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reovultionary20thcent_14 (2007).

 

 

Giovanni Gentile: Philosopher of Fascism, trans,  A. James Gregor. ( New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2001)

 

 

The first Fascism, that of the turn-of-the-century Italy, took root in an industrial retarded environment, in a nation newly reunited, possessed of a traditional agrarian economy, and essentially innocent of an urban proletariat.[1] A. James Gregor intends that a fascism “consensus” emerged which is absence of cognitive significance. However, fascism cannot be explained without its tie to the Marxist prediction of universal revolution.

 

 

François Furet, in his work The Passing of an Illusion, The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century (1999), argued that immediately members in the west of the media and influentials’ bought into the media propaganda of the Bolshevik plea for communism is peace, and the plight of the proletariat masses has resulted in the victory against the warring nations. ( Good quote here/ revolution)

 

Initially intended the Bolsheviks has promised a distribution of resources, the final result of the last steps in a Marxist revolution. The result of this intention gave way to a realization that is to say, no matter how much the Bolsheviks wished they could ignite a proper Marxist revolution, they could not work around the facts that Russia’s modernity and Marx’s preliminary conditions for a revolution did not coalesce. What turned out to be a Soviet communist propagandist-media machine, in fact, as we have learned, turned out to be more characteristic of the principles and similarities to fascist theory.  This could be explained by the characteristics of the Soviet period known as the “Cult of Stalin.” In essence Fascism doctrine was inbred (for better terms) with that of neo-Marxism [ and left under the etymological guise of perfect Democratism] . Therefore, classical Marxism marks no characteristics of the Soviet system and its relations to proper communism. Yet, as Gregor explains, a curious consciousness has survived or emerged.

 

 

This could be explained from a nostalgic response to modernity, or even, so to speak, of a return to romanticism of the failed communist systems predicated on Marxist theoretical systems – wanting the past in place of the present. The morality of Marxism was predicated upon distribution – a type of “materialistic equality.” Not an United States of American precept, “all men are created equal,” but a concept of ‘material is created equal for all.’ The implementation of this “alleged” religious truism for Marx was “revolution,” implying change, and the take-over of the modes of production by the communists known as proletariats. Proper religion, i.e. the Catholic Church and then the off-shoots of the Protestant revolution were initially the “distributors of goods,” now became extinct on a “secular level” of rationality which was replaced by a new religion – [Democracy-mjm, then Marxism]Marxism. During the feudal period, the Latin Church had controlled the purse strings of production. Eventually, for Marx, this step in the historical process would evidentially extinguish itself.

 

 

Furet explains that Democracy in Europe originated with the French Revolution had yet to reveal all of its revolutionary “consequences.” Since traditions had been overcome by the emancipation of the self in the French Revolution, but not all the principles of that revolution answered all the questions for a perfect society, Lenin placed Marx theory into a democratic messing of theories to form a hybrid theory, to which in fact replaced religion. “After centuries of [religious and economic] dependence, the late eighteenth-century French had been the heroes of that reappropriation of the self; the Bolshevik had picked up from where the French had left off.”[2] This way Lenin could add the centuries of science, drawn from Marx’s Capital. The revolutionaries thus managed to repossess for ideological arsenal the substitute for religion that was so sorely lacking in late eighteenth century France. By combining these two supremely modern elixirs with the contempt for logic, the revolutionaries of 1917 had finally concocted a brew sufficiently potent to inebriate the masses for generations to come.”[3] If effect, Furet implies, that tradition, one form which could explain the Church’s role in the middle ages, were replaced by the Bolsheviks’ veritable interpretation of the Marxist proletariat world theme, the new distributors of goods.

 

 

The “new distributors of goods” now became the “modern communist system,” with its prophet anointed at its head as Karl Marx (1818-1883) and his disciple Frederick Engels (1820-1895). If the Latin Church, then the Church of England and the many breakaway denominations of varies sects could not come to a consensus of Biblical facts, terminology, historical processes, an events, neither could the communists come to a consensus on Marx and Engels’ work.  That did not stop a secularist revolution. This could explain what has become sometype of secular, but still religiositic, mass consensus: a twisted Gentilian form of individualistic “want” to connect to a “unified consciousness.”  Although Gregor does not promote this exact speculation of the “new distributors of goods,” explicatory, it does coincide to his argument of the “curious” consensus.

