the controls of governance, “lets take over the daimyō’s role. When things began to become erratic, the daimyō didn’t care anymore, which of course led the way to opening opportunities for the peasant headmen to rise in non-legal governance control. Why is this? The Tenryō managing Bakufu stated they have no longer control of the domains.

Edo of city life:

Another trend after 1790s was the focus on Edo’s lifestyle as a complete synergy of expression. “ Edocentrism” it was called; the metropolis of newly formed worlds of ideas and customs. This was the new politico-economic-cultural center and the economic engine of Japan.

Urban Culture: Genroku, exhibited a Edo population over 1 million, built up through the sankin kotai system, samurai families and their excesses catered to by servants, merchants, and traders.

Culture of decadence of Edokku modle ( Turn everything upside down)  looked down upon by pro-Bakufu moralists. In turn,  the Edokku looked down upon the  samurai and daimyō and portrayed them as weak and dissolute. Travel for pleasure was also proscribed, seen as wasteful. Mass pilgrimages caused chaos. Edo tourist sites celebrated in travel guides, literature and art.

Russian encroachment vie Ezo ( northeast)

Definitions: (elaborate definitions for things appear throughout text)

Bakufu, The Tokugawa administration.

Daikan            Shogunal attendant. Jobs: finance minister; officials approved by daimyō. They administer, but do not police within the village; they watch over the village, collect the rice-tax, and also calculate rate of exchange. The lowest rank of samurai.

/ nichi = the way or road; meant what are ideals of morale or things.

Domains: 46 of 69 provinces of Japan (since ancient times).

Fudai              (cadet branches) 10,000,000 koku per year 1/3 of realm.

Gekokojō        “ Those below commanding those above.”

Giri                 amalgamation, a cutting-up of villages in a given domain from a larger. territory. Mura-giri. A samurai’s duty.

Kenchi daikan           The cadastral survey

Kenshi                        Tokugawa cadastral tax.

Kokugaku      rural headman school set up by daimyō to teach jinsei, turns into power-network for headman’s problems against daimyō and samurai. Kokugake came from Kara (Another form to say China, but translation means empty) and gaku, studies. Initially a deity religious type of functionary. It helped change the rural agrarian society:” We’re the real base of the Tokugawa system.” The ideal was offered to have the wealthy peasant replace the samurai. Then associations of many headmen was the functionary. In the late Edo period, Daimyō could not control or help all of the problems.  Later many manushi’s said, lets take over the controls of governance, “lets take over the daimyō’s role. When things began to become erratic, the daimyō didn’t care anymore, which of course led the way to opening opportunities for the peasant headmen to rise in non-legal governance control. Why is this? The Tenryō managing Bakufu stated they has no longer control of the domains.

Nanushi (mamushi) /shōya               Most important village peasant, the headman.

Nengu             the two tiered taxes, one of the large (rice koku), and all others, grain tax.

Nōmin            (Agrarian), hyakushō ―  ( Peasants known today)

Mabiki            literally cutting away, the word designated for infanticide.

Mura              (village ) ,   buraka― ( Village known today)

Rōnin              Master-less Samurai

Rōjū (government official)

State Shinto/Buddhist                       Tokugawa state religious centers where annual vows of anti-Christianity and other banned religions take place.

Uakanomo – guni      Village orders: toshiyori, hyakushō dai, yoriai.

Waka-guni     special duty crew; they are peasants that fill all voids of responsibility in village.

Wakanomo- guni ― Village Independent groups, Meiji get rid of this system.

Ujigami           animistic religion, ancestral worship, banned by widely practiced.

Tenryō            bakufu lands,  Tokugawa land that is taxed and directly under their control.

Kunritsu         Important figure who wrote that everyone above him was corrupt in the Tokugawa system and even had harsh words for peasants in village.

Ojoyo              Superheadsman, in later periods. O meaning large. (Spelt Ohoyo, but sounded as).

Tedai  secretary, adapted when crisis management was need, ruled the tenryō land management, and was allowed to wear temporarily the two swords of the samurai.

Tenryō  7,000,000 koku per year. 1/5 of realm; aka bakufu lands.

Tokusei, were debt relief agents who rose up against the Samurai, the owners of the land.

yoriai              Heads of village families and attend a privet council of only heads of family. This gives certain rights in village to people that belong to the council. In later periods some sell their land (ie. House) and become landless, meaning they lose their seat on the council and thus many village privileges. 

Samurai/ bushi

Nomin/peasant (hxakusho/farmers)

3.a) Tokugawa Shogunate or Edo Bakufu,

Society:

·   Normative Shogun society consisted of the attributes of social, political and economic hierarchal order.

The Shogunate of the Tokugawa. ( the Rulers & Ruling classes)

·  The emperor’s rule defined a proper period title. The emperor was kept away from the population, within a beautiful garden complex, where they ruled without control of Japan.

