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Political Science 137A, August 30, 2007 (U.C. Berkeley )
Mjm – Fascist Doctrine, its prior founding Idealism, was to become a revolutionary system, which swept into the Stalin Soviet period, the National Socialist period, and even took shape in variables regions as a revolutionary methodology to develop backward regions and states -- all around the world.
Fascism developed over a set of objectives to ward of impending irredentism and subjective imperialism. Its main emphasis was to develop a defense mechanism that was contingent on notions of survival, both material (economic) and spiritual (self- identity). In essence it was reactionarism against internationalism predicated but actualized on real fear of individual to mass-oppression, led by the advanced developing states. The 1850s population explosion of Europe, adjunct with imperialism – the carving up of the world, “economically and physically”—reorganized the globe in fear of continuing mass-world-oppression. Two of these advanced developmental states, France, then England, led a world-wide scale attempt to dominate the world economically by declaring regions across the globe as their “personal territory.” (Other European states followed suit) With intensions such as benevolent trade, often these two world-powers led to subjugating the indigenous to their conquest. The foremost and prominent conditions to attain a “defense mechanism” were to modernize their states, regions or areas, both industrially and sentimentally. Since the French Revolution, and the subsequent Industrial Revolution, with the advent of Marxist theory of revolution and worker rights, socialist groups began to organize groups to anticipate a world revolution in the name of democracy. However, over time, these socialist groups began infighting, vying for new interpretations at a Marx revolution that did not materialize. One of the main witnesses to the delay, was that perceptive-liberal democracies which had achieved advanced forms of capitalism, were not following the Marx theorem. Instead, as was witnessed with France and England, these epistomocracies were waging a world-wide domination, both physically and economically on less developed states that could not fend for themselves. At insult to injury, these espistomocracies were developing a far-more sustainable bourgeois than Marx had predicted. In development of these observances, many Socialist, Marxist, and other social scientists of the late nineteenth century began to look away from Classical Marxism, reinterpret his ideas and, more favorably for the Italian intellects to disagree with them. This led to interpretations of history rather non obtrusive to communistic principles. Explicatory, Marx was too simplistic, laden with contradictions’, failed predictions’, and failed to record the correct preconditions for a revolution to achieve its defense mechanism. Fascism solved this issue. This could explain the reason that Stalin had abandoned Marxism, Trotsky claimed old Bolshevism dead and Fascism alive in Russia, and Fascist principles had swept the globe often achieving their goals of formulizing a defense mechanism of these geographical “spaces.” In contemporary lingoism, this term constituted what was called “political space.” As a euphemism, this linguistic term benevolently would be termed colonization. In actualism, its sinister repercussions’ produced fear across the globe, with its intension of advance industrial societies dominating lesser industrial and non-industrial societies.
Uniformly apologetic in its connotative description, this concept implied dentotativly “imperialistic rite.” As conscious consequence to observed trends and observing this trend for fear itself, “The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 simply announced, unilaterally, that the Western hemisphere was no longer open to European colonization nor European interference. “ (181)Under the Darwinian auspices of “might it rite,” Fascism grew out of these actualities, intended or not, and somewhat intuitively. Self-preservation, as its relationship to the group in any given lesser industrialized or non-industrialized state, gave way to unMarxist theories spurring on urgent construction of conditions to save one’s self, one’s representative –i.e., the group—from imperialistic oppression. Marx had not redressed the sentiment of human need to counter “external” forces. Marxism focuses only on inter –internal economic and social forces. It was not, therefore, Fascism, that destroyed Marxism. It was Marx’s failed oversight, failed predictive, and failed understanding of human’s basic needs to protect their histories, their invented or real heritage, their memories, and their past. Marx failed to understand that Modernity is an illusion, a tempered result of memory – a vital function to the mind. Failing to understand that Modernity is an illusion, Marx therefore propounded his theory on the base of teleological conscripts. Like Islam or Christianity, the end was already written, the conclusion already conceived, the memory already forged. When the capitalist countries reached their pinnacle, all the principles of Marx doctrine would fall into place and “automatically” the proletariat (loosely, and simplistically defined as urban wage-worker| the class of modern wage laborers who, having no means of production of their own, are reduced to selling their labor power in order to live, Note by Engels - 1888 English edition of the Communist Manifesto) would take over the world by its teleological duty, and achieve “final communism,” taking over the modes of production, producing unfounded wealth, distributing it equally to all people, apparently without human self-interests –but in “perfect-consciousness-group-interests.” After the Italian intellectuals began to understand Marxism in light of what he actually said and meant, many socialists did not have the faculty privilege to produce this result, Marxism was ignored.
What the Fascists ultimately argued was that Marxism was too simplified and that society was much more complicated in “actuality.” To produce a modernized society, the complexities the human spirit, the human physiological conditions, and the human martial needs, must be addressed and argued over but which then the determinants revealed which would provide the necessity and means to stand-up against the domination by the imperialist countries. Was domination, life of subjugation, better than, freedom? The Fascists disagreed. Fascism was not against freedom, it just had its interpretations of it. But Freedom could not come until its urgent safety addressed the irredentism and imperialism of the age. The age was the twentieth century and after cognitive analysis by some of the world authorities on revolutionary movements in the twentieth century, a reinterpretation has come to light that has stood the test of time. No Marxist revolution took place on the face of the earth. That is no mass-mobilized major revolution of the twentieth century revealed the principles outlined in Karl Marx’s and Frederick Engel’s communist doctrine. Non-contestable, it remains a possibility that no Classical Marxist revolution has ever taken place on the face of the Planet called Earth, either large or small. What can be suggested are variations, thematic but non-principled in application of revolutionary movements? Mao’s revolution was a Chinese traditional peasant revolution. Lenin and the Bolsheviks’ were a peasant revolution. Italy was a fascist revolution. Pol Pot’s revolution was a peasant revolution. And National Socialism was a revolution based upon a racist electivism. Ultimately, Deng Xiaoping, the predecessor after Mao adopted Fascism principles, National Socialism, Germany adopted Fascist principles, Stalin, after Lenin’s passing adopted Fascism principles. Japan had adopted Fascist principles during the Meiji era, South American countries adopted Fascism, and the count continues today as a prevailing method of modernization. Albeit, as Professor Gergor pointed out, India is developing without the aid of Fascist principles. Yet, India, with its immense poor population has not fully developed industrially. The case is not closed. It can be stated that somewhat “duel transitional” principles can explain this phenomena. Hoever, the objective of this research is to focus on the prevailing method of industrializing to achieve the “defense mechanism.” The desired and preferred principle, as history has shown, is Fascist in nature but not in name. (/MJM 10122007)
Fascism: Literal Construction
Fascism is a cognate of Italian idiomatic prefix and suffix, which simplify a terminology use to describe a “binding together” of two opposing political ideologies – the left and the right. Apolitical, Fascism argued by some intellectuals, consisted of non-political bias.
Fascism’s etymological Origins
Elementary and Sophisticated Explanation
[ MJM: Fascism to me is an old concept, but a new word. It is basically the process of a kingship’s role in history, predicated on the notion of modern society and how certain groups within a loose community of lands ask, promote and forge a centralized elite system to organize a vast disorganized common body of people. Mythological and actual, kingship arose mainly by disorganized masses of people asking for a prime leader to adjudicate, rule, and defend them against outside predators.]
Local circumstances is how Fascism came about.