 

 “A curious” consensus: has emerged among the disappointed neo-Marxists of the West, Gregor explains, in his book Giovanni Gentile: philosopher of fascism (2001). They have chosen to identify Fascism, and generic fascism, with any form of real or potential violence: thuggery at soccer matches, skinhead obscenities, immigrant bashing, vandalism in graveyards, anti-feminism, homophobia, and “hate-speech.” Furthermore, Gregor illustrates, “Fascism” is seen embodied in fundamental Christian beliefs, in anti-communist sentiments, in tax protests, in libertarianism, in sexism, in ‘anti-environmentalism,” in the difference to the abuse of children and animals—in effect, in anything deplored by prevailing “ political correctness.” There are “neofascists,” cryptofascists,” parafascists,” and quasifascists” everywhere. “Fascism,” we are told, is pandemic.”[4] In essence, Gregor explains, everything that is hated is deemed a descriptive of fascism.

 

This can be explained, Gregor intends, because most of us use what is known as common discourse. In common discourse, we do not use the cognitive facilities intended for clear communication. In Chalmers Johnson's book on Revolutionary Change, The term "revolution" (like all terms in social science) is poorly or idiosyncratically defined.[5] When we meet people on the street to have informal conversations with, this consists of usually ill-intended and uninformed definitions of terms.  The quick sound-byte on the evening news is one example of this type of common discourse in the media. There remain no time requisites to elaborate and/or set up definitional boundaries on the evening news. In a 20-30 second evening news sound-byte, how can someone explain the word “communist” or “anti-communist” and how it pertains to someone’s sentiments?

 

So and so was pro-communist during the 1920s, and this explained why he spied on the United States of America and was substantially influential in communist spy circles of the 1930s in Paris and Miami (as a hypothetical newsbyte example).

 

What would this mean? Communism has meant different things to different people, different ideological state theories, and different political parties, leaders and committees. Modern communism, absent of Thomas Moor’s book of Utopia, is regarded almost unanimously as the modern theoretical conscript for the 20th and 21st centuries Marxist/communist movements. Gregor illustrates that no major mass-mobilizing “revolution” in the 20th century took on all the characteristics of a Marxist revolution. In fact, Marxist theoretical derivatives existed in the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 (1920- 1921, Furet’s heroic founding period) as well as the National Socialist revolution in 1933, Germany. Gregor contends that Lenin's revolution had very little to do with Marxism as an ideology. “Actually, 1917 was characterized by a number of revolutionary preconditions, none of them specifically Marxist: (1) an alienated elite (the military and the nobility who blamed the Czar for Russia's defeat); (2) alienated intellectuals who supplied a suitable ideology for (3) mobilizable masses--who were mobilizable because many young men had been removed from their traditional and stable environments (away from system reinforcing institutions like the family, the schools, and the church).”[6] Within Russia, the preconditions for a classical Marxist revolution could not produce a Communist-Marxist revolution under the Marxist rubric. As Furet intends, it was not important to Lenin to understand the Marxist theoretical system. Lenin had to reinvent a system to replace the non-preconditions existing in Russia and force a differentiated revolution through illusionary methods. Since Classical Marxism intended that capitalism must reach its apex, the proletariat must finally have victory over the bourgeoisie, and finally all the proletariats take over the factories and the modes of production, Lenin understood it was impossible to have a communist revolution predicated on Marxist principles. Therefore, how could we call this a Communist Revolution in the media? Russia was a backward economic country, which furthermore was exasperated by the conflicts of World War I. Revolutionary characteristics were present, but none of a semblance of a communist/Marxist characterizes were present.

 

It is hard to call the October Revolution (1917) and the subsequent Furet (1920- 1921) heroic founding period for the Soviets a communist revolution. “V. I. Lenin, who came to power through a peasant revolution, died waiting for the "saving" Marxist revolution in the West. Leon Trotsky, perhaps as responsible for the revolution as Lenin, declared that Stalin had abandoned all semblance of Marxism and had introduced "fascism" in what had been Bolshevik Russia.”[7] Marx had claimed that it was impossible for a peasant to take over the controls of the modes of production. Since Lenin was so adamantly awaiting a Marxist revolution, he decided to begin it by eradicating the bourgeoisie in Russia, the intellectuals, who knew how to run the factories. In addition, since Lenin had to use peasants in the revolution, we could and might as well call this a Fascist revolution. The similarities between mobilizing the masses in Italy, and the mobilizing of the peasant masses in Russia, the characteristics remain similar to that of a Fascist revolution described in Italy in 1922.  