·   The Samurai, until 1868, under Tokugawa rule, were rulers who alone had the right to hold office and bear arms and whose cultural superiority the rest of the population acknowledged.  Most often cited as: Samurai - Member of the (traditional) warrior class.

·    Shogun - Barbarian subduing General (war lord, see below).

Shogun

Shogun (, shōgun is a military rank and historical title in Japan. The rank is equivalent to "general," a high officer in an army. The honor was bestowed by the Emperor or a regent. As a title, it is the short form of sei-i taishōgun. Shoguns were military steward and directly connected to the imperial court.

What the shogun traditionally did was to tame the barbarians of far off lands, just as the Christian believed they had to civilize the western hemisphere barbarians before the coming of Jesus Christ; Both, not similar, but similar because of an aim at civilizing the uncivilized in their regions’ midst. Now they are administrations and want to form a civilized country.

Three major Samurai groups

·         Kamon: cadets

·         Fudai: Daimyō (Tokugawa loyalists and neutrals)

·         Tozama: outside Daimyō, like the Mudi ( mostly losers at Sekigahara)

There are 16 groups of samurai. Some are wealthy, while some in the later stages of Tokugawa were reduced to poverty and begging (selling their swords, and making bamboo imitation replacements); each Samurai carried two swords and wore a (sash (something here)

Daimyō model

Daimyō were the most powerful feudal rulers from the 12th century to the 19th century in Japan. The term daimyō literally means "great name." Sometimes the word is used to describe warlords.

Daimyō could exists without owning a domains, and by siding with Ieyasu in 1600 the could receive, and did, a bit of contiguous territory as a reward for their help. Even before Sekigahara Daimyō were pacifying the country, reading for a new eventual administration.

After Sekigahara, warlords were either rewarded to the winning side of the battle or reorganized for their disloyalty. Fudai lords were reputedly decended form Ieyasu’s pre-Sekigahara retainers and tozama from other lordly families of 1600. Shinpan were those Tokugawa relatives (Kamon) who traced their lineage to Ieyasu by way of his several sons. 34

Daimyō – were the client states, but adhered to autonomous territory qualifications.

Totman uses “haphazardly applied,” he writes, that japans’ political arrangements from Kamakera to Tokugawa periods as federal in the purist meaning. A central authority contends with satellite semi-autonomous governments, of which both act in tandem, but interact as part of a political whole – for the good of the people ( jinsei).

Daimyō model…Continued. Revenue, monitary system, a.k.a tax system in rice.

Rice as Tax is sent to Edo, in exchange for legitimacy. Edo then disperses the rice as monetary control. A symbol, yet a real commodity of value. Persons are value, and work hard to produce the rice. Then that rice has value, into which it becomes a viable contributing monetary factor for the central authorities.

Han: Daimyō Domain.

Difference between the shogun and the Daimyō: the Daimyō became the shogun, holding political office, becoming military generals.

Imagawa Yoshimoto built a Vertical hierarchy, later justified by the rules of these lands the came to rule. The Daimyō came into the provinces and took control of the land and the houses. The house was important because it represented authority of rule to any local domain.

Koku: servicing the house meant servicing the land.

Kōgi: Mission to improve life in a domain. On public authority, they regulated waterworks and land working on behalf of the people of the domain.

Kamon

Fundai

Tozama

Hatamoto: bannermen, 5,200 families.

Gokenin

Ashigaru

Distribution of Land

Estimated yield (koku)c.  1700

Imperial Household                            141,151, koku

Tenryō ( Shogunal domain):               4, 213, 171 koku

Hatamoto-gokenin lands:                    2, 606.545 koku

Fundai-shinpan  Daimyō lands:          9, 325,300 koku

Tozama Daimyō lands:                       9,834,700 koku

Temple & shrine lands                        316,230 koku

Most of the greatest lords were Tozama. Each existed as a bastion of autonomous power, complete with legitimate authority, with an ideology to rule and a self-sustaining government, bordered territory, a inter-tax base, a peasant producing populous, and administration regulations.

State bureaucratic system.

  • Gekokojō, “ Those below commanding those above.”

Ideology of Confucius: Those who rule above rule those below because it is a natural and spiritual way. Deliberate new legacy attempted by Shogunate to legitimize their power entails a neo-Confucian doctrine.

Models facilitated by bakufu

·     Horizontal alliances ( Contracts signed by families), no hierarchy involved, but a development of a common bond based on sectarianism; meaning that each came together and worked for/ ‘later against’ the Daimyō. Variations of village politics is covered in this section but one must understand that hereditary in the house system was a horizontal alliance, understood within the village and matters to samurai stipens. When the merchant classes and wealthy peasant classes arise this ideal breaks-down in all rural sectors of Japan.