Fascism was an Italian construction, both in word and thought. World War I was the most devastating war on earth up till that time. Austria and Hungary, albeit primitive in industry, had a powerful army. Italians were no match for them militarily. Austria and Hungary got their weapons and military systems from Germany. Italy, on the other hand, had little to nothing of arms and training. Italians lost people on the battlefield at a higher rate than the French and the British combined. All of these Italian people of the war came back home with rifles, pistils, and handgrenades. They were not happy. They were the peasants. The military let them keep their arms? Why, try to take their weapons away, they came home armed to the teeth. The Italian people of the war who had come home were particularly dangerous because they were “not” going back to a primitive existence. The absence of secure jobs demonstrated an unhappy living experience. The soldiers did not want to go back to the countryside, and in fact needed medical services found in the cities. Do you think they were going to work as peasants again? So people who worked as intellectuals saw a possibility of a revolution for Italy. They began to make their voices known. They did this through meetings and writings, publishing, and normal channels of communication. Marxism had pervaded much of the western intellectual thought governing the historical process of states (i.e. countries, nations with boarders and a military). Marxist intellectuals expected revolutions in all parts of the globe. Other groups knew what the intellectuals had been predicting. Non-Marxists, of course, reacted. The Catholics tried to mobilized the people of the war, but the Church could not offer as much as was demanded. Italy has little resources and little of state funds. Since Marxism had produced the discourse of distributaries of all goods equally among people, this type of rhetoric permeated the social fabric of Europe, no less in Italy which had little wealth. Since the emotive Marxist rhetoric tended toward conspiracy, Marxists promoted the expressions that wealth resided in secret places; they needed to stir up the masses to uncover it and then distribute it. Then the distribution ideologies entered the mainstream Italian circles of political talk.
The Italian Socialists who stayed at home during the war, began to call the soldiers emotive terms to describe “bad people” – and even more frightenly called them the capitalists. Socialist called the soldiers reactionaries. They did what their government wanted – that was go to war, die and/or see their friends die on the battlefield. After continuous prodding the masses to incite a revolution, the Socialist pushed the rhetoric to the extreme in effort to overthrow the reconnection of the peasant soldiery to the government. The soldiers and pro-solder government groups reacted in-kind. And the military said I will not take this (moonbat) mentality. Soon the Socialist and/or Marxists saw their scheme of world revolution slipping away. Essentially, three groups consisted of a discontinuation of Italian history: Socialists, advocating for a Marxist revolution, the government, trying to keep things calm and do what they could do to keep Italy intact as a nation, and the people of the war, the soldiers, who came home with their arms, unwilling to return to the country.
The soldiers were also mad at their government who gave them no work. In essence, the government had no work, because it had no infrastructure or economy of which to handle the masses returning home. The Soldiers refused to go back to the countryside to be mere farmers and live on the edge of existence, so the Socialists decided to change their revolutionary scheme. The Socialists, enemies initially with the Capitalist soldiery, as they called them, decided to forge a friendship on common grounds against the Italian government. The socialist were awaiting a revolutionary vehicle to provide them an opportunity. What better friend was there than a friend armed to the teeth ( an expression to mean “heavily armed”). Therefore, it was the political left and the political right forming an alliance, according to some, or non-political affiliated, according to others. Whatever the case may be, the capitalists and the socialist forged a united front against the government. Fascism was waiting to be born.
The socialist saw a potential for a revolution movement, but had no movement to do this. So what happened was the socialist groups organized groups of veterans. Out of this process of “binding” came the term Fascistico – “Groups of veterans.” The word was an association. The Fascist ( groups of the political right and the political left of Italy) chose the title because veterans groups wore black shirts – that is the special operations forces, who had come back heavily decorated and possessing the most weapons. Phrases such as “we lost all our friends and we are mad,” illustrated frustration toward the world at large. The entire point of the exercise was to point out the soldiers, the people of the war, were the Old Italian peasantry. They came home to a government devoid of wealth, unfit to help them – they turned this realization into anger. The Marxist Socialist was always looking for a vehicle to fulfill Marxist theory and prediction of world revolution, and the two united to form a third alternative – Fascism.
The symbology of Fascist came from the clothing of the more advanced military section of the Italian military. The Special Italian Forces wore uniforms that consisted of black shirts. The word Fascists, black shirts, and the reality of – “ the soldier peasants – brought into existence the term Fascist. All that was left for a legitimizing of the word was an ideology. The Socialist, non-Socialist, reformist-Socialist all pitched into write, create and normalize Fascism – the Fascist doctrine.
Summery: Soldiers came back pissed, no work and the socialist saw them as the vehicle to rise to power, and they had the weapons. So mobilizing the forgotten veterans, that lived in a society that was primitive lead to a process that created a term and then was intellectualized as an ideology.
What was left was a need to establish a Hero Leader to lead this New Movement and some Intellectuals to define its Doctrine
Suggested Reading: Because "fascism" (used generically to cover National Socialism as well) is uniformly identified with war, race hatred, mass murder, and oppression of "workers," students are urged to read the literature on these features found in "Marxist" regimes. See S. Courtois, et. al., The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression (Harvard University Press, 1999) and F. Furet, The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century (Chicago University Press, 1999).
The History of Fascism: The beginning of the 20th century featured war and revolution. The Great War (1914-1918) was the most devastating war in history until that time. The revolutions that followed (the Bolshevik , the Fascist  and the National Socialist ) gave the specific character to the century. The Bolshevik revolution was very singular. It was predicated on an ideology that anticipated an international revolution in an advanced industrial environment, in which the proletariat (the urban working class) constituted the majority of the population. In fact, the revolution in Russia took place in a retrograde industrial environment, in which less than 7 percent of the work force was urban proletariat (for Marx, there was no such thing as a "rural proletariat"). In Germany, where a much larger proportion of the population was "proletarian," the revolution that manifested itself was both anti-Marxist and nationalist (and yet one of the major ideologues of Nazism, Ludwig Woltmann, was originally an internationally recognized Marxist, and many Nazi leaders had been Marxist revolutionaries). Neither post-World War I Italy, nor Czarist Russia, satisfied the conditions for a Marxist revolution. The Fascist revolution was a revolution in a retarded economic environment (like Russia), that was fueled by nationalist (like Germany) and industrializing impulse (like Lenin's NEP and Stalin's "socialism in one country")--features that seem to typify revolutions in the 20th century.
The First World War seems to have created conditions characterizing revolutions of the 20th century. It provided the disequilibrating conditions necessary for fundamental social and political change. Large masses were drawn off from their traditional residences, detaching them from their traditional values and customary behaviors. Rising expectations were thwarted. Large numbers of intellectuals were alienated, and provided the dislocated a transfer culture (a set of beliefs that anticipated a radical change in the social and political order). The security forces in all three systems were alienated from the established regime.
In Italy, Benito Mussolini (1883-1945) had served as the political and intellectual leader of the Italian Socialist Party (1912-1914) until the crisis of the First World War led him to separate from the party and opt for intervention on the side of the Allies. After serving as a combat soldier, being wounded, and returning to civilian life, Mussolini (in 1919) organized the Fascist movement in order to (1) protect the interests of the veterans; (2) assure Italy its spoils of victory; and (3) create the conditions for Italy's entrance into the circle of the Great Powers. The opposition between Mussolini (and his followers) originated in the differences between those who wanted Italy to become involved in the war and those who did not (the organized socialists). After victory the animosity between the two sides increased in acts of violence.
Fascist slogans emphasized industrial development in order to provide the conditions for Italy's accession to the status of a Great Power. At first, the development would take place under authoritarian auspices, but liberal economic modalities (1922-1925). After 1925, the developmental program was state dominated. The Corporative State was identified with the economic, political and military development of a modern Italy that would resist the impostures of the advanced industrial countries (the United States, England and France).
In trying to "understand" (in terms of social science?) the rise of Fascism (or any other revolution), some have chosen to select "moral crisis" as the fundamental cause.