 

 

Since, Lenin could not adhere to the Marxist preconditions; he had to formulate a nationalistic imperative. To do this, he played-off the old notion of Rus’ fears’ of the western intervention into their political and physical world. The west had periodically invaded and intervened in Rus’ political landscape. The Time of Troubles (l598 or l604 to l613 or 1618) amounted to a nationalistic movement to remove Sweden, Poland and other foreign forces from Rus’ political centers in the 17th century. Sweden had sought to dominate Rus’ prior and during the Petrine period. Lenin had no trouble to initiate an hybrid belief of the imperial capitalist and irredentist fear onto the Russian people. He argued that they needed to change course, and organize themselves around an “elite vanguard.” Couched around a Marxist ideology of the proletariat of the masses, Lenin construed a revolution inspired upon nationalistic imperatives. “In effect, a "Marxist" revolution in a primitive economic environment makes little, if any, theoretical sense.”[8]

 

National becomes the vehicle of survival in the 20th century.

 

The beginning of the 20th century featured war and revolution. The Great War (1914-1918) was the most devastating war in history until that time. The revolutions that followed (the Bolshevik [1917], the Fascist [1922] and the National Socialist [1933]) gave the specific character to the century.”[9] In Origins and Doctrine of Fascism (1929?), Giovanni Gentile explained that Italy’s involvement in World War I resulted in a profound spiritual crisis. He explained there had been two distinct currents; these two currents had been fighting for two decades, which had always ended in threats for regional war. The interventionalists and those who chose non-involvement – Gentile was referring to what he called the tortured history of Italian neutrality – to understand that there were not simply two political opinions or two historical conceptions that found themselves opposed, but two souls, each with its own fundamental orientation and its own general and dominant exigency.[10]

 

 

Promises of an Italian a frontier on the Brenner Pass in the Northeast, annexation of Trieste and the Istrian Peninsula ( but not Fiume), part of Dalmation coast in what is now Yugoslavia, a dominate position in Albania, and unspecified colonial concessions[11], was not the only particular end to be taken into account for entering the war. In order to end these decades of factionalism, Gentile argued that entering the war would finally unite the nation through the shedding of blood. [12]  

 

“ The war was seen as a way to cement the nation as only war can, creating a single thought for all citizens, a single feeling, a single passion, and a common hope, an anxiety lived by all, day by day – with the hope that the life of the individual might be seen and felt as connected, obscurely or vividly, with the life that is common to all—but which transcends the particular interests of any. (Origins of fascism, Gentile, gregor p.2).

 

Centuries of foregoing political and military intervention in Italy by Spanish, Austrian-German,  and French forces resulted in these two currents crystallizing in the late 19th century. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Ottoman Empire had been called the “sick man” of Europe. Prior to the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was militarily strong but held in check by France and Spanish treaties with Italy. Italy had been occupied for much of its history after the Italian renaissance period with the understanding of its inherent neutrality. With Spain and France out of Italy by the nineteenth century, the political picture for Italy had changed from a fractional state with various foreign influences to a possible autonomous state intent on fomenting its own agency. Italy had long been a neutral state in international affairs, but it also was a state that begun the Renaissance that eventually swept Europe and sparked the “Age of Enlightenment.” Italy’s identity was grounded in a historical process. Italy had its own historic identity, and its pride emerge with this new found autonomy. Since Marxism was universally upheld by the socialist and intellects in Europe at this time, Gentile’s argument pertained to the neutrality of many of the Italian citizens and this new found “freedom” by the interventionists, who had duel purposes of finally uniting Italy, and attending to Irredentism. As Gregor points out, and Gentile confirmed, war at this juncture of Italy’s history brought unsuspected Totalitarian prescriptions.