·     Vertical Alliance, Hereditary by horsizontal house tradition(s) with qualifications,  but within system a meritocracy per say, but of heritage and ranking appointments to samurai that made up the Tokugawa’s ruling system this is a vertical system. This was the ideal of Gekokojō. This belonged solely to the Shogun and their samurai classes in theory.

·     Ikki Modle (this was an imaginative model that arose independent from official doctrine, but had been in culture before, and later comes back into fashion in Edokko).

  • Religion.

Themes:

  • 1560 -1710 General–Before and Tokugawa period : growth, pacifism and order.
  • 1710-1850 stasis. Late Tokugawa social/political tension reflected in intellectual life.

What was the government? From eastern to western writers throughout history, from the Tokugawa period beyond, there was no consensus.  There were elements of feudalism, militarism, authoritarianism, and/or many other variations. Most just say it was a military dictatorship, but this doesn’t suffice the semi-autonomy of the rural/village/domain regions, which made up the majority of area of Japan. I like to call it a type of federalism of a brand that has not been identified. Centralized feudalism is an oxymoron, therefore this will never apply correctly to a definition. However, we all must keep in mind the fluidity that Edo was. It changed drastically from its inception under Ieyasu’s minding. The federalism aspect that I would like to identify actually allowed the rural to eventually take over the commerce of the Castle-town, forcing the widely claimed reason of the Tokugawa fall for raising unbearable taxes that eventually erupted into peasant revolts, and a change in domainal power structure bringing the Edo period to a close. The best conclusion was the Bakufu didn’t tax correctly when they had a chance on the rural monopolies, which brings a thesis of the fall that is in stark contrast to the normal patter of historiography. Most historians, commentators, and popularists write a theory that the Tokugawa fell because of steep taxes weighing too heavily on the peasants who rose up and jittered the very power structures leading some daimyō and samurai to splinter – off and join in the peasant rebellion. However, a better theory is that there were not sufficient taxes in ‘all of Japan’ which lead to the financial struggles of Edo, Osaka, Nagasaki, and other foci of Bakufu power. If a comprehensive tax structure existed, the Bakufu would never have had to expropriate rural power and therefore the peasants would naturally rise along with them into economic prominence. But the pattern shows that the countryside became the economic power and the cites economically fell because of incomprehensive tax programs. On theory I think of why this was treated the way it was historically that is, was writers focused only on the castle-towns, especially Edo to see what the tax trend was and innocently think that this was the normality for all Japan. Be that it may, this is only a theory non–the–less and not mine. One can see the historiography of the arguments by many Japanese and other investigators to what brought down the Tokugawa, and usually they come in four-main departments. So when reading the text take in mind that changes occur, and there never was a comprehensive tax on the new rural industries that arose. There will be national products that were distributed all over Japan, but the Bakufu by tradition didn’t want to tax it, and therefore the families and stem-families that operated these new idea corporations rose to become more wealthy than a combined estimate of the national income. We learned these by records ceased by the Bakufu. There were such wealthy corporation heads that never were sufficiently taxed that it makes one wonder why? The reason is the ideology of taxation was ingrained in an archaic time period, but we ( the earth) and the Tokugawa had moved into a new era of pre-modernism, where new economic functionalities must come into play in order to make a state work properly. This means it is not the Bakufu fault. Certainly the Marxists wrongly jumped the gun to blame Britain’s of all the ills of modernism when they were the spearheads for the world – meaning they were in untested waters and problems and kinks always exist. They had no idea what to expect. Here we can say the same thing about the Bakufu. They were living in untested waters. There were no outside influences apart from a small culturalizaiton of Dutch influence and a mundane Chinese influence that had nothing to do with managing monopolized corporations. In affect, tax can be one major reason, the larger reason I believe is that this society witnessed its own creation of capitalism apart form a western world, meaning it understood from within its eather, base, root, and/or its genesis. The west had no influence or for that matter contact to issue its ideas. It happened naturally. Even though western thinkers teetered with the ideas, it happened naturally but autonomous regions of the rural. This is why it happened in Japan. The Provinces were semi-autonomous and samurai didn’t want to enter. If the samurai could he would never enter the domain. It was easy for the rural peasants to forsake prescripts after decades of rule because Tokugawa was settling down and once things ran smoothly, and usual payments arrived, as well as new artisans began their independent inventions, the rural broke rules in which the Bakufu didn’t become aware of for decades. There are examples here in this text. This is why a certain type of federalism in the Edo period existed, I believe. I do not have a name or a system; it was clearly a function unto itself. To call the Edo period a military dictatorship would be to imply that major suppression happened constantly, which never happened. To call it feudal would deny its birth into capitalism, which did happen and on a wide scale. These are my argument and there are many factors that can persuade one either way to keep within these older, I believe outdated, terms.