The Moral Crisis. It has been argued by some well-respected persons that the rise of Fascism was to be understood in terms of a "moral crisis"--with Fascism representing a kind of evil as opposed to Marxism and liberalism (supposedly animated by "Enlightenment values." Why would we be persuaded that such was the case? Was it what Fascists said that confirmed the diagnosis? Do we have surveys that tell us that Fascists rejected morality? How do we collect evidence to support our claim that the rejection of "the idea of liberty" was the cause of Fascism? Most commentators have ultimately become uncertain of the strength of such an interpretation. The result has been to reduce the issue of morality into a Psychological Disorder. Most of this discussion turned on Freudian interpretations and is (or was) as interesting and convincing as psychoanalysis in considered scientifically established. Whatever one makes of the attempt to make Fascism the consequence of psychological disorder, one result was that Fascism was never treated seriously as an ideological system. Marxism and Leninism were considered moral, coherent, and plausible, not requiring a psychological explanation. No one even considered the possibility that Fascists may have been normal. Fascist ideology was dismissed as rationalizations for either moral or psychological impairments. This was rarely if ever done when trying to "understand" Marxism or Marxism-Leninism.
Topics: Revolution in General
Summery of Fascist Revolution
Paradigmatic, it characterizes revolutions in a constructive matter, to make sense of something.
Left-wing, reactionary, Right-wing revolution does not make sense. But it makes sense to see variations on that theme.
Nationalist Socialist Revolution: Official name of Hitler’s revolution.
Lenin called his Fascist revolution officially “Socialist”
Socialism is not a word to use because calling something socialist is not definitive.
USA Democratic Party: Distribution sentiment, take from the rich and give to the war.
Fascism: Economy would achieve a certain plateau of productivity. Marx did not like this? Because if economy is achieving its goal a revolution cannot take place, so a good economy is not good for Marx theory.
(Marx) Goal: culture would be the satisfaction of human needs – Official Marx Rhetoric to introduce a moral revolution.
More and more wealth is concentrated in fewer and fewer hands. Why Capitalist is anarchic, it is Darwinian will, the survival of the fittest.
Definition: ideology is used to refer to a given constellation of beliefs (description and normative) which, taken together, have significant implications for a wide range of conduct. An ideology implies a way of life . It is a conceptual frame of reference which provides criteria for choice and decision by virtue of which the major activities of an organized community are governed. This may be called the normative, for this section on fascism.
Gregor believes this is a common usage and ordinary understanding of the definition of ideology, which is unobjectionable. [Here, he does not address the teleological connotative descriptiveness associated with its meaning, by some intellectuals.]
Gregors adds stipulations to the term ideology for his work on Ideology and Fascism. They are:
(1) An explicit value system, supported by argument, accompanied by (2) a relative coherent system of generalizations [bold words are my emphasis] about nature, society, and man to which a group appeals to justify the issuance of social and political directives, prescriptions and proscriptions, as well as (3) the formal and informal directives, prescriptions, and proscriptions themselves.
Gregor then categorized three forms or components of ideology.
The first component of ideology, as it is here understood, can be identified as a social and political philosophy, a fairly rigorous and coherent body of argued judgment concerning nature, society, and man which has normative implications. This philosophical component of ideologies has a detached and intellectual quality. It is formulated in reasoned guise and attempts to meet minimal requirements of significant discourse. Its specific distingishment trait is its normative potential.
Speculative social and political philosophies tend to be deceptively descriptive. Argument sequences seem to be concerned with the nature and origin of the universe, society, or man. The philosopher, as a consequence, appears to be preoccupied with the issuance of descriptive utterances different from those issued by the natural scientist only in their more inclusive scope and evident lack of quantitative precision. But for the speculative social and political philosopher, such a collection of propositions is obscurely related to a set of normative judgments. The ability to negotiate the transit between descriptive and normative propositions is what distinguishes speculative social and political philosophy from political science as science. Ideally, the natural scientist and the political scientist qua political scientist are concerned with description, classification, and explanation. They are concerned with descriptive or definitional propositions employed in the articulation of typologies, adequate descriptions, theory construction, and fruitful explanations. In their capacity as scientists, the natural scientist and the political scientist are not concerned, in principle, with what the universe, society, and man should be. Their preoccupation is adequate description and classification, competent explanation, and effective prediction. In contrast, the social and political philosopher or ( as he is commonly referred to) the political theorist is intent upon providing standards of rectitude—serious, sober, and insistent criteria governing approbation and disapprobation, and evaluations of right and wrong. In this sense speculative social and political philosophers or political theorists are a sub-group of practicing moralists.
[ mjm Note: Socrates was interested on defining, discovering and exploring the question of what is good and what is bad – but this did not define him as a practicing moralist]
Calculated to Persuasive rather than cognitively convince.
The Second component of ideologies is doctrine: a relatively loose constellation of assumptions, generalizations, and judgments about the general nature and the dynamics of social reality. These are conjoined with negative evaluations of the past and present which, together with some conceptions of a desired eventual state of affairs, provide a general guide to contemporary actions. Doctrine differs from speculative social and political philosophy in that it values commitments are tacitly assumed rather than argued, and by the fact that the focus of its concerns are exigencies of local and contingent character. Doctrinal ideas, taken by themselves, display only rudimentary internal coherence, and are characterized by high emotional salience. Doctrinal statements are calculated to persuade rather than cognitively convince. In general, doctrine is the leading edge of a social and political philosophy that has become an ideology. Doctrine finds its way into propaganda pamphlets and undergraduate surveys. It is usually the product of a number of apprentice talents. Social and political philosophy is characteristically the product of a master hand, or of a master guild of severely restricted membership. Marxism, as a social and political philosophy, was a product of the genius of Karl Marx. Fascism, as a social and political philosophy, was essentially the product of the genius of Giovanni Gentile. Marxism and Fascism as doctrines, on the other hand, were products of many hands. At what point doctrine becomes speculative social and political philosophy is much disputed, and the arguments need not be entered into here. Generally, the qualitative difference between social and political philosophy and social and political doctrine are so manifest that one can rest content with intuitive distinctions. That Lenin is not Marx and that Mussolini is not Gentile is evident in everything that Lenin and Mussolini wrote.
The Third component of ideologies is composed of formal and informal imperatives issues as codified law or represented in group sentiment and support by formal and informal sanction. This final component of ideological systems includes legislation, precepts, and social sentiments, instituted and fostered through a variety of social and political agencies. They typical response to violation of a positive standard of conduct (either public sentiment or a codified law) is moral indignation of conduct and/or punishment. The formal and informal imperatives provide the rule context by virtue of which ascriptions of good and bad can be meaningfully made, culpability assigned, and extenuation forthcoming. The first order of justification for an act is a reference to law or common social practices. It is on this level that the average citizen functions. In a communistic environment, the average citizen is a good citizen because he [or she] has adapted to a specific rule-governed context. In a fascist environment he would have been an equally good citizen. The end of the World War II saw innumerable good fascist become, in a remarkably short period of time, equally good democrats or communists, depending on the doctrinal and philosophical climate which prevailed in the geographical locale in which they happened to be.
When the entire prevailing ideological system is threatened, we speak of impending revolution. Revolutions constitute sweeping and fundamental changes in political organization, social structure [sometimes] , and economic control; successful challenges to the established social and political convents whose ultimate justification was the hitherto predominate ideology. A successful revolution, therefore, marks for our purposes a major break in the continuity of philosophical development. Of course, this does not imply that revolutions are essentially or primarily cerebral, but only that “ideas have consequences.” Revolution is obviously the consequences of the intersection of a finite, if indeterminate, set of causes. Among those causes, the appeal of one rather than another ideology, its consistency and evident relevance to a given crisis situation, is no doubt of significant, if incalculable, importance. Revolution is, in general, a violent reaction to multiple dysfunctions, conjoined with the indisposition of the established elite to countenance change, create the necessary conditions for revolution. A further set of local conditions, the presence of determined insurrectionary leadership and effective political organization, among others, can provide the precipitating agencies of revolution. The substitution of an alternate legitimate rationale for a new order of society is its characteristic, most manifest, outcome.
[…] In the present context all that is necessary is the indication that the mass-based radical movements of solidarity that provide the impetus for change in our time are, in a fundamental and important sense, revolutionary. They challenge the central commitments of the late nineteenth century. Against the contractualist, individualist, and permissive capitalist ideology of the last century, the oppose the tutelary, communalist, and authoritarian socialism of our time. The generic name assigned to the latter ideologies, however, they identify themselves, is totalitarianism.