 

 

In 1911, The War in Tripoli (1911), Italy became involved in a war with the Caliphate in Turkey. The war prompted an outpouring of nationalist sentiment in Italy, and many intellectuals were surprised by the response of the workers and peasants to the War in Tripoli (they were supposed to oppose all "capitalist" wars). Many syndicalists supported the war because of that unexpected reality and found themselves on the same side as the nationalists (although some, like Mussolini, opposed the war). The response of the "working class" to the war caused many (like Mussolini) the rethink the official socialist position. The issue of nationalism became a critical issue among revolutionary Marxists (both in Italy and throughout Europe).[13]

 

What lands and who wanted what lands and where. All of these countries had an aspiration to restore all these “lost lands.” Nationalist irredentism – that was typical of totalitarianism. Since Gentile’s ideas of Fascism stem from a totalitarian premises, more toward indirect nationalism than irredentism, Italy was able to guides its state development at a sustained rapid pace. “Mussolini switched from a position of neutrality to one of intervention in World War I separated him forever from the socialist movement.”[14]

 

In a Paradigmatic approach, Italian intellects understood that its industrial and economic base did not fit the Marxist preconditions for a classical Marxist revolution. If the Bolsheviks took the proletariat revolutionary rout, Italy was concerned with emblematic fallout of the peasant revolution observed in Russia. Dino Grandi (1895-1988), a World War I veteran and graduate in law and economics at the University of Bologna in 1919,   had written that Italian Socialist sought to take away personal and private freedom, by mimicking Lenin’s distributing of land – taking away of private land and giving it to the masses. ( page 40-41?  What book?))) Like Gentile, Grandi  argued that Fascism was a rejection of “mechanical materialism,” and a commitment to a new spiritual consciousness. ( page 40-41?  What book?)))

 

 

 

By May, 1915, [The First Fascism], these conviction were firmly established. Only those men disposed to lie to themselves and delude others could fail to recognize the internationalism as a real political alternative was defunct. On the day of Italy’s entry into World War I Mussolini wrote, ( Cite here)

 

“Never before as in this moment have we felt that the fatherland existed, that it is an irrepressible and insurmountable [ datum]; never before as in this moment of conflict have we felt Italy to be an historic personality, living, corporal, immortal.

 

A month later he wrote,

 

The fatherland is the hard and solid ground, the millenarian product of the race; internationalism was a fragile ideology that did not survive the tempest. The blood that vivifies the fatherland has destroyed the International.[15]

 

The nation was real in a sense that the International could never be. The nation was an enduring historic, physical, and moral reality. United in culture and tradition, based upon the complex and systematic interactive patterns fostered by contemporary economic development, the nation enjoyed the prerequisites of long-term viability—and war had revealed it to be a primary object of loyalty for the vast majority of the national proletariat. The nation, Mussolini argued, was the “great product of history,” the value of which, though long “unrecognized and despised,” was revealed on the occasion of the ultimate challenge afforded by World War I.[16] (144)

 

Here, Mussolini accompanied the discourse of Enrico Corradini and Alfredo Rocco on the interpretation of what “nation” meant to Italy. The European countries, albeit, sided into two main groups, with some remaining neutral, were forced to recognize restriction toward social preference to their past.  With the progressions of modernity influencing a break down of groups and subgroups into more complex relationships, the war forced internationalism to be immediately halted. A return to isolationism, on the micro-political scale subsisted as a defense mechanism.  War forced “sides” to be formed, developed and assessed. First, the ‘underlying’ question was not which philosophy was politically scientific, and which political model should be followed, but how the best way to survive ‘death and destruction?’ “Mussolini wrote that the War had revealed the “germ of new unanticipated political constructions” based upon objective fact “that ‘peoples and states’ had everywhere achieved their fusion in a block of ‘national unanimity.’” Germany, Belgium, France, England, Switzerland, and Russia manifested the same fusion of people, state and nation. War had revealed the infrangible material, psychological, and moral community of interests that sustained national unity. This community of material and spiritual interests arched over class, category, and regional interests.[17] In the war with the crumbling Ottoman caliphate, the exuberance increased. Nationalism was seen even by socialists, pacifists, Catholics and syndicalists as positive reinforcement of national sentiment.