Bakufu Philosophy: The stick of social discipline and the carrot of social opportunity produced the main theme of the Tokugawa.

The ecosystem’s production generally satisfied society’s essential needs, despite inefficiencies and inequities in the distribution system. In later centuries, as we shall note subsequently, those same sticks, absent those same carrots, no longer sufficed.35

1568-1598 Political reconsolidation: “ The passage from violence  to peace signified the reintegration of society’s muscle, money, and myth (political, economic, and religion). 36

Kamakura period 1185-1333

Sengoku period 1467-1568

Uprising # 2

Small insignificant Christian uprising ( rebellion in Shimabara) called out the Tokugawa to expel them to an islet away from the main Japanese  cities. The Christians were heavily taxed, and were poor people who had a right to protest. This was an excuse to purify Japan. Now only the Dutch could enter Japan’s boundaries, and this was basically once a year for trade purposes.

The Wonderful Contradiction.

  • Most villagers were aware which administrators were incompetent. Where the contradiction lies, is in the fact that the Tokugawa tried to legitimatize Confucianism, by forming a Neo- Confusion legacy, and running a traditional Japanese horizontal administration along with a vertical Chinese administration. The contradiction lays in that Confucianism calls for meritocracy as a way of government, where testing and talent play vital roles in high-offices in the land;  therefore the Tokugawa needed to employ special religious scholars to form a legacy to fit their model – their system’ contradiction. The way of the warrior, was a long Japanese tradition linked to the kokka.
  • So how did they do this?
  • Neo-Confucianism exemplified no social-climbing and high-officials received higher stipends, according to rank. People did complain.

Balance in Tokugawa

  • Pre-Tokugawa, the military were only looked upon by society.
  • Now, Bun and Bu, were a balanced core of objectives in running a smooth society.
  • Bun, being civil service.
  • Bu military service.
  • Another form of contradiction arose with this policy. Bun was looked down upon in the ancient times, so the Tokugawa tried to create a legacy (revising history of sorts – or special wordplay) to make it look as if bun was a legitimate pastime social champion.

Sticky Situations

  • Daimyō hold their own lands, but have Shogun friends, and Samurai worked for Daimyōs, so Daimyōs could be seen as working as a shogun administrator. So friendships play an important factor here in this administration system. The problem would stem from loyalties of each level to each other.
  • Bakufu were initially military administrators before they looked to the Chinese administration as a model for bureaucratic system of governance.  This included,…..
  • Confucianism was not a military model for administration, but a meritocracy built upon testing, ranking, natural selection and knowledge.
  • Confucianism based itself of jinsei, benevolent government.
  • The Chinese system was based upon tests, and these tests often took decades to prepare for, offering a learned politician to the throws of government.
  • Neo-Confucianism never seemed able to hurdle this contradiction in practical application that it did in China.
  • However, Samurai were trained in civilities in schools, but people were received into these schools from status and not ability as with China.
  • Japanese taught in Tokugawa government that government forms edit which attempt to place society into boxes, a simplistic way of organization.
  • Therefore, this society assumed everyone was (but needed) literate – which was not, or ever the case. There was enormous legal-code output by the governments, which needed vigilance of a literate administration as well as a society.
  • Tokugawa/bushi classes remained independent in power and on top of a modified - developed feudal system.
  • The only way the Tokugawa could remain in power was a strong agrarian class that paid taxes, accepted cadastral surveys and remained subservient to their class status.
  • Samurai could kill a peasant/commoner without penalty, and the law forbade samurai from living in villages – and to boot no Samurai wanted to live in them either – for the stigma this policy claimed.
  • Therefore, each village was semi-autonomous, and the government made each village treats itself with collective responsibility. Therefore, each villager would rat-out the other, or they would stick together to fight against the (watchers) Samurai, as any self preservation mode of survival entails.
  • A snitch society created a “no–report all families punishment.” If one family wronged a Samurai, or any other official up the ranks in society, all families of that village were held accountable to higher authority. 
  • The entire village is responsible for each other and to the Tokugawa in principle. But they also had to protect each other. So fear created unity within the village confines.

Laws

1.      Class separation

2.         Samurai off the land and into cities to take away economic power (see taxes argument, under “what is the government?”).

3.      Took swords away from the peasants

4.      Taxed the people for campaigns against the Koreans.

5.      Control imperial family.

17th Century (1600s) Domestic ideology.