Totalitarianism ideologies provide the justification arguments in support of a type of society minimally characterized by (1) an official and ( relative to antecedent systems of political thought) highly specific ideology based upon a radical rejection of some aspects of the past and chiliastic claims for the future, (2) a unitary mass movement of solidarity, hierarchically organized as a single party under the authoritarian leadership of a charismatic (or pseudocharismatic) leader and a directive and tutelary elite, (3) a technologically conditioned near-monopoly of the means of communication and coercion, and (4) centralized direction, under bureaucratized control, of the entire economy.
One of the central theses of this book will be that paradigmatic Fascism was the first, and remains perhaps the only, fully matured ideological rational for the totalitarian systems of the twentieth century. While Leninism could, for some considerable time, be reconsidered an extension of liberalism and “radical democracy,” Fascism from its inception was self-characterized as antiparliamentarian, antimajortarian, and explicitly totalitarian. The early and lifelong political ideal of Marx and Engels was a “democratically constituted state,” a Marxist ideal later characterized by Hans Kelson as a “perfected democracy” governed by the “majority principle.” As late as 1919, an astute a commenter as Bertrand Russell could still insist that “orthodox socialist are content with parliamentary democracy in the spear of government…” the Marxist of our time never tire of characterizing their system of government and the rational that subtends it as “truly democratic.”
[ Note: Direct democracy, has its base function as allowing “all people” directly elect their officials –“throughout the entire land.” Since the United States of America does not run a direct democracy there was no need to discuss it here. The idea behind the restriction of the framers of the USA constitution believed a more balanced government could be achieved by incorporating three major systems of government used in history. Direct democracy can be associated only with the House of Representatives, as a part of the tripartite government system of the United States of America: The Office of the President, kingship, the Congress, socialist representation, and the House of Representatives, direct democracy. Recently the Supreme Court has been raised to a lineal fourth part for a quartile system of government. However, this has been a questioned as all significant law changes are vested in the three major branches which can overthrow ultimately anything the Supreme Court stipulates as a ruling. Since Marx’s system is geared toward the implement of “power from below” we understand fully the reason why Democracy, the word itself, needed a reinvention in terminology. America has never been a democracy – the word means nothing significant, but only in its genitive sense].
The fixing of an adjectival qualifier like democratic to a social and political philosophy is, of course, never a substitute for serious analysis, the self-characterization of Marxist political ideas as truly democratic is sufficient to indicate that Marxists of sundry times and places sought to distinguish their democracy from that of the prevalent “ bourgeois democrats.” But whatever the analysis, and whatever the extent of legitimate skepticism in the face of Marxist, particularly Leninist, protestations of democratic ideals, that fact remains that Marxism in all its variant forms has identified itself as “ democratic.” Lenin’s anarcho-syndicalist State and Revolution is a sincere, in unconvincing, statement of democratic purposes. “We establish as our final aim,” Lenin insisted, “the liquidation of the state, i.e., of any sort of organized and systematic constraint… [We] are convinced that … all necessity for the coercion of men in general will disappear, all necessity for the subordination of one man to another, of one part of the population to another part…” And Alfred Meyer could recently reaffirm, “Democracy, in its most radical, anarchistic form, constitutes part of the ideal society toward Lenin and most other Marxists were striving.”
Leninism as a social and political philosophy constitutes, at best, a confused and confusing rational for the totalitarianism of Soviet and Chinese communist society. The practice of Soviet society stands in flagrant violation of the professed ideals of Leninism. Only specious and tortuous argument can give the semblance of consistency to the ideological system. The comparison of ideals of classical Marxism and the enactments which provide form and substance to Soviet society remains a source of continuous embarrassment to contemporary Leninists. The “democratic centralism” which imparts the hierarchical organization to the minoritarian Communist Party was initially a tactic devised to meet the exigencies of an autocratic and oppressive social and political environment. That Leninism has succeeded in making a virtue of necessity and has elevated the Party to the status of the prime institute of political domination and control remains a source of real theoretical discomfort to thinking Marxists. Rosa Luxembourg, one of the foremost Marxists of the turn of the century, felt that the Leninist conception of the party constituted a betrayal of the essentials of Marxism, but contemporary Leninists have been forced to make the Leninist conception central to their program for the realization of Marxism.
Use state as a variable here when reading this. What word concept can one replace for the word state?
Lenin maintained “so long as the state exists there is no freedom. When there is freedom there will be no state” [ note: state is not defined, and is a general statement; what is being argued here is all groups that gather around and form communities, and/or multiple interdependent communities form larger edifices of populations, class struggle will always exist – therefore, contemporary Leninist had first argued that a state was predisposed to dictatorship, class struggle will always exist, so one class will be suppressed, and the state and dictatorship could not exist ‘one without the other. Then later they added in a discrepancy] […] but now, “ for the first time in history, a state has taken shape which is not a dictatorship on any one class, but an instrument of society as a whole, of the entire people.” For contemporary Leninists the state is “the organ expressing the will of the whole people,” and, “will remain long after the victory of the first phase of communism.” These evident discrepancies have not escaped the attention of contemporary revolutionary Marxists. The Chinese communist contend.
The state is a weapon of class struggle, a machine by means of which one class represses another. Every state is the dictatorship of a definite class. So long as the state exist, it cannot possibly stand above class or belong to the whole people…The fact that Khrushchev has announced the abolition of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviet Union and advanced the thesis of the “state of the whole people” demonstrates that he has replaced the Marxist-Leninist teachings on the state by bourgeois falsehoods.
Soviet Leninism had proved manifestly incapable of producing a justificatory rationale for some of the most significant social and political developments featured in the revolutions that characterize our time. In this sense it is far less instructive than Fascism for understanding those revolutions which have been consistently nationalistic, or for understanding our epoch, which has become increasingly totalitarian. Therefore, the search for a sustained and consistent rationale for totalitarian nationalism must be sought not in the pages of Marx or Lenin, but in those of Gentile and Mussolini. Leninists are more preoccupied with explaining away than explaining, or even justifying, the totalitarian and nationalist features of the societies they govern. As the tutelary, pedagogic, enterprisory, and directive functions of the state increase and become the identifying features of the simple development dictatorships or totalitarianisms of our century, the Leninists insist upon the ultimate “withering away” of the state. That this “withering away” has been discretely postponed for “perhaps an entire historic epoch” documents the theoretical tension that has developed between Leninist doctrinal commitment and Leninist practice. Similarly, as the fraternity if socialist nations is increasingly riven by manifestly national interests, and as nationalism reveals itself as one of the most dynamic contemporary forces, Leninists expend an increasingly amount of energy certifying their theoretical commitment to internationalism and make remarkable little effort to vindicate the admonitions to “ socialist patriotism” now embodied in the Decalogue of the “Builders of Communism.”
[ Note: Marx’s and Engels’ goal was Communism was to rule the world, without the concept of class identification. Nationalism, which in my historical writings, has always existed, remains a constant threat and barrier to Marx and Engels’ vision. An example of China, under Mao tried to suppress the history of the Chinese people, but people living in China kept their histories hidden from the police forces and the government, and went underground. Regardless of breaking laws, the forces of memory and looking to the past stood strong with people who identified their self-worth with heritage, with ancestry, and with knowledge. Mao finally came to a conclusion that education relied on telling of the past in texts, and this speared on ‘curiosity,’ which of course killed the ‘cat,’ so to speak. After Mao, eventually the Chinese were allowed slowly to recover their heritage, ancestry and past – and finally restore the heroes of their history to public places of worship. Therefore, the classical Marxists had to rethink or make-up excuses to communicate to their constituency how the final stage of communism would come about. Deleting everyone’s memory, be it by forcing illiteracy, or by mind-control, was more difficult then imagined on paper]
That fascism as an ideological system has been the object of so little serious analysis is curious. Now, more than a generation after passing of pragmatic Fascism, George Mosse can justifiably maintain that “Fascism has been neglected movement,” and Hugh Seton-Watson can persuasively add that “the essence of Fascism is still elusive.”