 

The Bolshevik party had also experienced a crisis in Russia. Souvarine had first understood that instead of a authoritarian dictatorship the crisis that beset the Soviet communists after Lenin’s death reveled not only a psychological conviction of despondency to the real objectives to modernize, but that Stalin had to steer Russia from multi-interest groups from within the Leninist party platform and unite it under a “totalitarian” ideology. “Souvarine’s section of the work, La Russie nue, signaled the start of his long career as a chronicler of the Soviet disaster. Furet elucidates that, “As always with Souvarine, the prose has no literary pretensions, and his narrative is organized in a rather scholarly fashion, from the economic to the political. But from his accumulation of data and facts emerge a portrait of a society that was impoverished both in the cities and in the countryside, and that had not yet returned to its 1913 level.”[18] Souvarine’s writings are important because the recorder of early communist Russia was an advent socialist-Marxist throughout his life, even after exile from Soviet office. Furet’s use of his source represents a pro-communist who had recorded reliable data and observation. “ Had this poverty resulted merely from the legacy of the past combined with exceptional difficult circumstances, it would have been less significant. But Souvarine interpreted it differently: he incriminated the regime’s role in this kind of involution of a society constantly beaten down by bureaucratic authoritarianism [Lenin’s period till the transition of Stalin who finally crystallized its nationalistic-terror], corruption, ideological obscurantism, and the dictatorship of a Party that had merged with the National Police.”[19]

 

Souvarine’s present and knowledge of the past helped him, Furet intends, to understand the element he had seen as counterrevolution by Stalin. [ In Souvarine’s section of the work] La Russie nue paints a picture of what later would be called “ totalitarian” Russia. This was the observance of a form of state capitalism. Even thought these three volumes were published anonymously in the Soviet press, especially Pravda, the readership at the time was quite limited. Furet determined it was a “case of sour grapes—a classic suspicion that was to play into the hands of the Soviet Communism throughout the twentieth century, since the real history would be written essentially by former Communists.”[20] Furet facilitates the understanding of the need of the communists in Russia to believe they lived under classical Marxist principles. In 1917, the Bolshivicks seized power with promises and socialist sloganry that Russia would be tendered “ the land for the peasants.” But buy the “war Communist” period ( civil war) terrorist policy of forceful appropriating of agricultural products for the cities, alienated the entire rural population and destroyed agrarian culture production. This was Marx’s point of the end of History. The peasants were to be freed from Capitalist domination. Now, they were dominated by an militant aristocratic elite. This, furthermore, was predicated upon fancy, “feel good” sloganry, and of rhetoric and symbolism of ‘the future will be better.’ These former Communists who wrote the first histories from inside the boarders of Soviet Russia saw not Marxist Communism, in any shape or form, but saw something that reveled something radically different. As Furet proclaimed one of the major problems was “sweeping condemnation” of anyone that wrote anything negative about left-wing Soviet politics. As a fervor toward religious convictions’, we intend to understand Furet addressing the religiosity apparent in totalitarian systems. Lenin was a demi-gog, and Stalin even more revered in a transcendental form of deity worship. The centralization of the state by Stalin, the reinvestment of [ Rus’] chauvinism, and an invented tradition of a party system in combination of ideocracy and terrorist policies predicated a nationalization or as Furet explains a “ Russification,” [21]  from a Georgian willing to retract Marxist ideo-competition – within now a single unified national party. The Jews proclaimed themselves in desperation as the chosen people, but the new Soviet Russian proclaimed themselves as the “chosen nation.” Lenin’s scientific theory of action disappeared under Stalin. Scholarly discussions prevalent under Lenin’s party-apparatus were halted by Stalin. As a tactician, Stalin allowed the deifying of the founder of the Soviet Communism to exist in religious-like worship, often given oratories toward specific platitudes toward the passed leader.