From the early Muromachi period, after the Ming dynasty displaced the Mongols in China, both authorized and covert Sino-Japanese trade grew to great proportions, providing Muromachi leaders with most of their coinage. During the sixteenth century, however, that trade declined because of disruptions in both countries. 37

1570-1630, the rise in gross population, entrepreneurial initiatives mainly to the villagers, produced the extra cultivation of land, indicating increased economic viability and political change. Government promoted agriculture, mining, construction, and foreign trade. The prosperity of this era by economic growth remained the crucial indicator for peace. Mining was in great demand for Iron which made up the core of weaponry, tools, and construction supplies. Gold, silver and bronze from the 1590s onward created jobs for minting. Hideyoshi’s legitimacy lay in the fact he claimed the bullion mines thoughout Japan, and after Sekigahara, Ieyasu took them over. 38 During Ieyasu’s reign some fifty gold mines and thirty silver mines were brought into production . 39 After Sekigahara, Ieyasu inherited Hideyoshi’s authority over foreign trade, including that of the Iberians . 40 He controlled this authority over any daimyō so he could keep a lid on the possibility or reality of imported weaponry and “saltpeter imports, trade profits and political affects of Iberian missionary activity,” 41 Ieyasu forged his control by issuing permits and forming guilds, like the itowappu yarn (mainly silk) workers in 1604.

1604-1616 Ieyasu, unlike Hideyoshi who restricted trade to just one Dutch ship per annum, issued trade agreements with the Chinese and South Asians for about two-hundred trading missions. He issues licensed to Samurai and foreigners to keep tabs on the whole operation. However, he did this so to speak to  keep Japan equitable and stop the proselytizing of the Iberians who the Catholic Church demarcated the coming of Jesus appearing soon and the whole earth must be converted before he comes and takes everyone away (See excuse: 1637-38 Shimabara).

1603-1633, trade on the high seas remained risky with the Japanese seizing ships, the wako plundering ships, yet the profits from a Japanese investor for the first three decades of Tokugawa rule could reap as much as 110 percent and if not would possibly make the lowest percent of 35 which still is considered nominal profit range. Silk and silver were major commodities shipped.

1614-15 Osaka

1620s estimated peek of bakufu silver mines on Sado yielded some sixty to ninety thousand kilograms of bullion per annum. Until the 1630s, these mines played a large part in domestic and foreign trade.

1637-38 Shimabara

1630, basic consolidation had been achieved 42 and Yamanouchi administration subsequently tuned to long-term programs of economic development.

Three Major famines.

1732 crop failure ravaged the southwest called the kyōho famine. 43 Cause leafhoppers and frost. Affected years of 1732-33 witnessed people who reported suffering from  hunger as 2,646,020, and a death-toll of 12,072. forty-six han suffered with seventy-five percent crop loss.

1783 Summer, Volcano Mount Asama erupted August 4 (1783/7/7-8) on the Shinano Kōzuke boarder northwest of Edo, and prior to this the mountain belched smoke and ask regularly for three months. The explosion could be heard in Osaka and northern Honshu. This caused the Tenmei famine. Fire from brimstone took crops, and a meter and a half of ash piled up in the mountains directly east of Asama. 44 This caused the notorious Tenmei famine. The eruption caused bad weather for a long time. Census drop are seen when looking at the figures and comparing from 1780 to 1786, where a drop in 924,000 in populating and the numbers of the displaced were unreliable.

A particular disastrous case of governmental action occurred in Hirosaki. In 1781 the daimyō tried to reduce his han debt be promoting taxable new production, including cotton and silk cloth, salt, and pottery. The ventures all failed, so the lord turned to more customary alternatives, He resurveyed his lands, increased the tax levy, compelled the wealthy villagers to turn over stored rice, withheld part of his retainers’ rice stipends, and began shipping the accumulated grain to Edo and Osaka. Then the harvest failed. Evan as villagers and townsmen were rioting and demanding cuts in the rice price and cessation of shipments, he pressed on, at one point deploying troops so that freighters could depart Aomori safely. Some vessels made it to Osaka and Edo; some were lost at sea. But all their cargo was denied to the needy of Hirosaki, and the result was a tragedy twice that of the Tenpō years. By a relative conservative count, 81,702 people died of starvation. Reportedly 17,211 horses perished, and two-thirds of the han’s arable land, some 10,399 chō of paddy and 6,931 chō of dry field, temporarily went out of production.

Of course, rulers could also ameliorate hardship, but because daimyō governance was local, “virtuous” rule that bettered conditions in one area might worsen them in another. In 1783 the Tōhoku domain of Shirakawa (110,000 koku) reportedly lost nearly all rice crop. However, the lord, Matsudairia Sadanobu, grandson of the revered Yoshimune, was able through family connections in Edo to buy substantial quantities of rice, some from Osaka and some from nearby areas, including the Aizu, Taira, Nihonmatsu, and Moriayama domains. He distributed the food to his vassals and villagers and reportedly prevented any from starving to death. Saving his people despite massive crop failure helped give Sadanobu a glowing reputation, propelled his political career, and surely was to his credit. He did so, however, by obtaining rice from areas where need was comparable, and by assuring that it was distributed to his own people, not to outsiders, who found the boarders closed. Had the policy been more integrated, a more sensitive distribution system might well have kept the people of Shirakawa alive without leaving a reported 8,500 dead in nearby Sōma han.