The prewar neglect of Fascism was in large part the result of the union of ignorance and bias—understandable under the circumstances that prevailed when Fascism was an active threat to national existence, cherished institutions, and political predilections. Immediately prior to, and during World War II, Fascism was simply equated with National Socialism and charged with every absurdity, every infamy, and every caricature that could be legitimately or illegitimately associated with the political notions of Adolf Hitler. For some time, for example, it was common for commentators to charge that the racial doctrines of Fascism were “clumsy imitations” of National Socialist racism. Evan as careful a postwar and contemporary scholar as Ernst Nolte could conclude that by the end of his political career Mussolini, and consequently Fascism, had adopted “in toto Hitler’s political race doctrine.”
The first judgment, that the racial doctrine of Fascism was an imitation of National Socialist doctrine, although partially, and in a quailed sense, true, was made at the expense of the actual historic doctrine and it obscures the relevance of Fascist racial doctrine to more contemporary ideologies. The second proposition, that Mussolini fully accepted Hitler’s racial doctrines, is simply false.
Only recently has the more judicious assessment of both Fascism and National Socialism led to the awareness that
Because neither Fascism nor National Socialism has been thoroughly analyzed, we lack sound definitions of either and frequently confuse the two. Only the ignorant still think that Socialism and Communism, much though they have in common, are one and the same thing. But even serious scholars are liable to refer to “German Fascism,” and to use Fascism and National Socialism interchangeably.
Only the abatement of passion that followed the passing of Fascism as an international threat made possible the more objective and accurate study of Fascism as a political phenomenon.
Ch. 3. One the Meaning of “Meaning” and “Truth.” Page 42
Ch. 4. On Semantics and Syntactics. Page 77
“The meaning of a word is its use in the language.” – Ludwig Wittgenstein.
Meaning and truth are the most abused words in our language. – (paraphrase: A.J. Gregor).
Various meanings: C. E. Osgood, G.J. Suci, and P.H. Tanenbaum attempt to summarize the various meanings of “meaning:”
1) meaning as characterized by the formal or structural relations of signs to other signs ( rather than denotative meaning of the signs themselves) in the ruled-governed relations of a language (syntactical meaning); 2) denotative, referential, or designative meaning (semantic meaning); and 3) the relation of signs to psychosociological situations and behaviors (pragmatic meaning).
Syntax concerns itself with formal or structural aspects of language: the formation rules that specify the catalogue of available signs, indicate what combinations of signs are permissible as well formed sentences, and transformation rules – those rules that govern which signs can be substituted for alternate signs without changing the meaning or truth of a sentence and which tell us which sentences may be derived from others. A syntactical concern ideally occupies itself with the formal properties of sentences rather than their descriptive content. It will be restricted to a study of formation and transformation rules, activities which identify prototypic sentences, the form of true sentences’ and their permissible derivations.
Semantics, in turn, concerns itself with those implicit or explicit rules that make it possible to assign descriptive or designative meaning to signs and sign-complexes and exhibit the truth conditions for empirical assertions.
Pragmatics, finally, directs its attention to the investigation of language as a human activity, not only its specific cognitive uses, but also its emotional, volitional, and other essentially private psychological effects. Pragmatics also concerns itself with action, and outcomes which obtain on the occasion of linguistic use.
This triune typology seems not only to characterize the categories to which “meaning” can be assigned, to illuminate most of the characteristic uses of ordinary language, but to follow the simulative and explicative usage suggested by semiotics (or semiology), the sciences of signs , as well.
Truth, in turn, has entertained a similar multiplicity of meanings. It has been understood 1) to signify a relationship between an utterance and an eternal and immutable “form.”’ 2) to signify a state of mind, an intuition, or a demonstration; 3) to refer to the “coherence” or logical consistency of a body of propositions; and finally 4) to signify a relationship between an utterance and some “state of affairs.”
Expressions like “ Do you have any idea what nuclear proliferation means? and “ Did you understand the meaning of the Communist Manifesto?
Truth can be linked to synthetic claims ( ref. page 46). What is the meaning of his presidency? John Doe is a racist. The office of the chief executive is a position of racism – for all.
“What is the meaning of his election?” might constitute a simple personal lament, the issuance of an expressive statement which calls for no response, but is calculated to elicit from us a doleful sign of a lugubrious “Oh God!” What might be requested of us on such an occasion is not so much an answer to a cognitive query, but emphatic commiseration.”
In effect, if we recognize a question about meaning to be cognitive [the Socratic way] rather than expressive, we attempt to search out some indication of the public function of the sign in a specific sign vehicle, or the public of a sign complex itself, in some reasonably specific context. Knowing something of their public function, we would know something of the rules governing their intersubjective meaning and the conditions which might warrant the truth. [ Note: This is why lefties distain the Socratic method, as the process of his enquiry can uncover the meaning behind emotive utterances, it can reveal motive.]. […] Badly formulated and loosely jointed arguments, freighted with obscure, vague, and ambiguous meaning stung into exotic sentences – whatever their noncongitive functions – do little to assist in the intellectual enterprise.
Implicit in such suggestions is a distinction between linguistic competence and linguistic performance. We are all lamentably familiar with gross confusion which result from the failure to felicitously employ the language. Locutionary acts can be faulted, in fact and in principle, in a variety of ways. They can be undone by dispositions (entertained for whatever reason) to obscure, confuse, titillate, gull, incense, and manipulate. They can be faulted by psychic disabilities such as stupidity, disinterest, fallibility, impaired perception, as well as by intercultural and interpersonal contextual variation, socialization, and tacitly held presuppositions and auxiliary assumptions. Attempts at semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic rigor are calculated to produce criteria for characterizing linguistic competence -- ideally independent of such extraneous dispositional, psychological, and contextual variables.
Some political scientist’s agree: analytic truths, assertions whose truth is determined by a consideration of sign meanings, rather than any observations made on the world.
One standard use of the term “true” is that ascription made to “logical truths,” truths determined by the rules governing language use itself.
Synthetic truths: truths warranted by observation made on the object world.
Concreta: directly observable physical entities ( like People, tables, chairs).
Constructs: constructed entities not directly observable, but which are characterized by observable properties( objects like “the state,” “the government,” “ classes,” “class-orientated parties,” “ society,” “stratified societies,” and so forth).
Theoretical entities: which are not directly observable, but are only possessed of indirectly observable properties ( like Freud’s “Id” or “Superego”).
Analytical truth: is established by inspecting the logical properties of assertions in which they appear. Only descriptive (i.e., empirical or synthetic) truth claims can be verified by observation.
Analytic claims can be verified by inspecting their linguistic properties.
Analytic philosophers have sought to provide basic language which would be maximally unproblematic and provide for maximally realizable truth ascription. (M&P, 59). We no longer conceive geometry, mathematics, and uninterpreted calculi, for example, as informing us about the world. Such linguistic entities are analytic—they do not inform us about the world or its properties. Thus their truth is determined by procedures other than making observations upon the world and things in it. They are true by “definition.” Only synthetic, or empirical, truth claims are warranted by observation—and such observations have proven to be most reliable when undertaken under circumstances that are minimally context and language dependant. For that reason analytic philosophers have attempted to formulate artificial sense-data, phenomenalistic or thing-predicate languages—to maximally reduce context and language dependence.
[C]haracterizing the “meaning” of the simplest sign in our language is a complex affair. We can teach the color-blind person the referential meaning of the term red by providing him with suitable unproblematic observations (meter reading and so forth). We can teach the color blind person the systemic meaning of “red,” by showing how, in theory, wave frequencies can be understood to give rise to the perception of red among color-normal persons. In effect, we can provide him with cognitive appreciation if such sign use – even though we cannot convey to him the private psychological meaning of red – the personal internal reaction to exogenous stimuli.