 

The Lenin passing drew the two parties into conflict, and Stalin understanding that the old-Bolshevism, the left-wing was not constructive to modernize Russia. At the same time, Stalin still suppressed the right-wing bourgeois. What represented itself as political-social scientific level was arbitrary. “ Such was the new guise of “ socialism in one country.” It emphasized a new element of “Leninist” psychology—the belief that volition, given power, can accomplish anything—and added a new element, conceled beneath the call to activism and manipulated so adroitly by Stalin that no one could reproach him for disloyalty to Lenin: the Great-Russian national passion. Just like the French Jacobins, the late Bulshivicks were entrapped by the “chosen nation” idea, of which they were developing a new versions, if a more primitive one. Stalin’s formula allowed them to reinvest the traditional chauvinism of the dominant nation in their membership in a totalitarian party.”[22]

 

Souvarine recognized that Lenin’s party exemplified a dictatorship, ruled by terror with a distain for the law. It had confused the party with the state, dictatorship of the proletariat and the dictatorship of the party. Lenin’s party, for Souvarine turned out to represent  an idea of a party that was aristocratic. This was not Marxism. However, Lenin had allowed sectarian casts of ideological debating, and discussion was possible within the party.[23] But for Souvarine, Stalin represented something different. Stalin invented the “totalitarian” party. “ This forced unity, inseparable from Communist ideology, paralyzed all opposition and manufactured a leader. The Revolution was dead. Nothing testifies to this more, Furet points out, pitilessly than the literary triptych Vers l’autre flame, published in Paris in 1929 by the francophone Romanian writer Panaït Istrati, along with Victor Serge and Boris Souvarine.”[24] Victor Serge, the brother in law of Perrie Pascal, like him, had long nourished doubts about the terms of events—a man much too loyal to the anarchist notion of “neither God nor master” to find the postrevolutionary glaciation the lest bit palatable. Indeed, Furet writes, “his analysis was radical: the democracy of the Soviets was a lie, and the only reality of the regime was the dictatorship of a corrupt Party, peopled by cynical go-getters who had replaced the militants of the October generation.”[25] Hardly anyone thought that the Soviet discourse was entirely false, this was the best kept secret, a secret too sad, moreover to be pursued insistently.”[26]  In 1928, Stalin had cracked down on both left-wing old-Bolsheviks, and the right-wing bourgeois in Russia. As dictator, plural distributionism, poor peasant equality and proletariat plurality cancelled out the plural competition of the bourgeoisies, Darwinian constitutionalism, and might is right, but regulated by law, Stalin assumed a position outside the normative discourse of political wingism (a sense of what is politically left or politically right). The conscriptions of left and right no longer applied. Like William Jefferson Clinton, Gerhardt Schroeder, and Tony Blair concluded a new ideological “third way,” this conceptualization helped to reidentify a new classification-structure of political identification non-inherent of difficulties of terminological political wingism. Some have concerned this inherent contradiction as “centrism;” however the political science veritable(s) apply less to identification than to expression. It is possible to conclude a cognitive understanding that two sides cancel out all points of politically descriptive reference. In essence, as Gentile would argue that some intellectualism stood outside of ‘life,” therefore determining disjudgment onto it, the intellectualism (as a false intellectual) remained outside of the [ conscripts] conscious group and therefore could not make rational judgments. Regardless of positives of the war machine created at Stalin’s behest, the vindication of the populous’ support remains suspect of his reign: Stalin’s socio-economic policy, one individual singularity representing a mass-mobilized populous, tempted total disaster economically. Russia remained a backward country regardless of secret police efforts at Stalin’s control to motivate them.  Stalin replacing the Deity ( the one that stands outside of the conscious group, Gentile), created the scholastic notion of a period term referent as “The Cult of Stalin.” The religio-celebritism fuels the leader toward centralism (that is further centralizes and crystallizes he leader himself outside of the system, then actually transcendental resurrection symbolically but pcychologically), by its congregational-fan-base who approve the ascendancy by the ideological propagation of myth by the demi-gog. The deity falls in total infatuation within him/herself, promoting him or her self as perfection. Explicative to history, Stalin had stated that the Soviet Russia under him had reached the apex of state perfection in history. We would later learn by the opening of the Russian archives after the 1990s, that this would become demystification. Stalin isolationism, removal from the group-fold of ideological participation, as Souvarine emoted, led to a classic distinction of one determinable of totalitarianism. Rosa Luxemburg warned of the authoritarianism pretensions from Lenin’s mediocre interpretation of Marxism, but Stalin had forgone all discussion of it, which led to its abandonment in party discourse. As Furet illustrated Souvarine’s contention with Stalin’s objection with sectarian party interests, Giovanni Gentile’s objection to traditional Marxism, as Gregor illustrates,  was its similar emphasis on class interests (causing a fragmentation of the community), to the exclusion of overarching national concerns. In this designation of distinction of classism and its concerns for modernization, what Stalin had addressed as the problem with multi-Marxist discourse, was its timely disunity of progress. This could be explained by Stalin’s real fears that capitalists were going to invade and dominate Russia, a Leninist neo-Marxist interpretation, understood to be “imperialist nations” were the more advanced bourgeois nations. In order to modernize, Russia, according to Stalin needed a focalization. Representing the proletariats as a proper multi-faceted constituent meant sectarian interests slowed the process of industrialization for Russia and this in conclusion slowed the militarization needed to ward off an all-out affront on Soviet sovereignty. When Gentile classified Fascism as anti-intellectual, Stalin already an anti-intellectual, was able to formulate a similar principle of nationalism which had shown descriptions of Gentile Fascism. As religiously deified, the transcendental leader offered morality as a prescription for nationalism. In a sense, a unified patriotism under the auspices of urgency (the fear of the bourgeois west dominators), Stalin classified Russia less than communism and more than symbolic Fascism. The Gentilean ‘spirit” of sacrifice and/or volunteerism, had predicated Stalin’s ideology toward Soviet militarism. Grandi could associate this with Fascism by its defining structure. Like Enrico Corradini and Alfredo Rocco spokesmen for the benefits of nationalism, Stalin had reinvented the October revolution to be something closer to a counterrevolution, as Furet had pointed out --  the former communists had observed, recorded in their writings. Stalin distant the new party from the old-Bolshevik attendance to world internationalism and Marx attendancey, to nationalism and the unification under a militaristic program to ward of the other major world powers.