1790s Series of communications onward, foreigners requested diplomatic and commercial arrangements.

1830s, Tenpō famine, includes an outbreak of disease. Cause, bad harvest accompanying years of cold-wet summers (was this global warming?). Bad harvest patterns begin in 1833 and by 1836 deaths began to occur. Hirosaki han reported 35,600 deaths, 19,000 horse deaths, and 47,000 people who fled. Akita, in 1837,reported a death rate of two persons per household. Populations shifting: Many people fled to the castle-towns, like Edo or Osaka, but most didn’t make it and starved to death. Prices skyrocket for grain in as much as three times and in one location, as much as seventeen times the pre-existing rate; the further from the castled-towns the higher the price of rice or grains (Food in general). Two or three percent of the population shift to the southwest in the affected regions. Totman’s arguments are land reclamation created lost opportunity to grow, and also created flooding, which was a factor, as many left their paddy-field from the onslaught of the wet-summers.  In addition, a larger problem, in that cash crops (cotton or tobacco) grown in the vicinity of Osaka when the famine hit, which meant these areas needed to get their food from outside their lands. The issue lay in persons such as Yoshimune who had increased the tax-yield of the bakufu lands moving rice to cities and leaving the countryside short on rice-supplies. Furthermore, when the famine hit the shogun put pressure on the villages to provide more rice to the cities, leaving them wanting. 

18th Century (1700s) devoted to conscious “ system maintenance.” 45

1868 – End of The Tokugawa. 46

Education
Growing number of educated people reflected in growth of schools 59 domain schools established between 1781-1803, 72 more between 1800-1840. Also, the number of private academies exploded. (http://www.willamette.edu/~rloftus/temporeforms.html)

There was a perceived need for a synthetic approach to the growing crisis, beginnings of kokutai (National Polity) ideology pioneered by Mito scholars (Mito was an influential shimpan or collateral domain) who saw the need to synthesize Japanese traditions and religion with a powerful centralized state. (http://www.willamette.edu/~rloftus/temporeforms.html)

Mizuno Tadakuni
1794-1851, architect of Tempo reforms.

The Tempo Crisis. The Era of “heavenly protection” (or tianbao, i.e. Tempo in Japanese), began in 1830. Over Tempo era, scholars count 465 rural disputes, 445 peasant uprising, 101 urban riots, which peaked in 1836.

Contradictions:

Contradiction between growth and spread of knowledge; and rigid restrictions and censorship.

A growth of rangaku “Dutch learning," but restriction on foreign trade?

Some banning then period of allowing books into Japan, such as the European astronomy books and science books, which were first banned then later allowed in to a limited number of scholars.

End of tokugawa:

1840s

Opium War in China scared the Japanese it could happen to them. Coastal reforms for defense, cannon smelting for defense around Nagasaki.

Bakufu looked to Kansei and earlier “Confucian” reforms as model.
Moral health needed restoration. Urban life with gambling, drink, sex needed reform. Prostitution in Yoshiwara and other areas. Yet unlicensed prostitution flourished everywhere. Teahouses and restaurants ordered closed, mixed bathing outlawed. Lotteries, gambling, tatoos prohibited. Porn literature, racy novels banned. Music halls and entertainment proscribed. Actors banished. Sumptuary regulations enforced. Domains were hampered by inner factionalism, and resistance of han leaders to change. Commercial competition among domains drove up prices, ruined stable economic relations. Domains in race for development both military and economic. Economy, frugality, promotion of men of talent—traditional Confucian response to disorder, saw crisis as moral not political/economic. Domains reacted differently according to geographic location and other factors, some blame corruption of samurai city ways, urged frugality. Some cut samurai stipends, leading to more problems. Some argued for restriction of commerce.
47

The Neo-Confucian helped to bureaucratize the samurai thought which pervaded the ideology of the Tokugawa system and can be summed up in one term as jinsei. It turned samurai from a once military class of rulers into public servants and looked to harness the activity of the common people into a Tokugawa consensus. Rather than looking at it as a law, we look at it as a ritual of the natural hierarchy of the universe. Benevolent government was consciously fomented into Confucianism.  It was natural that the shogun rule, the great-lords administered their domains correctly, and the peasants ran frugality and produced vigorously.

Of course there were ways in which this had to be produced and maintained and that was the Tokugawa way. The relationship of the balancing of correct measure of kuni and kokka, make up the prime objective of the relationship between the samurai and the daimyō.