Objectivity, we learn language by living in the world, we mimic and learn words and definitions by way of examples.
Ultimately specific and public pragmatic considerations determine what will constitute a warrant for any epistemic claim.
Utility: a special class of pragmatic concern.
Vindicate: criteria governing truth ascription.
Criteria are justified by the purposes they serve.
Binding: Elementary principals of logic since Socratic Times – if one wants to survive, he must accept some material knowledge claims ( some “facts” and “laws”) as reliable guides to survive.
Semantic meaning: we attempt to convey the referential meaning of a term—for example, when we attribute an attitude, a disposition, or a sentiment to an individual or group.
Science directs its attention to referential and systemic meanings (essentially semantic and syntactic concerns) – the “signification” of terms, complex terms, and the propositions which host them. The significance of such terms, as long as one is preoccupied with “psychological significance,” is of minimal scientific concern. Only when such “significance” betrays itself in public actions, becomes subject to explanation and prediction, is it of scientific concern.
Meaning, truth, and Linguistic Precision: Confirmation of such insights always awaits public confirmation – the satisfaction of public evidence conditions.
Reliability maximally enhances man’s ability to understand and control his environment thorough the attainment of systematic and intersubjective knowledge, defined as 1) warranted conclusions about the more or less extensive uniform conditions under with natural events take place and 2) valid conclusions within the domain of formal concerns. Science has most effectively met the requirements governing knowledge enterprise. Aestheticians, moralists, and theologians are, nonetheless, enjoined by the same obligations. If a theologian conceives himself as contributing to the knowledge enterprise, it is incumbent upon him to convey meaning and offer criteria for the admissibility of his utterances as true. He has made the knowledge claim – and thus has assumed the burden of producing its warrant. He is not obliged to meet our standards, but he must meet some intersubjective standards. His efforts must, in effect, be pedagogical. He is obliged (as is the Laplander, the Bedouin, the Marxist, or the anti-Semite) to teach us how he uses the language, i.e., what he conceives the rules of felicitous use might be. If the putative referents of his assertions are “supernatural” entities of whatever kind, he must have some determinate way of conveying the meaning of the signs he employs. If he wishes to count as a legitimate, as distinct from a counterfeit, warrant for their truth.
Protocol sentences in science.
George Mandler and William Kessen characterize the issue of non-discriminating variables in language domains:
However complex theories may be, they all rest on statements of evidence, on the protocol sentences of a science. This is so homely and obvious that several important implications of the special nature of protocol statements may be missed….Human communication, and most especially scientific communication, depends on the existence of a shared language about which there is relatively little argument, a foothold in ignorance which will permit us to start an investigation. Just as the common language of a cultural group serves communication amount members of the group, so the protocol language of a science is the shared reference point for systematic research. It is not putting it too strongly to maintain that protocol language, the statement of relations among terms in the basic vocabulary, the irreducible minimum of empirical science….[Protocol] statements represent the end point of intersubjective agreement—whatever arguments may exists on more abstract levels of scientific language, there must be no argument about protocol statements or else a science cannot exist.
The analytic philosophers, as Gregor understands their motive, was to establish what might constitute a unproblematic evidence condition governing material or empirical truth ascription.
We employ language to express, to perform, to tender knowledge claims and to persuade.
Natural Languages are vehicles for communication which, employing a set of public signs or symbols arranged in accordance with syntactic, and governed by semantic, rules, permit meaningful exchanges between language users.
Semantic Rules for the specification of meaning effectively operate when signs appear in syntactically ordered linguistic entities called “ well formed sentences.” (M& P page 81)
Semantically pronouns, prepositions, adverbs, articles, and conjunctions, “I,” “on,” “the,” “and,” “no,” “all,” and “but” are meaningful terms and yet have no specific referents, they refer to no specific conceivable extralinguistic states of affairs. (M& P page 84)
Deductive Logic [ political-linguistic-scientific reference here] : a special class of intralinguistic signs has been the subject of scrutiny since antiquity, for such signs govern the ways in which parts of sentences and sentence ) or the propositions they express) can be related and truth status assigned independently of the meaning of any descriptive sign which occurs in them—and consequently independent of an experience in the world.
Two kinds of statements which can be assigned truth status (“truth status” understood to cover the truth, falsity and indeterminate status of a statement).
(1) statements whose meaning and truth are a function of their relationship to utterances invoked by some extralingiustic state of states of affairs; and (2) some statements whose truth is a function of their interlinguistic “form,” the syntactical rules governing the connectives and signs employed in them.
Statements like “ The Soviet Union is a one party state,” and “china is a dictatorship” require, for their cognitive truth, a specification of semantic meaning—and an indication of the truth conditions governing their responsible assertion as well, for nothing in the signs “Soviet Union” or China” implies “ a set of related elements.” Contingent truths concern the world as we experience it; they assert something of it. Such truths, identified as “synthetic,” or “descriptive,” contribute to funded knowledge and are required to refer, directly or indirectly, to experience as their ultimate warrant.
Truth, Meaning, Believing, and Moralizing. These terms refer to profound and difficult concepts. It is beyond the responsibility of this course to attempt their explication. For convenience, we will use the term “truth” to refer to sentences (propositions) that meet language domain (empirical and logical) variant “truth criteria” (simple and complex perceptions in the first and transformation rules in the second). A brief review of the variety of meanings attached to “meaning” is provided to sensitize students to the vagueness and ambiguity of language. “Believing” will be distinguished from “knowing” simply because the distinction is not often made. The entire notion of morality and ethics is very briefly considered simply because much of ideology is ethical in principle and pretends to be moral in act. Students are urged to take substantial courses in each and every one of these conceptual areas.
Background of the 21st Century. The present is the intersection of trends that find their origin in the “industrial revolution” (roughly dating from the beginning of the 18th century), itself the product of the “scientific revolution” having roots in the Renaissance (traditionally understood to have begun about the time of the fall of Constantinople in 1453) and the Enlightenment (the eighteenth century). The entire period was characterized by intensive intellectual activity: the erosion of the Church domination, the establishment of the political state, the rise of scientific thought, and inventions that led to rapid substitution of machine for human labor power. The industrial revolution fundamentally changed the relationship between political communities (cultures, states, empires, and so forth). For our purposes two phenomena of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are of principle significance: (1) the rise of surrogate (often political) religions; and (2) revolutionary political movements animated by ideologies that have all the properties of surrogate religions: i.e., the appeal to sacred books; the presence of charismatic leaders and martyrs; the employment of devotional rituals and symbols; and commitment to death on the part of its believers.
Revolution: the term “revolution” (like all terms in social science) is poorly or idiosyncratically defined. Charles Johnson’s book on Revolutionary Change is a good place to start (and you will learn something about how social scientists think). We will treat “revolutions” as “changes in the constitutionality established social and political order through the employment or the threat of the employment of violence.” The talk will be of “values” and “institutions” and the discharging of “roles” by “role-holders.” Major focus will be on educational and security institutions within an economic system (which provides the wherewithal for social life). The principle form of revolution with which we will deal will be mass revolutions that bring major consequences in their train (as distinct from “palace coups,” military dictatorship, and guerrilla insurrection). The “modern revolutions” of which we shall speak are exemplified in the Fascist, National Socialist, and the Marxist variants that characterized the 30th century. Much of the mainstream thought has shown itself to be fundamentally mistaken with respect to the realities of the 20th and the first intimations of the 21st centuries (i.e., consider radical Islam).
Modern Revolutions: the American and the French revolutions will be treated as the first exemplars of “modern revolutions.” While it is evident that modern revolutions can be understood in a multiplicity of ways, our focus will be on (1) nationalism, (2) development, (3) territorial expansion, and (4) the enhancement of military power. Throughout, the emphasis will be on (5) the ideological rationale sustaining the entire process (at least since the time of the American Revolution).