 

 

Georges Sorel resistance to individualistic interests would later be reflected and mimicked by the Stalinist proclamation: One party, one State, one goal ( to militarize), under a national banner of Russian patriotism, and all individualism was attained by identifying with a unified spirit of commodore. Stalin’s intent of formulating a national identity had been earlier reflected in Corradini’s theory of “group belonging.” Similar to Corradini’s distressing political nationalism to "restore the nation's greatness," Stalin created an ideology that Russia needed to “restore its greatness of Russianism” in order to defy physically the Capitalist-Imperialists. Stalin had come to realize that the Leninist secularism in party interests must be disallowed by a new ideology of promoting an ideology of group unity, predicated on similarities related to Fascist principles which could only receive the results attributed to modernization of a backward nation. The Fascist bound its individuals to a group consciousness. These similarities appear exactly as Stalin’s system of binding the Russian groups into a cohesive unity under a totalitarian authority.

 

 “Fascism emphasizes the state as the executive control agency of the nation. The community (as nation) and as collective will (as the state) precedes the individual and shapes him/her (as Aristotle and Plato affirmed).”[27]

 

 

If there was no Marxist Revolution in Russia as observed by these communists who witness, worked, lived, breathed and recorded its beginnings until the ascension of Stalin, then what was it? Assuredly it can perceive a moment in time, where conditions had created an opportunity for a peasant revolution then the ascension of a classical, but modified version of a dynasty. In this case, its name applied under the dynastic rubric of communism. However, we question ourselves to understand that little if no observable Marxist-Communist distinction tells us cognitively that this was such the case? The Germanic understanding that this was not the case provided a separate case in point that Hitlerian Germany adopted the Stalinist Totalitarian model.

 

 

 

 

 

Transition Stalin’s Totalitarianism Influenced Hitlerian Germany

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Internationalism

Internationalism: how to implement internationalism when different languages exist?  “Opposed to this monumental reality was the International, an organization that existed only on paper, responsible for little more than the sometimes issuance of a theoretical treatise in one of it “official” languages ( which did not include Italian).” [28]

 

nation

Mussolini had come to recognize the nation as a particular kind of social system; one rooted in tradition and sentiment, which is comprehensive and differentiated enough to be self-sufficient with respect to the functional needs of its members. The nation satisfied material, psychological, and moral imperatives [morality is always relative!].[29] (145)

 

 

Mjm –

 

 

 

 

Interventionists understood that men could attain the fullness of self, and enjoy concrete liberty, only within the complex of relations we identify as an autonomous political community. (39 of what book?)