Kuni the code of  jinsei; benevolent government, and Kokka , the ideology of house,  sought to blend two different concepts together and function as a contradiction which is possible, if not practical.

Toyotomi Hideyoshi, who became a grand minister in 1586, himself the son of a poor peasant family, created a law that the samurai caste became codified as permanent and heritable.

To understand the contradiction we simply changed the hereditary Kokka ( in which a samurai could have been associated with, a protector of ( from a military order that had influence with the imperial court),  and move him out of the domains and into the city and give the Kokka to the great-lord in which he uses peasants to run it)  to a temporal possession of a temporal ‘great-lord’, and we instead turn the samurai from a temporary position of the meritocracy military-system of domainal factionalism, of which Obu Nobunaga claimed legitimacy of military fortuitous, to a hereditary position as non-warrior, i.e servant of the people,  given by Tokugawa Ieyasu to the bakufu shogunate which then ruled by implementing kuni. For example,

 

·         Jinsei one: daimyō maintain the house to pass on, but need to pass it on in a condition the same or better than they inherited it. It is like a subway rider who rides the train and gets off at the end, but some how must leave it in a better condition, theoretically, then when he boarded it. Daimyō don’t own the house of the domain, it is owned by the ancestors. He is just a rider that will eventually get off the ride and leave the position to the next rider.

·         The peasant owns the house, but in essence have no power but within their own village. The shoganate give no power in political legitimacy of state to the house.

·         Filial is second only to jinsei. First the house must be ruled with benevolence, and second he must have filially to the Shogun.

·         Once a daimyō is removed his domain is demolished, and his castle must be cleaned and vacated. If one barricades themselves in their castle, they better have other daimyō support them to agree that the offending shogun acted without jinsei. Sometimes, the shogun overseeing a domain where this happened could not gather up enough people to forcefully remove a daimyō, thereby needed to leave the issue unresolved. However, this type of move meant everyone with the daimyō that revolts is under the same penalties now as the daimyō in question.

 Footnote 48,

553

APPENDIX A—
YEAR PERIODS (
NENGO[*] ), 1570–1868

 

Period name

Starting date

Genki

1570/4/23

Tensho[*]

1573/7/28

Bunroku

1592/12/8

Keicho[*]

1596/10/27

Genna

1615/7/13

Kan'ei

1624/2/30

Shoho[*]

1644/12/16

Keian

1648/2/15

Joo[*]

1652/9/18

Meireki

1655/4/13

Manji

1658/7/23

Kanbun

1661/4/25

Enpo[*]

1673/9/21

Tenwa

1681/9/29

Jokyo[*]

1684/2/21

Genroku

1688/9/30

Hoei[*]

1704/3/13

Shotoku[*]

1711/4/25

Kyoho[*]

1716/6/22

Genbun

1736/4/28

Kanpo[*]

1741/2/27

Enkyo[*]

1744/2/21

Kan'en

1748/7/12

Horeki[*]

1751/10/27

Meiwa

1764/6/2

An'ei

1772/11/16

Tenmei

1781/4/2

Kansei

1789/1/25

Kyowa[*]

1801/2/5

Bunka

1804/2/11

Bunsei

1818/4/22

Tenpo[*]

1830/12/10

Koka[*]

1844/12/2

Kaei

1848/2/28

Ansei

1854/11/27

Man'en

1860/3/18

Bunkyu[*]

1861/2/19

Genji

1864/2/20

Keio[*]

1865/4/8

Meiji

1868/9/8

 

Nengo[*] starting dates are given in year-month-day order.

Source: Nihonshi nenpyo[*] (originally a volume of Nihon rekishi daijiten ) (Tokyo: Kawade Shobo shinsha, 1973).

 

 

 

 

554

APPENDIX B—
DATES OF TOKUGAWA SHOGUN

 

No .

Name (descent status)

Reign dates

Life dates

1

Ieyasu (founder)

1603/2/12–1605/4/16

1542–1616

2

Hidetada (son)

1605/4/16–1623/7/27

1578–1632

3

Iemitsu (son)

1623/7/27–1651/4/20

1604–1651

4

Ietsuna (son)

1651/8/18–1680/5/8

1641–1680

5

Tsunayoshi (brother)

1680/8/23–1709/1/10

1646–1709

6

Ienobu (nephew)

1709/5/1–1712/10/14

1662–1712

7

Ietsugu (son)

1713/4/2–1716/4/30

1709–1716

8

Yoshimune (near cousin)

1716/8/13–1745/9/25

1684–1751

9

Ieshige (son)

1745/11/2–1760/5/13

1711–1761

10

Ieharu (son)

1760/9/2–1786/9/8

1737–1786

11

Ienari (near cousin)

1787/4/15–1837/4/2

1773–1841

12

Ieyoshi (son)

1837/9/2–1853/6/22

1793–1853

13

Iesada (son)

1853/10/23–1858/7/4

1824–1858

14

Iemochi (distant cousin)

1858/10/25–1866/8/11

1846–1866

15

Yoshinobu (distant cousin)

1866/12/5–1867/12/9

1837–1913

 

Reign dates in year-month-day order, as given in Nihonshi nenpyo[*] (originally a volume of Nihon rekishi daijiten ) (Tokyo: Kawade Shobo[*] shinsha, 1973). Descent status from entries in Daijinmei jiten (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1957).