“I very rarely issue truths, I’m not a prophet.” - A.J. Gregor.
Subject matter is very controversial. Not on Berkeley Campus, everyone is locked into one subject matter. Marx cool, everyone else fools.
Claims are universal, everyone make claims; but ask yourself: how does he/she know that? Say, I have to investigate, look this up. Responsible to Convictions…
Essay: “What do you mean by”
Language is used as a social activity; it is not a way to communicate the truth. Like apes, it is a grunt; most of social language is meaningless. Like: How is it going? What does that mean? It is a linguistic gesturing? People in general, communicate to each other in grunts and groans; we are our habits of social entertainment.
Paradigmatic: it characterize revolutions in a constructive matter, to make sense of something.
What does Socialism Mean?
Socialism: What does it mean? “I do not have a clue” – A.J. Gregor.
Gregor intends, Socialism is not a word to use because calling something socialist is not definitive. Socialism means what one wants it to mean. Using the term Socialism is fine, as long as you stay consistent with the terms.
What ever Hitler believed in regards to what Socialism meant to him, doesn’t mean a definition of the word existed? Racial democracy – Hitler called his social movement.
“ I have no clue?” – A.J. G. Communism meant different things to Lenin, Stalin, Pol Pot, and others.
Elementary epistemology: Language people use
Founding fathers did not want to use the term Democracy, they did not know what it meant. They wanted use the term a Republic.
“I do not give a definition of a revolution.” –AG
No one can legislate a meaning for you. If you use them in an inconsistent fashion, then one has problems.
Most language is a social tool – it is entertainment. Better know how to define your term.
Epistemology is a person or anyone making claims in social terms – ask how does he or she, or how do I know that is true?
Provocative, is not an argument style to define a truth. It is a tool to provoke, a statement to make.
Moral conjoiners, an argument that is immoral or indecent? Is that factual or a statement?
Provoking violence or violence to substantially change a constitution of a state.
Key elements to Revolution.
Disregards facts, and use emotions, play to the morals of the target base.
Morals are personal and not based on a universal preference.
(a) Must tap moral sentiments’ of the target base.
(b) Words, that provoke, like in the communist manifesto: “oppression.” Words have this quality, are emotive in quality – which means to get one aroused (sexually).
(c) Marx defines oppression is Das Capital.
(d) How does the capitalist control the world, or the USA? People get outraged, because they believe you are indecent and immoral.
(e) Emotive claims: Jews created all the wars in history: One has a Jewified conscious –
(g) Revolutionaries do not discuss facts, they discuss morals – this is a very powerful tool.
(h) A recourse, is “are you a racist?”
(i) End result is violence achieves results, the ‘60s motto demonstrated at UC Berkeley.
(j) Berkeley students are the most moralizing people in America – or the world for that matter.
(k) Moralizing people in the world are the most revolutionary. Can this be described as a “truism?”
(l) NAZI were a product of moralization.
(m) A set of empirical stages can describe moralization.
(n) Jay Lovstone?, -- Jews founded the communist in the USA? Or the Russia. How do we know anyone founded communism. Communism is moralization of a social tool, therefore who has the right way or the wrong way? Lenin’s final years, he remained confused.
(o) Does every capitalist want a war in Iraq? How does the invasion address the oil issue? It was already pumped out of the ground by the British and US anyway. There was no need to go there and control it. The claim that the USA went to Iraq to conquer the oil fields describes the non-factual and emotional revolutionary play on morality.
(p) 30 different societies came about in history because of a revolution. If revolutions are based solely on morals, then the people fought for something without any facts behind it. This can be explained as wanting, coveting and dreaming of something other than modernity.
(q) An example: Romanticizing the “other side of the fence,” so to speak. Moralistic people romance a time they do not live in and ask when was modernity? In the 1960s, some American’s said, “ I would love to live in China.” Well, Chinese had to eat their children during the difficult decades of the Communist regime under Mao. The Losses under Mao were of a Biblical magnitude – humongous casualties. The wanting the “other,” side of the fence was a morality of China was more better off under Communism – but there were no facts to back up the “want.” Well there were no Capitalists in China under Mao, I want to live there, many United States of American citizen’s claimed. But under the facts, the Chinese people who starved under the Communist regime, began to eat their children. People have been denied access to prime source documents such as letters, diaries and memoirs on this dismal part of history. When one see’s Hollywood actors travel to Cuba, and are staunch supporters of Fidel Castro and his regime, they never ask to live there – or want too. Ever ask why that is when those Hollywood actors claim that Cuba is more moral than the United States of America? This is a part of understanding what a revolution mentality is, and how it directly fits into the emotive state of morality.
(r) Must have imperial evidence.
(s) Patients during the Soviet period received no medial services, or physician care. Many United States of American citizens desired to live in the Communist, then Socialist state of the Soviet Union. They believed people were treated with morality, of the likes forsaken by the United States of America.
(t) Moral judgment, an empirical planning in argument to study these phenomena.
(u) Morality is relative to each one person.
(v) Morality: principles that one acts upon. A hedonist can be a moral principle to a single person, after defining a hedonist.
(w) Moral disputation. Your moral responses.
(x) A moral Claim: the Jews started communism and controlled the Soviet Union. So where is the empirical evidence?
(y) Cautionary suggestion, to consider how your claim demonstrates that someone knows something.
(z) High moral valance(emotive)
(aa) High emotional salience= Revolution discorse (emotive).
(bb) Revolution means some type of change in some sort of another, and usually involves violence.
(cc) Modern revolution followed the industrial revolution.- A.J. Gregor
(dd) Change in Revolution came during the United States of American Revolution. Some will argue that England went through this change, and have some evidence.
(ee) The American Revolution was a first and a unique description: a change in product distribution and material.
(ff) French Revolution was a violent, chaotic Revolution that never ended kingship or the nobility’s control of the people. They never fully realized what the American Revolution finally did.
(gg) Transformation of industrial revolution, aply describes the change in revolutions beginning “first” with the United States of America.
(hh) Fascism: Economy would achieve a certain plateau of productivity.
(ii) Marx did not like this? Because if economy is achieving its goal a revolution cannot take place, so a good economy is not good for Marx theory.
Industrial revolution: means that a transfer from labor power to tools, machines and from human labor. That means peasants who were on the farm – they were there sense the plebian era. For 10,000 years, the world was built by peasants – tax the peasants; the world was built on the backs’ of peasants. Now, technology created by people invented the machine, a factory, a steam powered apparatus, and intricate iron works.
It brought people together into cities; cities that were built only for the manufacturing of machines and factories.
Proletariats are people that live in cities and work for wages. In general, the Communist Manifesto has the term proletariat -- these are the dwellers in cities, and work for wages. The emotive here, are the people desiring “what is on the other side of the fence,” so to speak. They dream of a yester-year, and look back into time to create romanticism with the past.
Peasants live in the countryside, pay taxes and live off the land. They had a great life, it was egalitarian, the emotive consciousness wants to believe. In order to return to this “utopian” state of consciousnesses, a revolution must come about, most often violently, and return the (catchword) “oppressed” person (Proletariat) back to the primal lives they once led. During the middle ages, roughly three-fourths of the population was agrarian, living on some type of farm. This was where people romanced the past. Since the left-side of the brain determines the creative side, the imagination is an obvious natural occurrence to help one fantasize – away from reality. This fantasy, very much so, becomes a reality to the said person employing the left-side of the brain as the main vehicle of consciousness; and therefore results in a person living in emotive state of mind – resulting in a moral awareness. Facts mean little in this state of the brain. When under this state of the brain, suggestive comments come in slogans – easily absorbed and assimilated into the emotional catacombs of the left-side of the brain’s consciousness. Words become emotional, and more explicably entertaining. As the left side of the brain can imagine, fanaticize and therefore act out on its impulses, revolutions are easier to understand.
The population in which one makes changes. – industrial revolutions lead to people’s rights – movements in these cities.