 

(((((((((((((((((((((((

The structure of the analysis remains Hegelian. The individual is to be understood only as an element in a specific collectivity. 66

A.    James Gregor, “Contemporary Radical Ideologies,” ch. 2 (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 24-58.

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Classical Marxism constitutes perhaps the most ambitious attempt in the history of social and political philosophy to provide a justificatory argument for a specific organization of society. Its ultimate appeal is to a set of theoretical propositions supporting a special interpretation of history. That interpretation sees history impelled upon a dialectical course which necessarily culminates in an ideal society. That society is ideal because it is in accord with the very essence of man—it is his fulfillment. History is infused with moral purpose.
One final but critical difference distinguishes classical Marxism from Hegelianism. Both Marx and Engels were convinced that capitalism itself would produce a majority of men aware of the identity of their immediate interests with those of the collectivity that constituted their essence. Much of what Marx and Engels wrote supports the thesis that they were radical democrats, that they were convinced that the forces in operation in capitalist society would produce a majority of critically conscious human beings who would identify their person interests with the interests of their productive community. This consciousness would arise spontaneously. It would be an “efflux,” a “reflex” of prevailing material conditions. The tensions that transformed classical Marxism into Leninism center around this notion of a spontaneous, majoritarian revolution.

 

 

 

Bibliography:

A. James Gregor, “Contemporary Radical Ideologies,” ch. 2 (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 24-58.

 

 

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[1] Giovanni Gentile: philosopher of fascism, trans,  A. James Gregor. ( New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2001), xii.

 

[2] Furet, Francios,  The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea  of Communism in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999), 63.

[3] Furet, Francios,  The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea  of Communism in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999), 63.

[4] Giovanni Gentile: philosopher of fascism, trans,  A. James Gregor. ( New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2001), xii.

[5] A. James, Gregor, Precis no. 2, unpublished class materials. (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, 2007).

[6] A. James, Gregor, Precis no. 5, unpublished class materials. (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, 2007).

[7] A. James, Gregor, Precis no. 4B, unpublished class materials. (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, 2007).

[8] A. James, Gregor, Precis no. 4B, unpublished class materials. (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, 2007).

[9] Gregor, A. James, Precis no. 6, unpublished class materials. (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, 2007).

[10] Giovanni Gentile, Origins and Doctrine of Fascism, trans., ed. A. James Gregor (New Brunswick, New Jersey:  Transaction Publishers, 2002), 2.

[11] Alexander De Grand, “Italian Fascism, Its Origins and Development”, 2nd., ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), p.18.

[12] Giovanni Gentile, Origins and Doctrine of Fascism, trans., ed. A. James Gregor (New Brunswick, New Jersey:  Transaction Publishers, 2002), 2.

[13] Gregor, A. James, Precis no. 12, unpublished class materials. (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, 2007).

[14] Alexander De Grand, “Italian Fascism, Its Origins and Development”, 2nd., ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), p.29.

[15] Gregor, A. James, Ideology of Fascism (New York: The Free Press,  1969), 144.

[16] Gregor, A. James, Ideology of Fascism (New York: The Free Press,  1969), 144.

[17] Gregor, A. James, Ideology of Fascism (New York: The Free Press,  1969), 145.

[18] Furet, Francios,  The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea  of Communism in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999), 140.

[19] Furet, Francios,  The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea  of Communism in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999), 140.

[20] Furet, Francios,  The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea  of Communism in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999),pp.140-141.

[21] Furet, Francios,  The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea  of Communism in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999), p.137.

[22] Furet, Francios,  The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea  of Communism in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999),pp. 136-137.

[23] Furet, Francios,  The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea  of Communism in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999),pp. 136-140.

[24] Furet, Francios,  The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea  of Communism in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999), p. 139.

[25] Furet, Francios,  The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea  of Communism in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999), p. 139.

[26] Furet, Francios,  The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea  of Communism in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999), p. 141.

[27] A. James, Gregor, Precis no. 10, unpublished class materials. (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, 2007).

[28] Gregor, A. James, Ideology of Fascism (New York: The Free Press,  1969), 144.

[29] Gregor, A. James, Ideology of Fascism (New York: The Free Press,  1969), 145.