 

 

APPENDIX C—
EARLY MODERN EMPERORS MENTIONED IN THE TEXT

 

Emperor

Formal reign dates

Life dates

Ogimachi[*]

1557/10/27–1586/11/7

1517–1593

Goyozei[*]

  1586/11/7–1611/3/27

1571–1617

Gomizuno-o

  1611/3/27–1629/11/8

1596–1680

Meisho[*]

  1629/11/8–1643/10/3

1623–1696

(Gokomyo[*] )

  1643–1654

 

(Gosai)

  1654–1663

 

(Reigen)

  1663–1687

 

(Higashiyama)

  1687–1709

 

Nakamikado

  1709/6/21–1735/3/21

1701–1737

Sakuramachi

1735/3/21–1747/5/2

1720–1750

Momozono

    1747/5/2–1762/7/12

1741–1762

(Gosakuramachi)

  1762–1770

 

(Gomomozono)

  1770–1779

 

Kokaku[*]

1779/11/25–1817/3/22

1771–1840

(Ninko[*] )

  1817–1846

 

Komei[*]

   1846/2/13–1866/12/25

1831–1866

Meiji

    1867/1/9–1912/7/30

1852–1912

 

Formal reign dates in year-month-day order, as given in Nihonshi nenpyo[*] . Actual accession dates sometimes varied somewhat. Life dates are from entries in Daijinmei jiten . Emperors not mentioned in the text are listed in parentheses. A convenient list of first and last years of emperors and year-periods is to be found in Andrew N. Nelson, The Modern Reader's Japanese-English Character Dictonary , rev. ed. (Rutland, Vt.: Charles E. Tuttle, 1966), pp. 1018–22.

 

 

 

 

1      Totman, Conrad D, Early Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), xxv.

2          Ibid, 48.

3          Ibid, 49

4          Ibid, 39.

5          Ibid.

6          Ibid, 40.

7          Ibid, 46.

8          Ibid.

9          Ibid, 46, 47.

10       Ibid.

11       Ibid, 49.

12       Ibid, 3.

13       Ibid, 11.

14       Ibid, 12.

15       Ibid, 13.

16       Ibid.

17       Ibid, 50.

18       Ibid.

19       Ibid, 51.

20       Ibid, 52.

21       Ibid, 357.

22       Ibid, 357, 358.

23       Ibid, 360.

24       Ibid, 93.

25       Ibid, 50.

26       Ibid, 108.

27       Ibid, 109.

28       Ibid, 155.

29       Ibid.

30       Ibid.

31       Smith, Tomas C.  Native Sources of Japanese Industrialization: 1750-1920 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 10.

32       The following lecture notes are from the Cambridge History of Japan, Volume 5: The Nineteenth Century, Chapter 1, pp. 50-115, “Japan in the Early Nineteenth Century,” by Marius Jansen, and Chapter 2, pp. 116-167, “The Tempo Crisis,” by Harold Bolitho. [accessed online, October 2006]

33       Ibid.

34       Ibid, Totman 117.

35       Ibid, 60.

36       Ibid, 40.

37       Ibid, 73.

38       Ibid, 69.

39       Ibid, 70.

40       Ibid, 75.

41       Ibid.

42       Ibid, 57.

43       Ibid, 236.

44       Ibid, 238.

45       Ibid, 33.

46       Ibid, 35.

47       Ibid, Cambridge, 47.

48       Ibid, Totman, 553, 554.

49       Ibid,.

50       Ibid,.

51       Ibid,

52       Ibid,

 

________________________________________

Tomas C. Smith,  “Native Sources of Japanese Industrialization: 1750-1920” (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988),

Conrad Tolman, “Early Modern Japan” (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

Further reading

Mary Elizabeth Berry, :"Hideyoshi "(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1982).

Copyright © 1999- 2007 Michael Johnathan McDonald. All rights reserved.
All Rights Reserved. MichaelReport.com,  (Bookoflife.org )

 

 



 
   
 

 
   

 

Direct corrections and technical inquiries to
Please direct news submissions to Here

 

Copyright © 1999 - 2013 Michael Johnathan McDonald