Civil War, an industrial or an agrarian—the southerners had a better military by far, but could not produce the firearms because the North Represented the industrial side of the equation.
What America going south= agrarian
North America going north= industrial.
Principle: power projecting capability,( Iron clad arguents – destroy the whole fleet of woodships)
A capability implied by industrial revolution. How to win in wars, in dominance, power projecting capability
“Working class begins to live below subsistence.” - marx CM (paupism – destitute)
Where is the empirical realities.
Industrial arms people, with no distinguishment of a good or bad person. It arms people to win a war. Industrialized powers have power projecting capability
THE WARS of the 20th century are --motive, a foreign entity of controlling an other person’s space.
Nations want to be equal with other nations -- Clinton. Military power is a series industrial power.
What is the natural disposition? One will get an unequal power. The lesser power believes the larger power has humiliated their country sexually, the masculinity.
The third world countries feel abused and humility.
Second largest military force in the western hemisphere. – Cuba.
Third world: masculine protest. Put the children in uniform, put on a phenomenon, Why the pattern has stunt such a “feel oppressed.”
Provokes other countries to go thought a revolutionary process. This is what America does. Look at the ideological commitments, why is that Lenin was no longer a Marxist?
The revolution was going to be universal, it will evolved the all proletariat. So Lenin was about only about Russia – so he started to talk about patriotic war, his own country.
Hitler was not a nationalist, Hitler was a racist, there is a different. A nationalism:
Nationalist: an patriotic view of a preference toward a countries political system, not a view of preference toward a color of skin.
Racists are pathological—
It is not impoverishment of the people make which determines criteria for a revolution. Wow what a statement? Depression, in France, England but why did Germany go through a revolution? All had depression. But Germany?
Capitalist gave more money to the communist party than was given to the NAZI party. – USA Companies.
Lenin said t the Russians it is the great Russians that will carry the revolutionary bag – (mean we are racist, better than France, and others)
Don’t take this too seriously.
Nationalism says, you are a member of my community.
Lenin, died in 24, issued I had many mistakes, I need capitalist back – he was completely confused when he died.
Then Stalin came, said Socialism will be enforced, he would concluded; he Marxists: the communist said he was insane, and moved away from communism.
One cannot compare any two things, because no two things are alike.
Doesn’t say Treaty of Versailles was the problem for the German depression.
Philosophers who concern themselves not with the substantive propositions, the products, of science, but with the examination, analysis, and description of the language of science, occupy themselves with metascience. The Ethicist who is not concerned with issuing prescriptions and proscriptions, approbations and disapprobations, that is to say who is not concerned with making ascriptive claims are made and the truth conditions governing them, is concerned with metaethics.
Meta means base, baine, the mean.
Emotivist: (1930s, Vernon Van Dyke [Flawed book metaethics—Gregor])
Metapolitics: is a concern which commences with an analysis of the most primitive of fundamental knowledge claims upon which the edifice of political inquiry rests.
Metapolitics is concerned with the description, analysis, and justificatory norms governing the linguistic practices of those employing the language of politics and political inquiry. It is not concerned with substantively employing that language itself. It will generate no substantive truths. Everything will be pretty must the same as it was before—perhaps without confusion
It is the metalanguage in which one expresses what one wishes to say about politics and political inquiry as an object language.
Political inquiry rests upon an analytical primitive language base.
 Gregor, A. James, Ideology and Fascism, The Rational of Totalitarianism ( New York: Free Press, 1969),3.
 Gregor, A. James, Ideology and Fascism, The Rational of Totalitarianism ( New York: Free Press, 1969),3.
 Gregor, A. James, Ideology and Fascism, The Rational of Totalitarianism ( New York: Free Press, 1969),pp. 3-4.
 Gregor, A. James, Ideology and Fascism, The Rational of Totalitarianism ( New York: Free Press, 1969), 4.
 Gregor, A. James, Ideology and Fascism, The Rational of Totalitarianism ( New York: Free Press, 1969),pp. 4-5.
 Gregor, A. James, Ideology and Fascism, The Rational of Totalitarianism ( New York: Free Press, 1969),pp. 5-6.
 Gregor, A. James, Ideology and Fascism, The Rational of Totalitarianism ( New York: Free Press, 1969),pp. 6-7.
 Gregor, A. James, Ideology and Fascism, The Rational of Totalitarianism ( New York: Free Press, 1969), 7.
 Gregor, A. James, Ideology and Fascism, The Rational of Totalitarianism ( New York: Free Press, 1969), 7.
 Gregor, A. James, Ideology and Fascism, The Rational of Totalitarianism ( New York: Free Press, 1969), 8.
 Gregor, A. James, Ideology and Fascism, The Rational of Totalitarianism ( New York: Free Press, 1969),pp. 8-9.
 The Polemic on the general Line of the International Communist Movement ( Peking, 1965), p. 445. in Gregor, A. James, Ideology and Fascism, The Rational of Totalitarianism ( New York: Free Press, 1969), 9.
 Gregor, A. James, Ideology and Fascism, The Rational of Totalitarianism ( New York: Free Press, 1969),pp. 9-10.
 E. Weber, Varieties of Fascism ( New York, 1964), p. 9. Even as competent a scholar as Barrington Moore, Jr. makes this error. Vide b. Moore, “Social Origins of Dictatorships and Democracy” ( Boston, 1966), in Gregor, A. James, Ideology and Fascism, The Rational of Totalitarianism ( New York: Free Press, 1969), 11.
 Gregor, A. James, Metascience & Politics, An Inquiry into the Conceptual Language of Political Science, 2nd, ed. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2003), pp. 42-42.
 Gregor, A. James, Metascience & Politics, An Inquiry into the Conceptual Language of Political Science, 2nd, ed. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 46.
 Gregor, A. James, Metascience & Politics, An Inquiry into the Conceptual Language of Political Science, 2nd, ed. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2003), pp. 46-47.
 Gregor, A. James, Metascience & Politics, An Inquiry into the Conceptual Language of Political Science, 2nd, ed. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2003), pp. 59-60.
 Gregor, A. James, Metascience & Politics, An Inquiry into the Conceptual Language of Political Science, 2nd, ed. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2003), pp. 63-64.
 Gregor, A. James, Metascience & Politics, An Inquiry into the Conceptual Language of Political Science, 2nd, ed. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 69.
 Gregor, A. James, Metascience & Politics, An Inquiry into the Conceptual Language of Political Science, 2nd, ed. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2003), pp. 71-72.
 G. Mandler and W. Kessen, The Language of Psychology (New York: John Wiley, 1959), pp. 166f. in Gregor, A. James, Metascience & Politics, An Inquiry into the Conceptual Language of Political Science, 2nd, ed. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2003), pp. 58-59.
 Gregor, A. James, Metascience & Politics, An Inquiry into the Conceptual Language of Political Science, 2nd, ed. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 78.
 Gregor, A. James, Metascience & Politics, An Inquiry into the Conceptual Language of Political Science, 2nd, ed. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 85.
 Gregor, A. James, Metascience & Politics, An Inquiry into the Conceptual Language of Political Science, 2nd, ed. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 87.
 Gregor, A. James, Metascience & Politics, An Inquiry into the Conceptual Language of Political Science, 2nd, ed. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 89.
 Gregor, A. James, Precis no. 2, ( Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, 2007)
 Gregor, A. James, Metascience & Politics, An Inquiry into the Conceptual Language of Political Science, 2nd, ed. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 8.
 Gregor, A. James, Metascience & Politics, An Inquiry into the Conceptual Language of Political Science, 2nd, ed. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 8.
 Gregor, A. James, Metascience & Politics, An Inquiry into the Conceptual Language of Political Science, 2nd, ed. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 11.
 Gregor, A. James, Metascience & Politics, An Inquiry into the Conceptual Language of Political Science, 2nd, ed. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2003),pp. 13-14.
 Gregor, A. James, Precis no. 6, unpublished class material (Berkeley, University of California, Berkeley, 2007).